Unintended feedbacks: implications and applications for conservation by Larrosa, Cecilia
UNINTENDED FEEDBACKS: IMPLICATIONS AND
APPLICATIONS FOR CONSERVATION
CECILIA LARROSA
(MSc, Imperial College London)
A THESIS SUBMITTED
FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
DEPARTMENT OF BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES
NATIONAL UNIVERSITY OF SINGAPORE
DEPARTMENT OF LIFE SCIENCES
IMPERIAL COLLEGE LONDON
2017
Supervisors:
Professor E.J. Milner-Gulland
Assistant Professor L. Roman Carrasco
Examiners:
Assistant Professor Chisholm, Ryan Alistar
Dr Kaveh Madani, Imperial College London
Associate Professor James Watson, University of Queensland
- 2 -
Declaration of Originality
I hereby declare that this thesis is my original work and it has been
written by me in its entirety, I have duly acknowledged all the sources of
information which have been used in the thesis.
This thesis has also not been submitted for any degree in any university
previously.
Copyright Declaration
‘The copyright of this thesis rests with the author and is made available
under a Creative Commons Attribution Non-Commercial No Derivatives
licence. Researchers are free to copy, distribute or transmit the thesis
on the condition that they attribute it, that they do not use it for
commercial purposes and that they do not alter, transform or build upon
it. For any reuse or redistribution, researchers must make clear to others
the licence terms of this work’
- 3 -
Summary
Human reactions to conservation interventions can trigger unintended
feedbacks resulting in poor conservation outcomes. Understanding
unintended feedbacks is a necessary first step toward the diagnosis and
solution of environmental problems, but existing anecdotal evidence
cannot support decision-making. The aim of this PhD is to improve our
understanding of the role these unintended feedbacks play in
conservation science, and provide recommendations for incorporating
them into practice.
In chapter two, I analyse the implications these unintended feedbacks
have for conservation from a social-ecological systems perspective. I
present a conceptual framework that provides a theoretical
understanding of how conservation interventions can trigger unintended
feedbacks, and create a typology of unintended feedbacks that show
how unintended feedbacks undermine conservation efforts. I use the
typology to reflect on how best to plan for and mitigate unintended
feedbacks in conservation practice, and provide concrete
recommendations for future work.
Focusing on large-scale potential economic feedbacks based on
recommendations from chapter two, chapter three is an exploration of
potential unintended feedback effects of setting aside agricultural land
for conservation, and an assessment of their application in systematic
conservation planning to the Brazilian Atlantic Forest case study.
Results show that there is considerable potential for modelling land
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market feedbacks from conservation interventions using techniques
from other fields, such as land economics. However, I found two main
limitations for large-scale empirical applications: data availability, and
small effects on global markets. For the Brazilian Atlantic Forest,
feedback effects derived from informational rent capture were the most
relevant to the case study.
Widely used tools for conservation planning could produce misleading
recommendations if feedbacks are ignored. For example, in systematic
conservation planning, effectiveness depends partly on accounting for
natural and anthropogenic dynamics. Some dynamic conservation
planning approaches exist, but they need to be further developed, and
assessed against static approaches. In chapter four I examine the
impact of accounting for both economic and environmental feedbacks
into spatial planning for a set-aside programme in the Brazilian Atlantic
Forest. I model changes in forest connectivity and land opportunity costs
to evaluate the cost-effectiveness of the set-aside programme based on
spatial static and discrete dynamic conservation planning. Results show
that cost-effectiveness improvement for the dynamic approach was
relatively small, but varied widely with biogeographical region. However,
the proposed dynamic framework not only improved overall cost-
effectiveness, but increased informational rent capture, in so doing also
involving more municipalities in the programme.
In chapter five I apply the model developed in chapter four to multiple
policy relevant targets of Atlantic Forest restoration and provide
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recommendations for prioritising areas. In a reality of multiple targets and
objectives, the resulting map provides a starting point for priority
restoration areas based on three important considerations; potential to
improve forest connectivity, cost effectiveness, and potential to
incentivise participation through informational rent. However, the
assessment found that the cost of payment per year of set-asides for
meeting varying reforestation targets ranged between 15% and 133% of
Brazil’s annual expenditure on agricultural subsidies, making the
implementation of some of these targets highly unlikely.
This thesis identifies an urgent needed for the collection of evidence in
a structured way in order to understand the mechanisms by which
human decision-making feeds through to conservation outcomes at
different scales. Socio-economic data availability, a mismatch in scale
between data availability and prioritisation grain, and economic model
complexity present the main limitations to accounting for these
feedbacks in spatial conservation planning. Even though a dynamic
approach to spatial conservation planning does entail higher
computational requirements and transactions costs, I find the potential
benefits in terms of increased cost-effectiveness could offset these
costs. Most importantly, the analysis shows that a dynamic approach
can help decision-makers maximise the existence of informational rents
by prioritising areas with higher informational rent capture and still result
in a lower overall intervention cost. Accounting for environmental and
economic feedbacks can be a valuable tool for more evenly distributed
interventions that provide higher incentives for participation without
- 6 -
increasing intervention cost.
People adapt and respond to conservation interventions, and their
actions feed through into changes in the conservation situation itself; this
fact is something that conservationists rely on for their impact. However,
these same responses are being overlooked when they affect outcomes
indirectly through unintended feedbacks. The research undertaken for
this PhD advances knowledge on the role feedbacks play in both applied
conservation and conservation science. Showing from theory to practice
how studying and managing unintended feedbacks can improve
conservation by providing insight into the realm of possible outcomes
from planned conservation interventions.
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1. Context and problem statement
Planning conservation in a complex world
One of the central challenges faced by society is understanding and
managing complex interactions between humans and nature (Hull et al.
2015b). Even though historically conservation interventions seemed to
be at odds with other societal needs, there are multiple examples of
positive unintended consequences of conservation interventions on
people (Miller et al. 2012). However, the complex interaction between
humans and nature, when aggregated, has the potential to undermine
outcomes of planned conservation interventions, and even do more
harm than good (Polasky 2006; Jack et al. 2008). An unintended
consequence can have knock-on effects that ultimately have a feedback
effect on the intended conservation outcome.
Feedbacks play a central role in determining the outcomes of human-
nature interactions, and recent studies have started exploring methods
for monitoring and modelling feedbacks in the context of Coupled Human
and Natural Systems (Carter et al. 2014; Mayer et al. 2014; Spies et al.
2014). In conservation, evidence of perverse outcomes of conservation
interventions due to feedback effects comes mostly from theoretical
models, or is of an anecdotal nature (Armsworth et al. 2006; Polasky
2006; Spiteri & Nepalz 2006) (see chapter 2 for multiple examples).
However, this evidence is enough to highlight the need to understand
the role these feedbacks have in determining conservation effectiveness
and success (Damania et al. 2005; Lambin & Meyfroidt 2010).
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Conservation faces the challenge of preserving biodiversity and
ecosystem functions with limited access to resources (Balvanera et al.
2001; West et al. 2014). Overcoming this challenge requires transparent
assessments and cost-effective approaches to support decision making
(Ferraro & Pattanayak 2006; Laycock et al. 2013). Systematic
conservation planning is a process of identifying, prioritising and
managing conservation resources and actions to protect biodiversity and
ecosystem services (Margules & Pressey 2000a; Sarkar et al. 2006).
This approach has been widely applied in various forms, and in the past
30 years has grown to be the most important paradigm for identifying
conservation priorities and investments (Kukkala & Moilanen 2013; Boyd
et al. 2015; McIntosh et al. 2016).
Despite the benefits brought by systematic conservation planning,
various weaknesses have been identified (Ban et al. 2013; Guerrero et
al. 2013a). A key limitation of this approach is that the process and
products of systematic conservation planning tend to be static, the
underlying assumption being that time (and the conservation
intervention itself) do not affect the features being preserved or their
context beyond the intended outcome, such as other land uses (Loyola
et al. 2013; Jones et al. 2016). However, these assumptions generally
do not hold. The number of studies accounting for environmental
dynamics in spatial conservation planning is steadily growing (Faleiro et
al. 2013; Loyola et al. 2013; Tambosi & Metzger 2015; Uezu & Metzger
2016). Accounting for social dynamics, on the other hand, has been
confined to incorporating land market feedbacks within the context of the
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optimal reserve selection problem (Dissanayake & Önal 2011; Butsic et
al. 2013). This lack of inclusion of sufficient consideration of social
processes and feedbacks of the system for which the planning is
designed can contribute substantially to programme failure (Ban et al.
2013).
Limited resources: conservation and the competition for land
With increasing global population and per capita consumption, meeting
global demand for food and other natural resources whilst protecting the
environment is a major challenge (West et al. 2014). With crop demands
projected to increase by 100 – 110% from 2005 levels by 2050 (Tilman
et al. 2011), there is an urgent need to better manage agricultural land-
use change to reduce the loss of habitat and ecosystem functions, whilst
meeting a rising demand for resources (Godfray et al. 2010). However,
reconciling development and conservation does not involve simple
trade-offs. Conservation interventions that impact land use at large-
scales have the potential of becoming a market force locally and globally.
Large conservation land purchases act as a competitor in the market
having an effect on agricultural land and food prices (Schleupner &
Schneider 2010; Bakker et al. 2015), and policies that change land use
can have an effect on the price of commodities (Jantke & Schneider
2011; Villoria et al. 2013). Approaches that aim to find solutions that
reconcile conservation and development need thus to account for the
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role large-scale conservation plays in related markets to have a chance
of being successful.
Fragmentation and the preservation of biodiversity and ecosystem
services
Widespread conversion of forest to agriculture and related infrastructure
has left heavily degraded biomes across the world; 70% of the remaining
global forest is within 1 km of the forest’s edge, exposed to the effects of
fragmentation (Haddad et al. 2015). Fragmentation, the division of
habitat into smaller and more isolated fragments separated by a matrix
of the human-modified landscape, leads to long-term changes in the
structure and function of the remaining fragments (Fischer &
Lindenmayer 2007). Despite disagreement on the extent to which
fragmentation itself is detrimental for biodiversity conservation (Didham
et al. 2012; Fahrig 2013), a recent study found that habitat fragmentation
reduces biodiversity by 13 to 75% and undermines key ecosystem
functions by decreasing biomass and altering nutrient cycles (Haddad et
al. 2015). The detrimental effects of fragmentation together with the
changes in phenology, species composition and range shifts produced
by climate change are likely to result in exacerbated biodiversity decline
and extinction in the near future (Watson et al. 2013).
The best approach to preserving biodiversity and ecosystem function in
fragmented landscapes appears to be strategic: preserve key forest
remnants (Ekroos et al. 2014; Melo et al. 2013), and at the same time
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determine where and how vegetation can be restored in order to facilitate
connectivity between preserved remnants (Chazdon 2008; Howe 2014).
This strategic approach is best undertaken through the use of systematic
conservation planning. However, a systematic conservation planning
approach that ignores dynamics and feedbacks is likely to be particularly
misleading when applied to fragmented landscapes where restoration of
ecological function and conservation of biodiversity require the setting
aside of land currently in other productive uses. This is because these
are the landscapes in which the trade-offs between different land-uses
are likely to be most acute, and changes in land use in one location will
potentially have knock-on effects at the landscape scale.
2. The Brazilian Atlantic Forest
Ecological importance
The Atlantic Forest originally covered approximately 150 million
hectares, extending over a latitudinal range of around 29 degrees across
Brazil, Paraguay and Argentina (Ribeiro et al. 2009). This biome of
evergreen and seasonally-dry forests hosts thousands of endemic
species, from more than 8000 plant species to more than 650 vertebrate
species (Tabarelli et al. 2010). The Brazilian Atlantic Forest (BAF) is
regarded as the oldest Brazilian forest (Rizzini 1997), composed of five
main types of forests produced by differentiation related to combinations
of temperature and rainfall ranges (Oliveira- Filho & Fontes 2000; 
Scudeller et al. 2001). Endemic species are clustered in eight
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biogeographical subregions, five of which are widely recognized centres
of species endemism (da Silva & Casteleti 2003). This complex biome
hosts plant species diversity per unit area higher than that of the majority
of the Amazon forest, which underpins the inclusion of some reserves in
this biome in the United Nations Organisation for Education’s (UNESCO)
list of World Natural Heritage Sites (Joly et al. 2014b).
Due to the presence of exceptional biodiversity and extreme land cover
disturbance, this biome has been recognised as a key global biodiversity
hotspot for more than a decade (Mittermier et al. 2004). It has also been
referred to as the “hottest hotspot” (Laurance 2009), “shrinking hotspot”
(Cezar Ribeiro et al. 2011), and “top hotspot” (Eisenlohr et al. 2013). The
latest estimate of remaining natural intact vegetation in the Atlantic
Forest is 3.5% of its original extent (Sloan et al. 2014), 11-16% for the
BAF (Ribeiro et al. 2009). The remaining forest in the BAF is a highly
fragmented landscape that spans across the Brazilian Atlantic coast
(figure 1.1). Banks-Leite et al. (2014) estimated that over 88% of the BAF
has less than 30% forest cover using 200-ha landscape units. Forest
fragmentation is a major cause of forest species loss within isolated
forest remnants (Cardoso da Silva & Tabarelli 2000; Cullen et al. 2016),
and a strong positive relationship has been found between the number
of animal and plant species and forest fragment area (Chiarello 1999;
Tabarelli et al. 1999).
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Social importance
Over 125 million people (~70% of the Brazilian population) live along the
Brazilian Atlantic coast, and the BAF provides a series of ecosystem
services that contribute to their well-being (figure 1.1). Reservoirs in the
BAF produce 62% of Brazil’s electric power production, as well as
providing drinking water for the 125million inhabitants (Joly et al. 2014b).
Traditional and local people still rely on many native species fruits as a
food source, as well as raw materials such as fibres and oils (Apel et al.
2006; Satyanarayana et al. 2007). For example, fast growing demand
for an Amazonian berry has led to an increase in production of native
Jucara berry pulp in the BAF, from 5 tons in 2010 to 97.76 tons in 2011
(Trevisan et al. 2015). In terms of agriculture-related services, the BAF
hosts approximately 60 species of long-distance pollinator bees, though
the service they provide is at risk due to habitat loss, exotic species and
climate change (Giannini et al. 2012)
Main threats
Habitat loss, the main threat in the BAF, is stratified by altitude (Tabarelli
et al. 2010). At elevations greater than 1600 metres above sea level,
40% of all forest still persist, though these areas represent less than 1%
of the entire BAF. However, massive forest conversion into croplands,
abandoned pastures, real estate properties and urban areas has
occurred primarily across low to intermediate elevations (Tabarelli et al.
2010; Scarano & Ceotto 2015). Intermediate elevations are mostly
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agricultural lands that have been historically allocated to primary agro-
pastoral commodities such as sugarcane, coffee, cattle and more
recently soybean and biofuel crops (Frickmann 2003; Sayre 2003;
Tabarelli et al. 2005). Other threats include forest degradation through
fuelwood harvesting, illegal logging, collection of plants and plant
products, and invasion by alien species (Galetti & Fernandez 1998;
Tabarelli et al. 2004). In some areas, poaching threatens wildlife even
within protected areas (Tabarelli et al. 2005).
.
- 25 -
Figure 1.1 Map of Brazil: population, Atlantic Forest cover for 2012,
and biogeographical subregions. Sources: AmerPop 2015, SOSMata
Atlantica 2012, Casteletti & Silva 2003.
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Conservation efforts
Within the last four decades, over 700 protected areas have been
created in the BAF (Sayre 2003). However, these represent only 9% of
the remaining forest (Joly et al. 2014b), and protected areas with strict
protection (IUCN categories I and II) encompass only 1.7% (Ribeiro et
al. 2009). 75% of all protected areas are smaller than 10,000 ha, too
small to ensure long-term species persistence, and almost 80% of all
remaining forest cover is farther than 10 km from the nearest protected
area (Ribeiro et al. 2009; Tabarelli et al. 2010). Only 1% of the
threatened plant species and 15% of the threatened animal species
occur inside protected areas (Scarano & Ceotto 2015). Improving the
protected areas system and protecting large existing forest remnants in
the BAF is crucial; however, large-scale forest restoration is necessary
to ensure that biodiversity-derived ecological functions are provided
across the biome (Banks-Leite et al. 2014b).
The potential for forest restoration
Restoration has been practised in the BAF for the past 30 years, but with
small scale, isolated projects, no major changes in forest cover have
been observed (Rodrigues et al. 2009). To become an effective and
widespread means of conserving the Atlantic Forest, restoration
initiatives still have big challenges to overcome, such as reducing costs,
conforming to socio-political issues, scaling up restoration projects and
planning restoration actions at landscape-level (Rodrigues et al. 2009;
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Melo et al. 2013b). The Atlantic Forest Restoration Pact (AFRP) was
created to address this need in 2009, one of the most ambitious multi-
sectoral coalitions set up for restoration, with more than 260 institutions
involved (Pinto et al. 2014). The AFRP was launched in 2009, with the
goal of restoring 15 million ha of the Brazilian Atlantic Forest by 2050
through the promotion of biodiversity conservation, jobs and income
generation, ecosystem services maintenance and provisioning, and by
supporting farmers to comply with the Forest Code across the biome
(Brancalion et al. 2012; Pinto et al. 2014). It is estimated that the cost of
actively restoring 15 million hectares including seedlings, replanting and
monitoring for two years– but excluding acquisition costs– ranges
between 49,000 and 77,000 mill. $ (c. $3,315-5,216/ha; Calmon et al.
2009).
It can be unrealistic to restore such large amounts of forest through land
acquisition, especially considering the fragmented nature of the BAF,
which would involve several small purchases to maximize forest
connectivity. Ecological set-asides on private land are a promising
strategy to preserve biodiversity and ecosystem services across
farmlands (Dobson et al. 2006), enabling their benefits to reach people
more widely (Gardner et al. 2009). Setting aside private land for
conservation nonetheless, comes with financial costs to the landowner.
In the BAF, the median yearly gross profit per hectare of agricultural land
is USD $467 (interquartile range $199 to $868), which is more than the
Brazilian minimum wage (Banks-Leite et al. 2014b). Payment for
ecosystem services (PES) schemes provide a mechanism to incentivize
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landowner participation on set-asides (Milder et al. 2010). Brancalion et
al. (2012) provide a detailed analysis of a ‘‘basket of opportunities’’ to
incentivise forest restoration that includes PES, as well as other
opportunities such as crop production in agro-successional restoration
schemes and exploitation of timber and non-timber forest products in
restored areas. In general in Latin America, there’s been increasing
implementation of policies devoted to payments for ecosystem services
(Balvanera et al. 2012; Melo et al. 2013). In Brazil, there is a national
PES scheme, in which watershed committees established by law charge
for the use of water within a watershed and return part of this fee through
PES to landowners who implement forest restoration projects. For
instance, in Minas Gerais, this PES scheme increased native forest
cover by 60% in a targeted sub-watershed (Richards et al. 2015).
Research suggests that developing and promoting non-timber forest
products integrated into agroforestry systems on family farms in Brazil
could not only reduce deforestation pressures but also actively stimulate
reforestation (Souza et al. 2010; Trevisan et al. 2015). These
characteristics make PES-linked restoration initiatives based on
agricultural set-asides a realistic approach to large-scale restoration of
the BAF.
1.3 Aims and objectives
The aim of this thesis is to explore the importance of feedback effects of
conservation interventions and the ways they can be included in
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conservation planning for real-life conservation problems. I use the
Brazilian Atlantic Forest as a case study because it presents the
opportunity to assess multiple feedbacks within the extremely relevant
scenario of a highly fragmented threatened biome in direct competition
with agriculture for available land, where there is high-level commitment
to a large-scale forest restoration intervention.
The following objectives were designed to address the aims of the thesis:
(1) Explore the role that unintended feedbacks play in conservation
outcomes. Sub-objectives are:
a. to develop a theoretical framework for understanding how
conservation interventions can trigger unintended
feedbacks and provide a new typology of unintended
feedbacks to guide the collection and organisation of
evidence.
b. to assess existing evidence for unintended feedbacks in
conservation.
c. to identify how best to plan for and mitigate unintended
feedbacks in conservation practice.
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(2) Explore underlying mechanisms that have the potential to
undermine the cost-effectiveness of conservation programmes by
increasing the price of agricultural land, and assess their
applicability to a real-life case study. Sub-objectives are:
a. To review economic mechanisms within the context of
unintended feedback effects of conservation interventions
based on land use change.
b. To assess existing methods and data requirement for
mechanisms identified in 2.a.
c. To empirically assess the modelling of these mechanisms
for the Brazilian Atlantic Forest.
(3) Develop and test a methodological framework to prioritise a large-
scale set aside programme that enables accounting for both
environmental and social feedbacks simultaneously. Sub-
objectives are:
a. To develop a methodology for a spatial conservation
planning approach that includes both environmental and
economic dynamics.
b. To compare prioritisation outcomes for both a static and a
discrete dynamic prioritisation approach and evaluate the
trade-offs between them.
c. To assess the degree to which ecological and economic
characteristics of prioritisation units affect the best
prioritisation approach for that unit.
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d. To characterise the role informational rent capture plays in
a large-scale prioritisation within the context of both a static
and a discrete dynamic prioritisation approach.
(4) Explore the relative effects of different conservation targets and
prioritisation approaches on the outcome of a conservation prioritisation.
Provide recommendations for restoring the Brazilian Atlantic Forest.
Sub-objectives are:
a. To identify priority areas for natural restoration in the BAF
that are robust to diverse targets and approaches.
b. To compare costs and benefits of meeting three different
forest restoration targets that are currently policy-relevant
to the BAF and have the potential to be implemented.
c. To assess the effect of increasing target area on the
difference in prioritisation outcomes for both static and
discrete dynamic prioritisation approaches.
d. To provide recommendations regarding prioritisation
approach choice in the context of diverse targets for the
BAF.
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1.4 Thesis outline
Chapter 2: Unintended feedbacks: challenges and opportunities for
improving conservation effectiveness
In this chapter, I examine the role unintended feedbacks play in
conservation outcomes and the need for better evidence on their
prevalence and types in different circumstances. I develop a framework
for understanding unintended feedbacks and provide a typology based
on an existing social-ecological system approach that facilitates the
systematic collation of evidence. Approaches to planning for and
mitigating unintended feedbacks in conservation practice are discussed
to provide recommendations for management and future research. Gaps
identified in this chapter were used to guide research for the rest of this
PhD.
This work has been published as
Larrosa, C., Carrasco, L.R. & Milner-Gulland, E.J. (2016). Unintended
feedbacks: challenges and opportunities for improving conservation
effectiveness. Conserv. Lett., 9, 316-326.
Chapter 3: An empirical assessment of economic mechanisms for
unintended feedback effects of agricultural set-asides in conservation.
In this chapter, I explore economic mechanisms that underpin potential
unintended feedback effects of conservation interventions that are
based on changing land cover. I present the theory behind both classical
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market and market failure mechanisms, and explore approaches that
could be used to model these feedbacks. This understanding is then
applied to a real-life case study, the large-scale restoration of the
Brazilian Atlantic Forest (BAF) through payments to set-aside
agricultural land. I describe the socio-economic context of the case
study, identify the mechanisms that may cause feedbacks in this system,
and assess the potential for modelling them. The analyses in this chapter
inform the choice of feedback effect (informational rent) modelled in
chapters 4 and 5.
Chapter 4: Spatial conservation planning accounting for environmental
and economic feedbacks
Chapter 2 shows a gap in the literature for dynamic conservation
planning approaches that account for both ecological and socio-
economic dynamics. Focusing on a farmland set-aside restoration
programme for the Brazilian Atlantic Forest, and based on results from
chapter three, in chapter four I propose and test a methodological
framework to prioritise a large-scale set-aside programme that enables
accounting for both environmental and social feedbacks simultaneously.
I model an environmental feedback that accounts for changes in forest
connectivity, and an economic feedback that accounts for changes in the
opportunity cost of farmland promoted by informational rent capture. I
compare prioritisation outcomes for a static approach with the proposed
discrete dynamic approach, and explore the trade-offs between
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approaches. I assess the role that informational rent capture plays for
spatial conservation planning at large scales, and discuss the
implications of the results for conservation planning in the BAF.
Chapter 5: Restoring the Brazilian Atlantic Forest: understanding the role
of multiple restoration targets and prioritisation approaches
This chapter is centred on the application of the understanding and
methods developed in chapters two, three and four, to provide insights
and recommendations for restoring the Brazilian Atlantic Forest. I apply
a spatial conservation planning to the case study in the context of
compliance with the Brazilian Forest Code. Using three qualitatively and
quantitatively different restoration targets which have been proposed for
the BAF, I compare prioritisation solutions for both the static and
dynamic approaches defined in chapter three, assessing informational
rent capture as an economic incentive for restoration. I discuss how likely
it is that these targets are implemented, and how my results could work
in conjunction with existing initiatives.
Chapter 6: Discussion
This chapter provides a synthesis of research findings, key implications
for conservation management and science, policy recommendations,
and directions for future research.
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Chapter 2: Unintended feedbacks: challenges and
opportunities for improving conservation effectiveness
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1. Actions lead to reactions
Unintended effects of planned conservation interventions can have
knock-on effects that result in perverse outcomes. For example, the
threatened Javan hawk eagle was declared a National Rare/Precious
Animal to promote public attention for its conservation, but this attention
also increased trade demand for the species (Nijman et al. 2009).
Potential land use restrictions under the Endangered Species Act
resulted in pre-emptive timber harvesting, which destroyed an area of
habitat that could have supported half the 129 colonies needed to meet
the red-cockaded woodpecker’s conservation target (Lueck & Michael
2003). In Indonesia, increased income from seaweed farming, promoted
as a conservation tool to reduce pressure on fisheries, was invested in
capital improvement of fisheries businesses, potentially increasing
pressure on fisheries (Sievanen et al. 2005).
Conservation science needs to be able to predict and design for human
reactions to interventions, and the range and extremes of possible
outcomes (St John et al. 2013). Understanding the feedback loops that
constitute the unintended knock-on effects of conservation interventions
is a key element in achieving this goal. An unintended feedback exists
when reactions to an intervention have an effect on the intended
outcomes directly or indirectly, as illustrated in the examples above.
Unintended feedbacks include both human reactions to interventions
and ecosystem dynamics. There are multiple examples of perverse
outcomes in natural resource management, such as management
suppressing natural disturbance regimes or altering slowly changing
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ecological variables, leading to unintended detrimental changes in soils,
hydrology and biodiversity (Holling & Meffe 1996). However, the
unintended feedbacks of conservation interventions modulated through
human decision-making are poorly studied, and are likely to be
significant determinants of conservation outcomes (Milner-Gulland
2012). Here we highlight the role unintended feedbacks play in
conservation outcomes, and the need for better evidence on their
prevalence and types in different circumstances. In order to guide the
collection and organisation of evidence, so that a strong empirical
underpinning can be built for future research, we develop a new
framework for understanding unintended feedbacks. First, we modify an
existing social-ecological system (SES) approach to provide a
theoretical understanding of how conservation interventions can trigger
unintended feedbacks. Then, we present a new typology of unintended
feedbacks, drawing on a wide range of conservation examples that show
how unintended feedbacks undermine conservation efforts. Finally, we
use the typology to reflect on how best to plan for and mitigate
unintended feedbacks in conservation practice, and discuss implications
for future work.
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2. Undermining conservation efforts: how much do we know?
It has been recognized that unintended feedbacks can render
conservation interventions inefficient and ineffective (Polasky 2006).
However, there is still a relatively simplistic narrative regarding how
people will react when planning conservation interventions (St John et
al. 2013). For example, a lack of success in the alternative livelihoods
approach is linked to its three simplistic assumptions of substitution,
homogeneous community and impact scalability (Wright et al. 2016).
Even with the use of project design tools like Miradi (Miradi 2007), which
make the theory of change underlying the chosen intervention explicit,
the indirect consequences of people's reactions to conservation can still
remain unaccounted for. With conservation interventions increasingly
centred on changing human behaviour, understanding how these
interventions alter the incentives and actions of the people causing
biodiversity loss, and their knock-on effects, is of great relevance to the
design and evaluation of such interventions.
The literature on unintended consequences of conservation
interventions on people (Cernea & Schmidt-Soltau 2006) or non-target
species (Harihar et al. 2011) is large, however, cases documenting how
unintended consequences feed back to result in undermined
conservation goals are uncommon and mostly anecdotal. Examples of
potential unintended feedbacks mediated through human decisions
include integrated conservation and development projects enhancing
the profitability of existing environmentally harmful activities such as land
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clearance (Jack et al. 2008), promoting development of new enterprises
that may impact other ecosystem components (Spiteri & Nepalz 2006),
or leading to positive net migration (Oates 1995). Widely used market-
based approaches such as payments for ecosystem services (PES)
bring into play spatial and temporal scales that can differ from the target
system, broadening the scope of potential effects of feedbacks. For
example, protection of forests from exploitation under Reducing
Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation initiatives can
lead to displacement of exploitation to distant areas (Angelsen 2007a).
Studies addressing real-world unintended feedbacks in conservation are
scarce, but modelling has been used to explore how interventions can
backfire. Damania et al. (2005) used a household utility model to show
how an alternative livelihoods approach to alter hunting behaviour could
increase mortality of the most vulnerable species. Other modelling
studies have shown how land market feedbacks lead to highly cost
ineffective conservation planning (Jantke & Schneider 2011), or that
buying land for conservation can sometimes condemn more species
than it saves (Armsworth et al. 2006). Land purchase for conservation
can increase the price of non-developed land, for example by reducing
the stock of land for development, raising the prospect of future
conservation land purchase, or increasing the amenity value of
neighbouring land. This can then displace development, potentially to
other biologically sensitive areas, or limit the amount of land that can be
purchased for a given conservation budget.
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Reviews of unintended feedbacks are also few and scattered. A review
examining the extent to which the peer-reviewed literature addressed
feedbacks between conservation interventions and SESs found most
articles focused either on the effect of conservation on people, or of
people on the environment, with few studies empirically addressing both
the social dynamics resulting from conservation initiatives and
subsequent environmental effects (Miller et al. 2012). There is a lot more
focus on feedbacks in the resilience and SESs literature (Gunderson &
Holling 2002). This literature is based on a systems thinking approach
that explicitly considers the interaction between the social and ecological
components of a system, facilitating interdisciplinary analysis of human–
nature dynamics (Glaser et al. 2008). Within the last decade, significant
progress has been made with respect to interdisciplinary investigation
and modelling of coupled SESs (Baur & Binder 2013).
Recently, the importance of explicitly accounting for feedbacks to better
manage complex systems has been highlighted with a Special Feature
published in Ecology and Society (Hull et al. 2015a). From a coupled
human and natural systems perspective, the articles in this issue identify
feedbacks that stabilize and destabilize systems across agricultural,
forest, and urban landscapes. Emerging themes include multilevel
feedbacks, time lags, and surprises as a result of feedbacks.
- 41 -
3. Building an understanding: an SES perspective
Systems thinking is especially attuned to explaining side effects and
perverse outcomes due to its emphasis on feedback loops, and it has
been recommended as a theoretical approach to underpin behavioural
change policy design (Lucas et al. 2008). Systems dynamics modelling
has been applied to manage and avoid unintended consequences and
their feedbacks in designing hazards management and disaster relief
policy (Gillespie et al. 2004). For example forest fire management
(Collins et al. 2013), emergency resource coordination (Wang et al.
2012), and efficient positioning of relief services (Widener et al. 2015).
Clearly articulated with systems thinking theory, the SES literature is
where most of the work on human-natural systems has been done,
providing a strong grounding for work on unintended feedbacks.
An SES is a complex, adaptive system consisting of a bio-geophysical
unit and its associated social actors and institutions, with boundaries that
delimit a particular ecosystem and its problem context (Glaser et al.
2012). As complex systems, SESs present inherent properties such as
nonlinearity, emergence and self-organization, path dependence, and
positive/negative feedback loops (definitions in Table 2.1; Becker 2012).
These properties are relevant to the analysis and planning of
conservation interventions because they provide a framework for
understanding and describing SES behaviour. Given the increasing
spatial tele connectedness of social actors and institutions through
international trade, information technologies and travel, the spatial
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boundaries of the SES can encompass multiple countries or represent a
global system.
In systems thinking, a feedback loop exists when results from some
action travel through the system and eventually return in some form to
the original action, potentially influencing future actions. In a “negative or
balancing” feedback the initial change to a system causes a change in
the opposite direction, dampening the effect; in a “positive or reinforcing”
feedback the initial change to a system causes more change in the same
direction, amplifying the effect (Chin et al. 2014). For example, a
reinforcing feedback loop between fragmentation processes (fire,
logging) and landscape pattern (connectivity, patch characteristics, and
edge effects) significantly accelerated the effect of deforestation on
biodiversity in the Brazilian Amazon (Cumming et al. 2012).
There are several frameworks to analyse environmental problems in the
context of SESs. We take as our starting point the SES Framework
(SESF), developed by Ostrom (2009) as a diagnostic tool for
understanding the sustainability of complex SESs. Binder et al. (2013)
reviewed 10 SES frameworks that were explicitly designed for
application by both researchers and practitioners (SM Table 1). Ostrom’s
framework is the only one of these that conceptualizes the bi-directional
interaction between the social and ecological systems, and treats both
systems in almost equal depth (Binder et al. 2013). The SESF is also
relevant to a wide range of natural resource issues, has been
increasingly applied in conservation, and enables the visualization of the
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system’s structure with varying degrees of complexity. The extent to
which the theories underlying different SES frameworks would lead to
similar or diverging results would still require exploration.
Ostrom’s SESF (figure 2.1) has a nested structure where actors use and
provide for the maintenance of resource units, within a resource system,
according to rules and procedures determined by a governance system,
in the context of related ecological systems and broader social, political
and economic settings (McGinnis & Ostrom 2014). The framework
enables analyses of how attributes of the four core subsystems both
affect and are affected by interactions and outcomes via feedbacks at a
particular time and place (Ostrom 2007). These subsystems are: (i)
resource systems (e.g., protected area, lake); (ii) resource units (e.g.,
trees, amount and flow of water); (iii) governance systems (e.g., the
specific rules related to the use of the protected area or lake, and their
implementation); and (iv) actors (e.g. resource users, managers;
figure.1.1).
Although the fact that conservation acts on complex SESs is well
accepted, the consequences of considering the conservation
intervention itself as embedded in the system are less well appreciated.
The moment a conservation action or policy is mooted, it becomes part
of the SES, redefining it, affecting all four subsystems directly or
indirectly (figure 2.1). The triggered reactions to the conservation
intervention flow through the SES and in turn affect the intended
outcomes, forming feedback loops. It is via these interactions that
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reactions have the potential to undermine conservation outcomes or
generate policy resistant systems (Sterman 2000).
As it becomes a part of the SES, the conservation intervention can alter
both the system's structure and/or the dynamics of the processes within
it. These dynamics include economic processes at the system scale,
such as land market feedbacks (Armsworth et al. 2006) or behavioural
changes at the scale of the individual or community, such as are
explored in psychology and decision science (Gintis 2007). For example,
some PES schemes have increased inequity through processes such as
marginalisation, elite capture of benefits and increased vulnerability of
some groups, resulting in reduced project legitimacy, non-participation,
corruption and even active resistance (Pascual et al. 2014). These types
of processes at a smaller scale can drive feedbacks at the system scale.
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Table 2.1. Properties of social-ecological systems as complex adaptive systems
Property Description Example
Emergence Emergence means that a system’s behaviour is more than the sum
of its parts. Non-linear interactions between elements of the system
give rise to novel structures, patterns and properties that cannot be
explained only from the single elements (Ratter 2012).
Even without a specific blocking event, we get
traffic jams, merely as a result of car drivers
following simple rules: drive at a certain speed and
do not crash into the car in front; slow down if there
is a car close ahead, speed up if not (Ratter 2012).
Self-
organization
Self-organization is the appearance of new system structures without
explicit pressure from outside the system (Ratter 2012).
Emergent structures can be found in many natural
phenomena, for example, bird flocks or hurricanes
(Ratter 2012).
Feedback loops The process by which the results of an action define the situation we
face in the future. In “negative or balancing” feedback the initial
change to a system causes a change in the opposite direction,
dampening the effect; in “positive or reinforcing” feedback the initial
change to a system causes more change in the same direction,
amplifying the effect (Sterman 2000).
Increases in the size of farms increased
investment, leading to agricultural intensification
(reinforcing feedback). However, consequent soil
degradation problems spurred wetland restoration
that reversed degradation in croplands (balancing
feedback; Steen-Adams et al. 2015).
Non-linearity Interactions between elements of the system cannot be described by
linear functions (e.g. s-shaped response curves; Folke 2006).
At low levels of herbivory overall community
responses lead to non-proportional increases in
production potential, whereas extreme herbivory
causes an extreme reduction in productivity (Dyer
et al. 1993).
Path-
dependence
Non-linearity generates path dependence, which means that the
evolution of the system depends on the history of the path it has so
far taken. Path dependence leads to the existence of multiple
equilibrium states and the potential for thresholds (tipping-points)
and qualitative shifts in system dynamics under changing
environmental conditions (Levin 1998).
Accumulation of nutrients in a lake (eutrophication)
in combination with a trigger such as flooding or
warming can shift the system from a clear water
lake to a turbid water lake (Folke et al. 2004).
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Figure 2.1. Theoretical framework for understanding unintended
feedbacks from conservation interventions adapted from the Social-
ecological System (SES) Framework (McGinnis & Ostrom 2014). In
black the SES Framework: solid ovals denote core subsystems and full
arrows denote direct links between subsystems. Core subsystems
interact to produce outcomes that have feedback effects denoted by
dashed arrows. In blue a modification to the SES Framework: the
conservation intervention becomes part of the system jointly affecting
and affected by interactions and outcomes. The dotted-and-dashed line
indicates the boundary of SES; exogenous social, economic and political
settings or related ecosystems can affect any element of the SES.
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4. A typology of unintended feedbacks
Schoon and Cox (2012) introduced a framework to analyse disturbance-
response dyads in an SES that accounts for both structure and flow,
based on the SESF. We use their work as a basis for creating a typology
of unintended feedbacks, whereby disturbance to the structure or flow of
an SES, caused by a conservation intervention, triggers unintended
feedbacks.
We define an unintended feedback as a feedback triggered by a
conservation intervention, which was not built into intervention design,
and that has an effect on conservation outcomes. It can consist of
multiple reinforcing or balancing loops, and the net effect can either
undermine or enhance conservation outcomes. Here we focus on
feedbacks that undermine conservation outcomes because they are of
greater concern to implementers. Three types of unintended feedback
are identified: (1) Flow (relating to a change in a parameter within the
SES), (2) Deletion, and (3) Addition (both relating to a change in SES
structure).
(1) Flow unintended feedbacks are due to the enhancement or
dampening of pre-existing feedback loops within the SES, caused by the
conservation intervention. For example, in the USA, land use restrictions
imposed on Federal forest concessions by the Endangered Species Act
reduced lumber supply. This increased its price, thereby promoting
logging in private forests within that region (Murray & Wear 1998;
Polasky 2006). Another study showed that, depending on the structure
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of demand for bushmeat, a reduction in supply caused by enforcement
of anti-poaching laws could lead to an increase in prices inducing others
to enter the market and increase hunting levels (Wilkie & Godoy 2001).
(2) Deletion unintended feedbacks occur when pre-existing feedback
loops within the SES are lost due to the conservation intervention. For
example, in Kenya, impoundment by the government of an area along
the Turkwel River curtailed traditional management of this area. The loss
of this institutional structure led to increased forest degradation (Stave
et al. 2001).
(3) Addition unintended feedbacks occur when interventions add
components to the SES network structure. Most conservation
interventions add actors, institutional structures or links, either human or
natural. For example, new legislation aimed at creating incentives for
biodiversity conservation in Mexico allowed landowners to benefit
directly from wildlife exploitation through the creation of wildlife
conservation units. However, in some regions, these new structures led
to investment in practices that reduced native biodiversity in the long
term, such as fencing and cultivation of exotic grasslands (Sisk et al.
2007). Re-introducing wild dogs generated negative attitudes and
persecution of existing wild dog populations in South Africa due to
perceived and real threats of predation on livestock, despite a
compensation scheme being in place (Gusset et al. 2007).
Multiple feedback loops can interact to undermine an outcome. For
example, Österblom et al. (2011) identified three unintended partial
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feedback loops that explained in part the European Common Fisheries
Policy’s failure to deliver on its social and ecological goals despite
continuous efforts. Additionally, a single intervention can produce
different types of unintended feedbacks. For example, the establishment
of protected areas can trigger a flow unintended feedback; increases in
land allocated to protected areas could increase the prices of agricultural
commodities due to foregone agricultural production, which can result in
highly cost ineffective conservation (Jantke & Schneider 2011). The
establishment of a protected area can also trigger a deletion unintended
feedback: the imposition of external conservation rules brought by
Ranomafana National Park in Madagascar resulted in a change of social
norms concerning accepted behaviour when harvesting pandans
(Pandanus spp.) that led to unsustainable use in the villages surrounding
the park (Jones et al. 2008). The establishment of a protected area can
trigger an addition unintended feedback as well: Tarangire National
Park, in Tanzania, is a source of added risk for household decision
makers, some of whom pursued aggressive land conversion in
anticipation of park expansion (Baird et al. 2009).
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5. Implications for applied conservation
The prevalence and potentially disastrous effects of unintended
feedbacks highlights the need to consider them more fully as important
elements of conservation intervention design. By representing the way
in which a conservation intervention alters an SES as three easily
identifiable disturbances, the typology presented here facilitates a
diagnostic approach to analysing how unintended feedbacks affect
outcomes.
A priori identification of potential unintended feedbacks can improve
conservation practice by enabling the consideration of complex
relationships. In Tarangire National Park, consideration of SES
dynamics suggested that greater security of land tenure would be a
better approach to forestalling pre-emptive land conversion in
anticipation of park expansion than the proposed increase in land use
restrictions (Baird et al. 2009). Applying the typology of unintended
feedbacks within results chains during the conservation intervention
design process could highlight potential unintended feedbacks,
substantially improving the utility of project design tools such as Miradi
(Miradi 2007).
Evaluating the possible perverse outcomes of policy interventions is
often highlighted as an important step in guidelines for policy design (e.g.
Hallsworth et al. 2011). For example, to avoid feedbacks from negative
impacts on equity, it has been suggested that policy development
processes use standard assessment tools (such as Impact
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Assessments), on top of which additional criteria can be addressed
(such as social or environmental justice; Brooks et al. 2006). Guidelines
for selecting models and developing interventions from the policy design
field could be adapted in future to inform conservation intervention
design within the context of unintended feedbacks.
An incomplete understanding of an SES and its history is not the only
cause of unintended feedbacks. Prediction of human behaviour, and
knowledge of system behaviour can provide an idea of the range of
conservation outcomes and intervention can produce. However,
unintended behaviour within an SES can also be due to emergent
properties that, so far, cannot be predicted (Ratter 2012). An adaptive
management approach that monitors feedback structure and behaviour
could improve the early detection of emerging properties of an SES.
Recently, Mayer et al. (2014) proposed the use of specific indicators that
give insight into the structure and behaviour of feedbacks, such as
Shannon entropy and Fisher information, as monitoring tools for
sustainable management.
Evaluations of conservation impact need to understand the mechanisms
by which conservation interventions have impact, including both directly
on the target and indirectly on other components of the ecosystem via
changes in human behaviour. A posteriori consideration of potential
feedbacks operating in an SES can help identify the true drivers of
observed patterns. For example, the change at national scale from net
deforestation to net reforestation that took place in Vietnam was a
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consequence of two separate forces: endogenous socio-ecological
feedbacks, such as local resource depletion, explained a slowing down
of deforestation and stabilization of forest cover. However, it was
exogenous socio-economic factors, such as global trade, that better
accounted for reforestation. Neither process represented a planned
response to ecosystem degradation (Lambin & Meyfroidt 2010).
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6. Implications for future work in conservation science
The current anecdotal and scattered evidence is not enough to support
general principles for conservation decision-making that minimize
unintended feedbacks. It is difficult to say at present under which
circumstances unintended feedbacks may be most significant for
conservation outcomes, or which mechanisms of human behaviour
underlie them. The type of conservation intervention, and the complexity
of the SES, may play a crucial role. For example, it is expected that
indirect approaches, such as alternative livelihoods, may increase the
likelihood of promoting unintended feedbacks due to the higher number
of actors and links comprising the system. However, there is not enough
evidence to substantiate this statement because currently the literature
is inadequate to support a systematic review. Studies of the correlates
of conservation success have encountered similar limitations (Brooks et
al., 2012). There is a need to establish comparative databases to collate
case studies for analysis, in order to describe unintended feedbacks,
their drivers and underlying mechanisms (Table 2.2). The typology
presented could provide a framework for this task. Data collection efforts
are underway to gather examples of SESs, which could inform this
analysis, for example the social-ecological systems meta-analysis
database (SESMAD) project, which aims to enable analysis of case
studies of a diversity of SESs by collating them in a comparable format
(Cox 2015).
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Table 2.2. Examples for the operationalization of the typology of unintended feedbacks
Unintended
feedback type Example mechanisms Potential indicators to monitor Operationalization
Flow Reduction in supply of lumber
(Murray & Wear 1998), or bushmeat
(Wilkie & Godoy 2001), or land
available for agriculture (Jantke &
Schneider 2011)
x Price of lumber/ bushmeat/
land
x Volume traded/ sold in
markets
x Land use change
x Traded species
abundance
x Surveys in key
markets
x Satellite data
x Household surveys
Deletion Loss of traditional management over
an area (Stave et al. 2001) or loss of
social norms regarding an area or
species (Jones et al. 2008)
x Overlap between existing
governance structures and
new regulations
x Accepted exploitation
practices
x Perceived social norms
x Household surveys
x Listings of
traditionally used
species or taboo
species
x Participatory land use
mapping
Addition Creating economic incentives for
conservation (Sisk et al. 2007),
species reintroduction (Gusset et al.
2007)
x Impact of new regulation
on land tenure and equity
x Land use change
x Conflict: lost livestock or
crops to reintroduced
species
x Household surveys
x Satellite data
x Conflict reports
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The literature on behavioural change based policy can shed light on
which aspects of an intervention need to be considered when analysing
evidence of unintended feedbacks. Darnton's (2008) review of
behavioural change found that three elements determine whether a
policy intervention has negative impacts on equity or not: (1) what factors
of a behavioural model are targeted by an intervention, (2) the way in
which those factors are targeted, and (3) the theory of change underlying
the intervention. Given that interventions that have negative impacts on
equity can result in unintended feedbacks such as corruption or
sabotage (Pascual et al. 2014), these same elements could prove to be
important intervention characteristics within the context of unintended
feedbacks.
Feedbacks that enhance conservation outcomes are also possible, and
present opportunities to magnify or extend conservation effectiveness
by harnessing synergies within the system. Similarly, there is a need to
collect case studies in order to start exploring the circumstances and
mechanisms that enable this type of feedback. Additionally, focusing on
finding and studying examples in which unintended feedbacks were
overcome and managed could provide invaluable insight.
Currently, policy support tools widely used to explore the potential
impact of different interventions at large scales are based on static
models that cannot account for unintended feedbacks. InVEST (Nelson
et al. 2009), for example, ranks relative biodiversity and ecosystem
services outputs under different scenarios; the tool currently focuses on
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developing relatively simple models to meet demand from decision-
makers (Ruckelshaus et al. 2015). Under some circumstances
incorporating unintended feedbacks might not have a large effect on
model predictions (Zvoleff & An 2014a), but this will depend on the
system (Armsworth et al. 2006). Mechanisms by which unintended
feedbacks occur could be incorporated into these models to assess the
robustness of their predictions; however, there will be a trade-off
between model complexity and the gain in predictive power given the
likely high uncertainties in developing and parameterizing a dynamic
systems model. This trade-off needs to be explored urgently to elucidate
when more complex models are necessary to avoid misleading
recommendations from such tools, or when simpler models give robust
results (Table 2.3).
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Table 2.3. Questions for future work on unintended feedbacks of conservation, and
recommended next steps
Question for future work Suggested next steps
1. How widespread are unintended
feedbacks, and under what
circumstances do different types of
feedback occur?
Establish a comparative database that
collates case studies, structured using
our framework and typology.
2. When and how should
unintended feedbacks be included in
policy support tools?
Include mechanisms causing unintended
feedbacks in models underlying policy
support tools and explore trade-offs
between model complexity and gain in
predictive power. For example, include
land market feedbacks from land
purchases for protected areas in InVEST.
3. How do personal and social factors
influencing behaviour promote or inhibit
unintended feedbacks from behavioural
change based conservation
interventions?
Use existing models of behaviour that
have been successful in explaining pro-
environmental behaviour to examine the
roles these factors play. For example, the
theory of planned behaviour.
4. What are the different
mechanisms by which unintended
feedbacks operate in conservation
interventions at different scales?
Explore models that include individual
and system dynamics and their
interactions, to understand mechanisms
by which human decision-making can
have consequences for conservation at
different scales
In systematic conservation planning, effectiveness depends partly on
accounting for natural and anthropogenic dynamics (Pressey et al.
2007). Nonetheless, most conservation planning still uses static
information to derive solutions. Scenario analysis is becoming more
common, for example in designing landscapes robust to climate change
(Singh & Milner-Gulland 2011; Levy & Ban 2013) but dynamic
conservation planning studies that take into account trends in, for
example, land prices are uncommon despite the existence of
approaches to account for land market feedbacks (Dissanayake & Önal
2011). Dynamic conservation planning approaches need to be further
developed, and assessed against static approaches (Table 2.3). For
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instance, empirical data have been used to suggest that reserve
selection could be improved by accounting for land market feedbacks
which vary across landscapes (Butsic et al. 2013).
Ultimately, conservation outcomes derive from human decision-making.
Much work has been done using behavioural theory to explore
conservation outcomes. Tools at the individual or household level
include bio-economic models based on rational choice (e.g. Stephens et
al., 2012) and social-psychological models based on the theory of
planned behaviour (e.g. Williams et al., 2012). SESs have emergent
properties that make responses to interventions different than the sum
of individual responses. It is important to understand the ways in which
system behaviour emerges from the collection of many individual
decisions, and how individual- and system-level dynamics interact
(Ratter 2012). Agent-based models can capture these properties
(Rounsevell et al. 2012), but also need to include institutional dynamics
and external trends. Advanced tools for modelling complex adaptive
systems can be applied to SES structure analysis, such as network
topology (Janssen et al. 2006). Social network theory has been applied
within the context of social movement theory to explain how
environmental social movements develop (Ernstson 2013). These tools
applied to the study of SES properties such as emergent behaviour and
self-organisation can start to unveil the mechanisms by which human
decision-making could have consequences for conservation (Table 2.3).
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7. Conclusion
There is plenty of anecdotal evidence that understanding unintended
feedbacks is vital for effective interventions to combat biodiversity loss.
The recent interest in the central role of feedbacks in managing complex
systems (Hull et al. 2015a) provides the right arena where a literature on
unintended feedbacks could flourish. The fact that people adapt and
respond to conservation interventions, and that their actions feed
through into changes in the conservation situation itself, is something
that conservationists rely on for their impact. However, these same
responses are being overlooked when they affect outcomes indirectly
through unintended feedbacks. There is an urgent need to collect
evidence to understand the mechanisms by which human decision-
making feeds through to conservation outcomes at different scales.
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Chapter 3: An empirical assessment of economic
mechanisms for unintended feedback effects of
agricultural set-asides in conservation.
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1. Introduction
In Chapter 2, I presented a typology of unintended feedback effects that
may impact the success of conservation interventions. I also highlighted
the lack of empirical analysis of the prevalence and magnitude of these
effects within the conservation literature, with the evidence instead
largely consisting of anecdotes. The lack of evidence precludes
systematic review and general statements about the likelihood of such
feedbacks occurring for a given intervention type or context. Some
quantitative empirical studies have been done in a few locations,
however, these are based on predictive modelling rather than actual
evidence of feedbacks. For example, in Brazil, statistical analyses at
county level found that policies intending to spare land through soy yield
improvements could actually lead to an agricultural land expansion in
the absence of strong regulation (Garrett et al. 2013). Yield
improvements in oil palm could lead to sparing of temperate agricultural
land, but increased deforestation in the tropics (Carrasco et al. 2014).
These unintended feedback effects are based onmechanisms explained
by market dynamics; given the realistic assumption that demand for
these basic commodities is inelastic, increased yields are not matched
by equivalent price drops, and therefore mostly increase rents from land,
increasing producers’ incentives to expand their production over time.
Market mechanisms such as these play a crucial role in determining
conservation success and cost-effectiveness, and ignoring them can
jeopardise conservation at local and international scales (Seidl et al.
2001; Armsworth et al. 2006; Wilson et al. 2006).
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A large component of conservation science research revolves around
understanding incentives that promote sustainable changes in human
behaviour (Spiteri & Nepalz 2006; Gibbons et al. 2011; Armsworth et al.
2012; Bryan 2013). Incentive-based interventions change the economic
incentives of private actors, leaving the decision on whether and how
much to change behaviour to them (Jack et al. 2008). The literature on
these mechanisms is vast in policy design and implementation (Oates et
al. 1989; Jaffe et al. 2003; de Vries & Hanley 2016), and lessons from
this field can be applied to incentive-based conservation interventions
such as payments for ecosystem services (Jack et al. 2008). However,
altering behaviour via economic incentives has the potential to trigger
feedbacks of various kinds that can undermine conservation outcomes.
Market-based mechanisms that explain feedback effects have been
mostly studied in the context of conservation planning and reserve
selection (Armsworth et al. 2006; Dissanayake & Önal 2011; Zvoleff &
An 2014b). In a seminal paper, Armsworth et al. (2006) used a simple
land market equilibriummodel to show how conservation land purchases
could result in increased biodiversity loss due to reduced availability of
land, increases in land prices and displacement of development.
However, studies in which these mechanisms have been modelled
empirically in a spatially explicit way are few (Walker 2012a; Butsic et al.
2013), and biased towards developed regions of the globe (Armsworth
2014). An assessment of the applicability of existing methods of
modelling market-based mechanisms to empirical case studies could
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better inform understanding of knowledge gaps and drive future work in
this area.
Certain situations cause market failure, resulting in inefficient allocation
of goods and services (Mas-Colell et al. 1995). To identify when and how
governments should intervene to correct the inefficiency, a framework
was developed to characterise situations which may predispose markets
to failure (Zerbe Jr & McCurdy 2000). These situations include the
provision of public goods, perpetuation of inequality, and externalities,
situations extremely common in the type of problems conservation
addresses (Hardin 1968; Marris 2009; Kemkes et al. 2010; Pascual et
al. 2014). Despite the relevance market failure seems to have for
conservation issues, few studies have looked at these mechanisms in
the context of potential feedback effects of conservation interventions.
For example, a market failure situation called information failure has
been shown to undermine conservation project cost-effectiveness due
to informational rent capture (Ferraro 2008; Harvey 2010). Informational
rent capture has been modelled for optimal design of carbon contracts
(Mason & Plantinga 2013), but its potential for feedback effects and
implications for conservation have not been assessed (but see chapter
4). If incentive-based conservation is to plan and manage for unintended
feedbacks, the potential for market failure needs to be considered.
Accounting for system dynamics is key to effective conservation
planning (Pressey et al. 2007), but to empirically model these dynamics
the mechanisms underlying the feedback effects of incentive-based
- 64 -
conservation need to be understood. The aim of this chapter is therefore
to explore economic mechanisms that have the potential to undermine
the cost-effectiveness of conservation programmes by increasing the
price of agricultural land, and provide guidance in approaching their
modelling. In the first section, I review the underlying mechanisms that
have the potential to undermine the cost-effectiveness of conservation
programmes by increasing the price of agricultural land. I review various
types of market feedbacks that may take place, based both on classical
market mechanisms of change in demand and supply, and on market
failures due to unpriced externalities. Examples of existing methods for
modelling and data requirement are indicated for the identified
mechanisms. In the second section, I describe the socio-economic
context of a specific case study, the large-scale restoration of the
Brazilian Atlantic Forest through payments to set-aside agricultural land.
In the third section, I assess the potential for modelling various
mechanisms for feedback effects within the context of the case study,
providing an example of how to empirically approach the modelling of
these feedbacks.
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2. Mechanisms for feedback effects
2.1 Based on classical market behaviour
Land markets potentially undermine conservation goals through
feedbacks that change the market value of land (Armsworth et al. 2006;
Polasky 2006). Market behaviour can be studied using mechanistic
models such as general and partial equilibrium models, based on
equilibrium theory (Dumas 1993). Equilibrium theory describes
characteristics of an economic system in equilibrium, and its underlying
assumptions are (1) perfect competition, and (2) perfect divisibility of all
resources and products (Scitovsky 1954).
Most commonly market behaviour has been studied via partial
equilibrium models, however, general equilibrium models now play an
important role in many fields of economics due to technological
advances which provide the necessary computing power (Nicholson &
Westhoff 2009). Partial equilibrium models limit the scope of the effects
of the intervention to one section of the market, and so are applicable
when the effects of the intervention in the economy as a whole are so
small they can be ignored (Mas-Colell et al. 1995). General equilibrium
models consider the economy as a whole and are applicable when
multiple sectors are interdependent (Mas-Colell et al. 1995). Within this
context, Butsic et al. (2013) grouped land market feedbacks by whether
they had equilibrium effects, or partial equilibrium effects. Both
equilibrium and partial equilibrium feedbacks can increase the market
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value of land and thereby heighten development risk in the area, which
can potentially undermine conservation goals.
Feedback from increased demand for land
When large areas are set-aside for conservation, either through
purchase, easements or other measures that take the land out of
circulation, supply and demand in local markets will be affected. An
increase in demand for land by conservation groups shifts the demand
curve outward, which results in additional land being traded in the
market, and at a higher price (figure 3.1, Armsworth et al. 2006). For
example, environmental land purchases by the Dutch government had
the effect of increasing prices on the land market (Jongeneel et al. 2012),
and increasing competition for land between conservationists and
farmers (Bakker et al. 2015).
In conservation, land market feedbacks have been studied by estimating
the price elasticity of land supply and land rents, mostly in data-rich
geographical areas such as Europe (Jantke & Schneider 2011; Toth et
al. 2011). To calculate these feedbacks, the economic data required
might not be available at a useful resolution for many developing
countries. These include time series data on land cost or land rent, and
data on the elasticity of supply and demand that can be estimated with
data on the amount of land sold per year (Eickhout et al. 2009; Barr et
al. 2011).
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Land market feedbacks can be modelled using both general and partial
equilibrium models, and standard models such as the Global Trade
Analysis Project (GTAP, Hertel 1997) and the General Algebraic
Modelling System (GAMS, GAMS Development Corporation 2013) can
be used for complex, national and global applications. However, these
mostly apply to interventions that affect well-defined markets in terms of
supply and demand, and are not spatially explicit.
Feedback from reduced supply of commodities
The conversion of land from agriculture or forestry to conservation can
be large enough to significantly reduce the supply of commodities. This
has the effect of increasing commodity prices, which can lead to higher
economic returns and result in increased land conversion from new
producers entering the market (figure 3.2, Villoria et al. 2013). For
example, the creation of the Redwood National Park reduced timber
supply in the region by protecting 30% of private standing timber, which
increased redwood price by 26% (Berck & Bentley 1997). Increased
demand for land for conservation can have a local feedback effect on
the preservation of that land via increases in local food prices due to lack
of land availability for agriculture, which has social and conservation
implications. For example, in Europe, increasing competition for land
increased the marginal cost of agricultural land as well as food prices
(Schleupner & Schneider 2010). It has been estimated that the feedback
effect of protecting of 5-30 million hectares of land increased the cost of
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land in Europe by an average 19% due to foregone agricultural
production (Jantke & Schneider 2011). The reduced supply of
commodities due to the conservation of land can also result in the
displacement of agriculture to far away areas through substitute
agricultural products. For example, a reduction in the supply of rapeseed
could increase the demand for palm oil, leading to increased
deforestation in tropical areas (Carrasco et al. 2014).
Feedbacks from reduced commodity supply can be calculated by
estimating the own price elasticity of commodities (Toth et al. 2011).
GTAP and GAMS can also be used as standard models to study these
feedbacks, and there are plenty of data due to the global nature of
commodities. However, there is a challenge with scale because the
reduction in commodity supply brought by the conservation intervention
has to be a significant proportion of global supply in order to have an
effect on commodity price or their substitutes at the global scale.
Therefore, these feedbacks need to be studied at the appropriate scale
for the commodity concerned (whether it is local, in the case of highly
perishable products, regional in the redwood case, Europe-wide in the
case of food, or global in the case of biological oils).
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Figure 3.1 Market model showing the mechanism of a feedback of
increased demand for land. The horizontal axis shows the area of
agricultural land available. DL0 and SL0 represent supply and demand of
the land market at initial equilibrium (price pL0 and quantity qL0). With
agricultural set-asides, a new demand curve DL2 resulting in a new
equilibrium (pL2 and qL2) in which more land is traded at a higher price.
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Figure 3.2 Marketmodel showing the mechanism of a feedback of decreasedsupply of commodities.
Horizontal axes show the amount of commodity and area of agricultural land available for the commodity and land market
respectively. Dc0 and Sc0, DL0 and SL0 represent supply and demand of the commodity and land markets respectively at
initial equilibrium (price p0 and quantity q0). For ease of comparison, price of commodity and land are represented in the
same scale. With agricultural set-asides, a new reduced supply of the commodity results in a new equilibrium (p c2 and
qc2) in which less commodity is traded at a higher price. This increase in price brings new people into the land market,
increasing demand to DL2. This has a new equilibrium (pL2 and qL2) in whichmore land is traded at a higher price.
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Feedback from increased amenity value
Open space protection increases the amenity value of neighbouring
land, which generally increases the value of development relative to
agriculture or forestry, increasing future purchase price and as well as
development risk (figure 3.3, Chamblee et al. 2011; Song 2011).
However, the price effect is often constrained to land near the amenity,
and it is not always significant. Lewis et al. (2009) estimated the amenity
feedback effect of protected open space on development risk and found
that local open space conservation policies did not increase price or
development risk in Wisconsin, USA. This feedback is mostly relevant at
local scales, and in places where the development of second homes is
important (Kondo et al. 2012). It can be estimated using before and after
data on land prices, or hedonic estimates of land prices (Jim & Chen
2006; Song 2011).
2.2 Based on market failure
Market failure is a situation in which competitive markets fail to allocate
resources efficiently, i.e. assumptions of general equilibrium theory do
not hold (Bator 1958). Free markets fail to attain economic efficiency
because prices do not provide the right signals to producers and
consumers, due to asymmetries based on externalities or differential
access to market-relevant information (Akerlof 1970). This concept has
been developed into a framework to define appropriate situations for
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government intervention and determine the type and scope of
intervention (Zerbe Jr & McCurdy 2000).
Economists have identified situations that lead to market failure, and
most of them have been studied directly or indirectly in the context of
conservation, especially within the payment for ecosystems services
(PES) context (table 3.1). However, evidence of how market failure
situations can lead to a feedback effect of conservation interventions on
the value of land proved hard to find. Here, I focus on information failure
due to its proven effect on reducing environmental and conservation
schemes’ cost-effectiveness (Latacz-Lohmann & Schilizzi 2005; Harvey
2010; Mason & Plantinga 2013).
Informational rent capture
Information failure takes place when there is an incentive for one of the
parties in a market transaction to hide information or actions. There are
two main types of information asymmetry, hidden information and hidden
actions, which result in adverse selection and moral hazard, respectively
(Mas-Colell et al. 1995). Adverse selection happens when those with the
higher level of information are better able to make choices that benefit
them, while moral hazard is when the incentive is to conceal or mislead
others in order to benefit from the market. In terms of land markets, a
good way to think about the issue is within the principal-agent framework
(Laffont & Tirole 1993; Salanie 2005). In a transaction between a
landowner (agent) and an institution or regulator (principal), it is usually
assumed that the landowners are better informed about their costs than
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the institutions, in the context of environmental and agricultural policy
(Wu et al. 2001; Bartolini et al. 2012). In moral hazard, the institution
cannot observe landowners’ actions, and those actions affect the
probability distribution of the outcome in a way that is costly to the
institution (Hölmstrom 1979). For example, an agro-environmental
scheme requires landowners to meet a given water quality target for a
neighbouring water body. However, the un-observability of fertilizer use
by landowners may provide an incentive to maximise private profit,
compromising the probability of meeting the target. The water target is
shared by a collective of contracted landowners, and the additional
presence of stochastic influences, such as rainfall, prevents the
regulator inferring a direct relationship between behaviour and water
quality (Harvey 2010). Therefore, the collective incentive provides a
temptation to free ride at the individual level.
In adverse selection, landowners have hidden characteristics, e.g. land
quality, that affect their cost of complying with the contract, and the
regulator cannot observe them (Akerlof 1970). For example, in the
context of conservation contracting, landowners (agents) know better
than the programme administrator (principal) about how participation (in
conservation actions) affect their production plans and profit (Latacz-
Lohmann & Schilizzi 2005). In this circumstance, there is an economic
incentive to hide the real cost of participation in the expectation of
extracting surplus rent, informational rent capture (figure 3.4). Capture
of informational rent is a concern because it leads to reduced cost-
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effectiveness for the principal under a limited budget (Latacz-Lohmann
& Schilizzi 2005; Ferraro 2008; Harvey 2010).
Adverse selection is of particular interest because it can have a feedback
effect on land prices. The informational rent captured by landowners
increases net returns per hectare in the same way as an agricultural
subsidy that entails a direct payment de-coupled from production. Direct
de-coupled agricultural subsidies, such as direct payments linked to
farmed area, have been shown to increase the price of farmland, even
impacting on the rural allocation of land (Weersink et al. 1999; Patton et
al. 2008; Latruffe & Le Mouël 2009). In this way, a conservation incentive
payment to set-aside farmland can increase the opportunity cost of
farmland, ultimately increasing the incentive payment (figure 3.5). This
is because, in order to forgo production, payment levels need to be at
least similar to the opportunity cost of setting aside land.
Most environmental studies dealing with hidden information have
focused on designing optimal contracts that minimise informational rent
capture based in contract theory within the context of agro-
environmental and carbon payments (Cagé 2009; Bartolini et al. 2012;
Mason & Plantinga 2013). The data required to model informational rent
extraction principally include data on the distribution of costs of
compliance for agents, as well as cost/payment information for the
principal. Distribution of agents’ costs can be estimated either through
actual cost data, proxy data such as farmland productivity or land quality,
or using revealed preference methods.
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Figure 3.3 Marketmodel showing the mechanism of a feedback due to increasedamenity value.
Horizontal axes show the amount of open-space and housing land available for the open-space and housing market
respectively. DL0 and SL0, DH0 and SH0 represent supply and demand of the open-space and housing markets respectively
at initial equilibrium (prices p0 and quantities q0). For ease of comparison, prices for open-space and housing are
represented in the same scale. Agricultural set-asides have the effect of increasing demand for open-spaces, resulting in
a new equilibrium (pL2 and qL2) in which more land is traded at a higher price. This increase in price increases demand for
development to DH2. This has a new equilibrium (pH2and qH2) in whichmore land and housing is traded at a higher price.
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Figure 3.4 Market model for informational rent extraction. There is
a distribution of costs of setting aside land, represented by high (MCH)
to low (MCL) marginal cost curves. These values are not observable by
the conservation organisation, which offers a payment to offset the cost
of setting-aside at MCav. For the amount for set-aside (qp) corresponding
to the equilibrium with demand at MCav, individuals with costs
determined by MCH would not participate. However, individuals with MCL
have a potential revenue (area shaded in pink) if they don’t reveal their
real cost. This area shaded in pink is the informational rent extracted.
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Table 3.1 Situations that lead to market failure. These are situations in which the allocation of goods and services
by markets is not efficient, and can occur simultaneously. The presence of any one of these situations leads to market
failure.
Market Failure Description Examples Studies in conservation
Productive and
allocative
inefficiency
Failure to produce and allocate scarce
resources in the most efficient way
Moments of food shortage,
disease outbreaks and
vaccines
In general, ecological– economic approaches towards biodiversity are based on the idea of scarcity
(Baumgärtner et al. 2006)
Monopoly power
Failure to control abuses of monopolistic
power Monopoly of services
Development of eco-tourism in the context of state's monopoly over access to forests in South India
(Münster & Münster 2012)
Missing markets
Failure to form, resulting in a failure to meet a
need or want Public goods
In villages around protected areas, markets for certain resources, e.g. fuelwood, will fail to form if the
transaction costs of getting resource products to distant markets outweigh the benefits (Muller & Albers
2004)
Incomplete
markets Failure to produce merit goods Education, Healthcare
About 90% of the finances for land-related PES projects in 2009 were created by command, based on
incomplete markets (Vatn 2015)
De-merit goods
Failure to control the production of goods that
have less merit than consumers perceive Cigarettes, alcohol -
Negative
externalities
Failure to take into account cost of an action
on third parties. Pollution
Ecotourism can have external costs on the resources it intends to protect, for example, in a survey of
United States National Park superintendents studying the adverse impacts associated with tourists,
84.1% reported negative impacts of visitors on native flora and fauna (Wang & Miko 1997)
Property rights
Failure to assign property rights, which may
limit the ability of markets to form Common property
PES to provide alternatives to logging in Indonesia would not work because communities would not be
able to enforce a PES agreement due to weak property rights (Engel & Palmer 2008)
Information
failure
Failure to provide enough information
because there is an incentive to hide
information
Cost of pollution
abatement
In contractual relationships involving PES, conservation buyers know less than landowners know about
the costs of contractual compliance. This enables landowners to extract informational rents from
conservation buyers by using their private information as a source of market power. This rent capture
needs to be minimised to improve conservation cost-effectiveness (Ferraro 2008)
Unstable
markets Volatile markets fail to reach equilibrium
Certain agricultural
markets, foreign
exchange, credit markets
Young markets with new instruments are unstable making prices volatile, such as carbon markets.
These conditions have seen the development of subprime carbon, contracts with high risks of not being
fulfilled in terms of greenhouse gas emission reductions. This can have consequences for food security
when these contracts are bundled with other agricultural and non-agricultural contracts into commodity
index funds (Mol 2012)
Inequality Failure to limit the gap between earners Perpetuation of pay-gaps
International PES will entail a net upward redistribution of wealth from poorer to wealthier classes and
from rural regions to distant centres of capital accumulation, mainly in the global North. This is because
the market model, in which profit incentives depend upon differential opportunity costs (Mcafee 2012)
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Figure 3.5 Feedback of agricultural set-aside payments on the opportunity cost of land. The opportunity cost of
agricultural land (OC) determines the incentive payments to set-aside land. At the same time, there is variability in the
OC, and farmers that have an OC lower than the payment capture a surplus rent called informational rent. This rent
increases agricultural land rent extraction, which increases the price of land, in turn increasing the opportunity cost of
land and incentive payment necessary for set-asides to take place.
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3. The case study
3.1 Socio-economic context
Country Profile
Brazil has chosen a development path that heavily relies on agriculture
for economic growth (Barros 2009). Agricultural production accounts for
6% of Brazil’s gross domestic product (GDP) (SM table 2), while the
entire agribusiness sector contributes to approximately 25% of the
country’s GDP (Martinelli et al. 2010). Fifteen percent of employment is
taken up by this sector (SM table 2), and in 2016 the country’s total credit
to agriculture was ~$7,000 million USD (broad definition which includes
Forestry and Fishing, FAOSTAT), the third-highest volume in credit to
agriculture (FAO 2015).
National policies to support agriculture include macro economic
adjustments, price supports and other fiscal incentives, favourable
agricultural trade policies, and investments in research and
development. These have transformed Brazil into a powerhouse of food,
fibre and biofuel production (Barros 2009; Martinelli et al. 2010). Brazil
is the second largest food exporter (~$60,000 million USD, SM table 2),
and among the top 15 food producing countries based on net per capita
production value (FAOSTAT, FAO 2015). The country is a leading
producer and exporter of soybean, sugar, coffee, oranges, poultry, beef,
and ethanol, but is also one of the world top 10 exporters of forest
products (~$7,500 million USD in 2012, FAOSTAT, FAO 2015) (SM
table 3). Even though it is decreasing its emissions, Brazil is the third
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largest greenhouse gas emitter in agriculture (~450 Mt CO2eq in 2012),
and the second in land use total emissions (~800 Mt CO2eq in 2012,
FAO 2015).
The success of the agricultural sector has been associated with
widespread destruction of Brazilian ecosystems, especially the Cerrado
and the Brazilian Amazon rainforest in the past decades (Cumming et
al. 2012; Walker 2012b; Rada 2013). From the year 2000, Brazil has
seen increasing intensification and commoditization of agriculture,
resulting in a decrease of ~40% in greenhouse gas emissions since
2005 and de-coupling of deforestation and agriculture (Lapola et al.
2014). For example, since the soy moratorium in 2006, only 1% of soy
expansion in the Amazon resulted in deforestation (Gibbs et al. 2015).
However, these changes in the land-use system reinforce the long-
established inequality in land ownership, contributing to rural–urban
migration that ultimately fuels the haphazard expansion of urban areas
(Lapola et al. 2014). Brazil’s status as one of the world’s most inequitable
countries in terms of income and land distribution is reinforced by this
pattern of agricultural growth, putting the sustainability of the country's
development at risk (Ocampo 2004; Martinelli et al. 2010).
Agricultural land market
The agricultural land market in Brazil has some unique characteristics,
such as low liquidity, but returns from agricultural production remain a
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key factor in market price dynamics is (Sauer & Pereira Leite 2011).
However, other factors like yield potential, soil type, rainfall pattern and
distance from markets can influence the land market (Cavailh & Thomas
2013; Choumert & Phélinas 2015). Poor logistics infrastructure - 53% of
the national transport is based on trucks (ANEC 2012) - and the massive
average distance to ports (>1000 km) make the distance to infrastructure
an important determinant of agricultural rent (Wohlenberg 2014).
In Brazil, land markets have become very dynamic in recent years due
to the growth of agribusiness, attracting the interest of investors given
the large amount of land available for agricultural expansion (Sauer &
Pereira Leite 2012; Brewer 2015). The less developed areas of the
country, known as the agricultural frontiers, where land prices are lower
compared to traditional areas, attract the attention of investors because
by occupying marginal areas before investments in infrastructure and
transportation have occurred, there is a greater future appreciation
potential (Wohlenberg 2014). However, this variability in the elasticity of
supply of agricultural land renders typical farmland market equilibrium
analyses, which consider only factors on the demand side and make the
implicit assumption that the stock of land is constant, inapplicable
(Rezende 2002; Sauer & Pereira Leite 2012). In less occupied regions
an increase in demand for land may lead to a negative impact on land
prices because of the higher elasticity of the land supply and the
possibility of converting lands and pastures into agricultural areas,
whereas in the developed areas the relationship is positive, since land
supply is almost inelastic (Barr et al. 2011; Ferro 2012).
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The wider economic context also has an effect on agricultural land
prices, modifying price signals. For example, in Brazil in the 1970s the
increase in the price of agricultural land was much higher than the
increase in the price of leasing land, suggesting that the benefits of land
tenure as an asset were higher than the benefits derived from
agricultural production (Ferro & Castro 2013). Speculation is an
important factor in the agricultural frontier region, different from that
observed in other regions, highlighting the strong interest of investor
groups interested in the potential of land appreciation in that region
(Ferro 2012). Wohlenberg (2014) observed that in Brazil, areas far from
end markets are exposed to greater changes in land prices and those
same areas are more susceptible to price cycles.
3.2 Forest restoration in the context of agricultural land markets
For restoration to be a successful conservation measure in the BAF,
regional level spatial conservation planning is a necessary step (Calmon
et al. 2009; Rodrigues et al. 2009). Furthermore, accounting for the
dynamics of the system, both environmental and economic, could
potentially have major impacts on spatial prioritisation outputs
(Armsworth et al. 2006; Butsic et al. 2013; Crouzeilles et al. 2015;
Goulart et al. 2015). In the following section, I assess the application of
market feedbackmodels within a spatial planning approach to prioritising
areas for forest restoration via agricultural set-asides in the BAF.
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4. Evaluating approaches to modelling land market feedbacks for
the BAF
The BAF overlaps with 17 federative units (or states, UF) that extend
across a massive 3.4 million sq. km (40% of Brazil; SM table 5, figure
1.1 in Chapter 1). Some of these states overlap with the Cerrado biome,
and are considered part of the agricultural frontier (Rada 2013), and
others have well-developed infrastructure and farmland, for example,
Sao Paulo produces 60% of Brazil’s sugarcane production (SM table 4).
Consequently, the land market will have local, as well as regional
characteristics. Commodity production is localised for sugar cane and
oranges, with Sao Paulo generating >60% of national production.
However, for other commodities such as soybean, chicken and beef,
production is more evenly distributed between multiple states.
Therefore, defining the relevant scale for modelling market feedbacks in
the BAF is a crucial challenge. I excluded feedbacks from increased
amenity value because they were not relevant across for the case study
due to their local effects.
Feedback from increased demand for land
Large-scale restoration initiatives can become one more major
competitor for land, an increasingly scarce resource due to a larger,
more affluent human population (Smith et al. 2010). In the BAF, a large-
scale increase in the demand for agricultural land from the conservation
sector could, in theory, have a feedback effect on agricultural land price
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(Table 3.2). Modelling the market for agricultural land can be
approached with a simple partial equilibrium model, where commonly
supply is assumed to be inelastic (Hertel 2010). However, in the BAF
this assumption does not hold (Ferro & Castro 2013), as geographical
location has a potentially strong effect on model parameters that shape
supply and demand (Wohlenberg 2014). For the spatial prioritisation to
be meaningful for ecological restoration, land markets would need to be
modelled at least at the municipality level, but the data required for local
land market modelling are not available for the BAF.
Feedback from reduced supply in commodity
Large-scale restoration could also result in agricultural production loss,
which given the role of the BAF in the global production of sugarcane,
coffee and oranges (SM table 3), could move the price of these
commodities, having an effect on the price of land for their production
(Table 3.2).
Modelling this feedback in a spatially explicit way could be done by
coupling a spatially explicit land rent model, for example, a von Thünen
model, with a global general/partial equilibrium trade model (either
GTAP or GAMS). The von Thünen model is a model of land use that
illustrates the trade-off between land values and the distance from points
of attraction, e.g. markets, in which land is allocated to the use that yields
the highest rents, and the rents of various land uses are determined by
location (von Thünen 1966). In conservation, this model has been used
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to analyse forest cover change by considering a simple model where
land has two uses: agriculture and forest (Angelsen 2007b). The von
Thünen together with the incentive payment, determines which areas
are set-aside defining whether or not there is a decrease in the
production of commodities. The decrease in the supply of the commodity
feeds into the global general/partial equilibrium trade model, which as a
consequence finds a new price for the commodity. This new price is the
input for the von Thünen model to find the new demand for land (see
supplementary materials for a case study). However, for the feedback to
be significant, changes in the supply of the commodity have to be large
enough.
In the BAF case study, there are three commodities that could potentially
move global commodity prices, sugarcane, coffee and oranges (SM
table 3). Sugarcane and oranges are mostly produced in Sao Paulo, and
coffee in Minas Gerais (SM table 3). Figure 3.6 shows, for each
commodity, what percentage of global production is affected as a
function of the area set-aside within the major producing states. Even if
half of the existing area of each of the commodities within those states
were withdrawn from production, which is an unrealistically high target,
global supply would be affected by no more than 8%. This forgone
agricultural production might not be enough to move global commodity
price. Consequently, modelling this feedback in a spatially explicit way
might not translate into important effects on the price of land. The effect
of different set-aside amounts on global trade could be tested in
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standardised models like GTAP, and based on results a decision could
be made whether to model the full coupled system or not.
Feedback from informational rent capture
Given the extent of the BAF, and the fact that landowners know the costs
of setting aside their agricultural land better than the agencies that will
be implementing the restoration project, informational rent capture is
practically unavoidable, producing a potentially significant feedback on
the price of land (Table 3.2). Informational rent capture models are
available in the contract theory literature (e.g. Corbett & Tang 1999;
Laffont & Martimort 2009). The biggest limitation for modelling these
feedbacks is access to data that enables the estimation of the variability
in the cost of setting aside agricultural land at a resolution that is
meaningful for the restoration programme, ecologically and
institutionally. This means enough samples of the cost of setting aside
land at, for example, the county level, allowing for the estimation of the
distribution of costs at the county level. This grain then could be
matched with ecological data without losing too much information on the
feature to be preserved. Proxies for the opportunity cost of agricultural
land can be used to estimate set-aside costs, including the price of
agricultural land and agricultural land rent estimates from production.
Informa Economics IEG FNP (http://www.informaecon-
fnp.com/english/aboutus) is the Brazilian division of the Informa
Economics group, and it operates in consulting and agribusiness
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information. This organisation owns a 25-year database of bi-monthly
surveys of prices for agricultural properties bought/sold for the whole of
Brazil. These results in multiple observations of the cost of land for every
two-month period that are classified by land type, which are aggregated
into regions that are homogeneous in term of land price determinants
(e.g. access to markets, land use type, and climatic variables.). These
regions vary in size but are comparable to the meso-region scale in
Brazil (small groups of municipalities, for more details on the data, see
Chapter 4). This unique dataset meets all requirements to model
informational rent capture.
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Figure 3.6 Forgone global production of Coffee, Oranges and Sugarcane for productive land set-aside in the
Federative units with the highest production of said commodities. Sao Paulo produces 60% of Brazil’s sugarcane,
and 80% of Oranges; Minas Gerais produces 55% of Brazil’s Coffee. The dashed grey horizontal line marks 8% of
global production, dashed vertical lines mark half of the cultivated area for commodities in Sao Paulo and Minas Gerais.
Based on yields: 1.58 tonnes/ha for Coffee, 79.24 tonnes/ha for Sugarcane and 21.44 tonnes/ha for oranges. Data from
IBGE SIDRA, agricultural census 2006.
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Table 3.2 Modelling feedbacks in the Brazilian Atlantic Forest
Feedback Mechanism
Spatially explicit
modelling Data requirements Challenges
Increase in the
demand for
land
An increase in demand for land by
conservation groups shifts the
demand curve outward, which
results in more land being traded in
the market at a higher price
Local partial equilibrium
models, where the
increase in demand is
given by the restoration
target
x Time series data on land
cost or land rent,
x Elasticity of supply and
demand
Data at a spatial
resolution that is
relevant for ecological
processes
Decrease in
commodity
supply
A large enough decrease in the
supply of commodities can increase
their price, increasing profitability of
land
General/partial equilibrium
model coupled with a
spatially explicit model of
land rents
x Data for commodity at
appropriate scale (supply,
demand, elasticities)
x Data on yields, labour,
transport costs, distances to
markets for spatially explicit
model
Decrease in commodity
large enough to move
its price, complexity
added for agricultural
substitutes
Informational
rent capture
An increase in net returns to land
due to informational rent capture
can increase the price of land
Local model of
informational rent
extraction
x Data on spatial variability on
the costs or opportunity
costs of land
x Data on incentive payments
Enough data on spatial
variability of opportunity
costs of land at
relevant spatial scale
Increase in
amenity value
Open space protection increases
the amenity value of neighbouring
land, which generally increases the
value of development relative to
agriculture or forestry, increasing
future purchase price and as well as
development risk
Hedonic estimates of land
prices
x Panel data on property
values and transactions
Data at a spatial
resolution that is
relevant for ecological
processes
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5. Discussion
Understanding the unintended consequences of conservation
interventions via market mechanisms have been highlighted as crucial
for conservation cost-effectiveness for at least 10 years (Armsworth et
al. 2006; Polasky 2006). A few studies have addressed this need using
theoretical frameworks to show land market feedback effects of reserve
establishment in conservation planning (Armsworth et al. 2006;
Dissanayake & Önal 2011; Zvoleff & An 2014b). However, only a few
empirical applications have studied market feedbacks in conservation,
and they are at local scales, or at large scale but not in a spatially explicit
way (Walker 2012b; Butsic et al. 2013). In other fields, however, such as
land economics, these assessments are commonplace, and modelling
and data analysis approaches are well established (Quigley & Rosenthal
2005; van Meijl et al. 2006). Therefore, there is considerable potential
for modelling land market feedbacks and their potential effects on
conservation. In this chapter, I took a case study area, the BAF, as an
example of an area where large-scale conservation-focused land use
change is planned, in the form of a forest restoration programme. I
assessed the degree to which different land market feedbacks are likely
for this area, and how these might be modelled.
This assessment found two main limitations for large-scale empirical
applications: firstly, modelling land market feedbacks requires spatially
explicit data on land markets at a spatial and temporal resolution that is
not easily available, particularly for the more remote, developing country
regions where conservation effort is often focussed. Secondly, even for
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countries such as Brazil, that are leading agricultural exporters, moving
land into conservation might not have a large enough impact on global
commodity price to cause a feedback via forgone agricultural production.
If production is mainly for local consumption, a model of the local market
could show strong feedback effects of forgone agriculture. However,
most commodities are globally traded so a reduction in local supply could
be easily met with supply from markets outside the local production,
negating an effect on price. Consequently, modelling the feedbacks of
forgone agriculture is unlikely to show an effect.
Increasingly, conservation organisations are moving towards cost-
effective conservation, which has led to the adoption of systematic
conservation planning approaches across the globe and multiple spatial
conservation plans even for the same regions (McIntosh et al. 2016).
Large-scale spatial prioritisations need a spatial unit that will reflect the
ecological process being preserved (Margules & Pressey 2000b).
However, the spatial grain over which socio-economic data are available
is often much coarser than the spatial grain that the prioritisation needs
to respond to on the conservation side, whether for ecological or
institutional reasons (Armsworth 2014). This mismatch between the
scale at which socio-economic data are available and the scale at which
priorities have to be set from the ecology perspective, is an obstacle to
accounting for market dynamics in spatial planning. Finding ways of
bridging this mismatch, such as using simulations that bring the datasets
into the same spatio-temporal resolution, are key to the integration of
market dynamics in spatial conservation planning.
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In the BAF case study, three of the proposed feedbacks on the price of
land have the potential to be significant; these are informational rents,
feedbacks on land prices, and feedbacks through prices of foregone
agricultural production. Given the spatial scale covered in restoring the
BAF, informational rent capture has the potential to be quite large,
potentially having a significant effect on project cost-effectiveness. Due
to the limited amount of exploration, this topic has had in conservation
planning, modelling this feedback could provide new insight into the role
of this type of market failure in determining priorities for conservation.
Additionally, a comparative empirical assessment of the relative
importance of feedbacks via the price of land could also prove important.
In some particularly developed states, such as Sao Paulo, all four
feedbacks (including the fourth feedback, amenity value) have the
potential to be important, and being the richest state, it has high-
resolution socio-economic data available.
Payment for ecosystems services, in this case, to set-aside agricultural
land, are a conservation intervention centred on providing an economic
incentive for changing behaviour (Wunder 2006; Daily & Matson 2008).
As such, this incentive will interact with other economic incentives within
the political context (Jack et al. 2008). Incentive-based mechanisms
include charges (such as taxes, user fees, and deposit–refund systems),
subsidies, tradable permits (including markets for pollution reduction and
tradable development rights), and market friction reduction (e.g., liability
rules and information programs) (Jaffe et al. 2003). Interactions between
mechanisms instituted for conservation and those instituted for other
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reasons and by other sectors could amplify or reduce the effect of
conservation-induced market feedbacks. For example, a PES that
reduces farmland area competes directly with land-linked direct
subsidies for agriculture, trading off one incentive for another (Latruffe &
Le Mouël 2009). However, PES schemes can increase the average yield
of farmland by pushing out of production the least productive areas
(Angelsen 2010). Consequently, in countries (such as Brazil) where
taxes to agricultural land are based on the number of hectares under
agricultural use, conservation-motivated PES schemes could have a
larger impact on the price of land because they reduce property tax, but
increase average yield. Therefore, there is a key research need in
understanding the interactions between conservation-motivated
incentive mechanisms and incentive mechanisms that are already in
place to address priorities in other parts of the economy. This has not
been traditionally researched in conservation science, although there is
increasing focus on navigating trade-offs between different conservation
targets at the global level, as well as trade-offs between provision of
different ecosystem services at the landscape level (e.g. (Seppelt et al.
2011; Lester et al. 2013; Castro et al. 2014)).
A serious potential feedback effect of protecting land is displacement of
exploitation to distant areas (Angelsen 2007a). A key challenge for large-
scale restoration initiatives is avoiding displacement of land uses, or
leakage, which can result in loss of biodiversity in distant parts of the
same country, or different countries (Schwarze et al. 2002; Melo et al.
2013b). This is beyond the scope of this chapter, but it something that is
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important to bear in mind for future research; general equilibrium and
partial equilibrium models could be of use in predicting the potential for
leakage at different scales (Carrasco et al. 2014).
In Brazil, the economic focus on agriculture for development poses a
further challenge to integrating large scale restoration and increased
agricultural production, at the national level (Alves-Pinto et al. 2017).
Restoration in areas with high cattle productivity in the BAF has been
shown to increase the risk of cattle ranching displacement to other
biomes (Latawiec et al. 2015). Even restricting deforestation in the BAF,
which results in little loss of national GDP, has disproportionate impact
on the agricultural and food sector because of the high importance of the
BAF area for agricultural production (de Souza Rodrigues Cabral &
Gurge 2014). However, the BAF presents a unique opportunity for large-
scale restoration due to its high potential for improved agricultural
efficiency (Joly et al. 2014a). For example, even though Brazil is among
the biggest beef producers worldwide (FAOSTAT, 2015), cattle ranching
is based on an extensive system with a stocking rate that is
approximately 33% of its sustainable potential (Strassburg et al. 2014a).
It has been suggested that combined efforts to promote sustainable
intensification, accompanied by other strategies such as diversification
of activities and PES for restoration, could result in tropical forest
restoration without risking perverse outcomes for food production and
development in Brazil (Brancalion et al. 2012; Pinto et al. 2014; Alves-
Pinto et al. 2017).
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6. Conclusion
Large-scale restoration projects can trigger multiple economic feedback
effects that can potentially undermine the overall outcome. However,
socio-economic data availability, a mismatch in scale between data
availability and prioritisation grain, and economic model complexity
present restrictions to accounting for these feedbacks in spatial
conservation planning. The BAF presents a unique opportunity in terms
of scale and policy relevance for accounting for economic feedbacks,
and I identify an informational rent capture feedback as the most relevant
and potentially informative to model. This chapter provides valuable
insight into accounting for economic dynamics in a real-life case study;
the remaining outstanding questions could provide guidance for future
work.
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Chapter 4: Spatial conservation planning accounting for
environmental and economic feedbacks
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1. Introduction
In order to design cost-effective interventions, conservation planners
need to consider both social and ecological dynamics throughout the
planning process. In systematic conservation planning, effectiveness
depends partly on accounting for natural and anthropogenic dynamics
(Pressey et al. 2007). Nonetheless, many organisations do not go
beyond mapping to identify priority areas when undertaking conservation
planning (McIntosh et al. 2016), either based on primary data or models,
which cannot account for feedbacks caused by the planned intervention.
The most widely used tools for spatial conservation planning still use
static approaches to derive priority solutions (Larrosa et al. 2016),
including Marxan (Ball et al. 2009), which is unable to easily integrate
stochastic or temporally dynamic data (Ardron et al. 2010).
Ecosystem dynamics have been included in conservation planning using
dynamic optimization methods for natural resource management
problems and restoration (Wilson et al. 2011; Williams & Johnson 2013).
Modelling of vegetation succession dynamics has been done with the
conservation planning software “Marxan with Zones” to incorporate
ecological dynamics in decision-making (Levin et al. 2013). The impact
of social processes on conservation planning outcomes has been
demonstrated by incorporating development risk (Costello & Polasky
2004) and market feedbacks (Wu et al. 2001, Butsic et al. 2013, Duke et
al. 2013) into reserve selection. Armsworth et al. (2006) showed using a
theoretical model that buying land to protect it could lead to an increased
probability of habitat conversion elsewhere in the landscape and result
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in overall biodiversity losses. This is because the act of buying land
increases its market price and accelerates its development. Land market
feedbacks triggered by the conservation purchases themselves could,
therefore, lead to undermined and even perverse outcomes. Some
studies have shown that dynamic conservation planning improves
project cost-effectiveness (Tambosi 2014), whilst in others, the benefits
were not so clear (Butsic et al. 2013). However, the joint effect of land
market feedbacks together with ecosystem dynamics has yet to be
empirically assessed in conservation planning.
Ecological set-asides on private land are a promising strategy to
preserve biodiversity and ecosystem services across farming
landscapes, especially where large numbers of small purchases are
required (Dobson et al. 2006). Setting aside private land for conservation
nonetheless comes with financial costs to the landowner, and in order to
forgo production, incentive payments need to be at least similar to the
opportunity cost of setting aside land. As shown in chapter 3,
conservation interventions that promote land cover changes can have
an effect on land prices via market feedbacks due to changes in the
supply and demand for land and agricultural commodities. These
changes in land price could lead to larger incentive payments in the
future, increasing the overall cost of the program, or affecting ecological
outcomes when the budget is limited.
Another mechanism by which feedback effects of a set-aside program
can increase the price of land is through the capture of informational rent.
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After owning land for a length of time, landowners form a better idea of
the cost of setting aside land than conservation agents. This is called
asymmetric information, and it is a type of market failure mechanism,
meaning that market prices do not provide the proper signals for the
efficient allocation of resources (Akerlof 1970). Landholders in such
circumstances can use their private information as a source of market
power to extract informational rent from conservation agents (Ferraro
2008). For example, consider a program where farmers receive a
payment to set-aside land for biodiversity: if the payment value is higher
than the opportunity cost of the area to be set-aside, there is an
informational rent captured by the farmers. By increasing net returns per
hectare, the programme therefore indirectly increases the price of
farmland (chapter 3).
Informational rent capture has been discussed in the conservation
literature as something to be avoided or minimized in order to increase
the effectiveness of incentive-based conservation interventions (Ferraro
2008; Ulber et al. 2011; Mason & Plantinga 2013). Reducing
informational rent capture is an important task for buyers of
environmental services who wish to maximize the services obtained
from their limited budgets. One way of reducing informational rent
capture is by obtaining information on observable landowner attributes
that are correlated with opportunity costs, which can be costly and still
be inaccurate (Ferraro 2008). Another way of reducing informational rent
include revelation mechanisms, which entail designing contracting
systems to induce landowners to reveal their hidden information, and are
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increasingly used for payment for ecosystem services (PES) contract
design. They tend to increase programme cost-effectiveness, but the
amount by which they do so depends on a number of things, such as
how much information on potential conservation benefits and timeline is
revealed to landowners, the auction pricing rule, and whether it is a static
(one bidding period) or dynamic (multiple bidding periods) market setting
(de Vries & Hanley 2016). Additionally, achieving fairness in PES
through auctions has been shown to be very challenging (Narloch et al.
2013). Costs of reducing that information gap through either mechanism
will increase with programme scale, and might even not be feasible for
large-scale programs. Reducing the information gap for increased cost-
effectiveness might not be beneficial at large scales due to the
associated costs, or when issues of fairness are considered. Within this
context, the role informational rent capture plays at large spatial scales
in spatial conservation planning is particularly relevant, and has yet to
be assessed.
There is a gap in the conservation planning literature on accounting
simultaneously for social and environmental system dynamics when
prioritising for a conservation intervention. Additionally, there is a need
to evaluate empirically the economic dynamics triggered by conservation
interventions at large scales. The aim of this chapter is to address these
gaps focusing on a farmland set aside restoration programme for the
Brazilian Atlantic Forest. I propose the first, to the best of my knowledge,
methodological framework to prioritise a large-scale set aside
programme that enables accounting for both environmental and social
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feedbacks simultaneously. The environmental feedback modelled
accounts for changes in forest connectivity using forest increment
experiments, and the economic feedback modelled accounts for
changes in the opportunity cost of farmland promoted by informational
rent capture. I evaluate the trade-offs between a static and a discrete
dynamic prioritisation approach by comparing their outputs for the same
case study. I characterise the role informational rents play in a large-
scale prioritisation, and examine how both approaches affect it. Finally,
I assess the degree to which ecological and economic characteristics of
a prioritisation unit influence which is the best prioritisation approach for
different metrics.
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2. Methods
2.1 Case Study
The Brazilian Atlantic forest (BAF) is a key global biodiversity hotspot
due to its exceptional biodiversity and extreme land cover disturbance
(Mittermier et al. 2004). It is a highly fragmented landscape that spans 8
biogeographical subregions of the Brazilian Atlantic Coast: Brejos
Nordestinos, Pernambuco, Diamantina, Bahia, Serra do Mar, Sao
Francisco, the Interior Forests (Florestas de Interior), and the Brazilian
Pines Forests (Florestas de Araucaria). Over 125 million people (or 70%
of the Brazilian population) live along the Brazilian Atlantic coast, and
the main threats to the biome are timber exploitation and agricultural
expansion (Saatchi et al. 2001).
Forest fragmentation in the BAF is a major cause of forest species losses
within the isolated forest remnants (Cardoso da Silva & Tabarelli 2000).
Restoration efforts have been underway for the past 30 years, but
scaling up restoration projects and planning restoration actions at the
landscape level remains a major challenge (Rodrigues et al. 2009; Melo
et al. 2013b). Landscape level forest connectivity regulates species level
biodiversity, wildlife movement, seed dispersal and ecological factors,
and so increasing it is an important target for biodiversity conservation
strategies (Shanthala Devi et al. 2013). Preserving large existing
remnants is crucial, as they provide a refuge to many species, however,
there is also an urgent need for restoration to ensure that biodiversity-
derived ecological functions are provided across the BAF (Banks-Leite
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et al. 2014b). In this chapter, I focus on ecological set-asides of private
land across farmlands as a strategy for the restoration of the BAF.
Although there are potentially many different costs associated with
restoration, I considered only incentive payment costs. I centred on
natural restoration, excluding active restoration costs because the
incentive payment is the central cost affected by economic feedback
effects (chapter 3).
Under the Convention on Biological Diversity's Aichi Targets, Brazil has
set a target for the “…restoration of at least 15% of degraded
ecosystems, prioritizing the most degraded biomes, hydrographic
regions and ecoregions…” by 2020 (National Target 15, www.cbd.int). I
used this as the policy target for forest restoration, under the
interpretation that the BAF is a heavily degraded biome and 15% of the
remaining biome needs to be restored. I calculated the restoration target
as of 15% of existing forest in each municipality for all the BAF, which
amounts to restoring a total of 2.68 million hectares (M ha) (table 4.1).
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Table 4.1. Policy target for the restoration of the Brazilian Atlantic
Forest. Under the Convention on Biological Diversity Aichi Targets,
Brazil has set a target of restoring at least 15% of degraded ecosystems
by 2020 (National Target 15, www.cbd.int). Biogeographical region
levels obtained by calculating the restoration of 15% of existing forest in
each municipality.
Biogeographical
subregion
Municipalities
(n)
Restoration Target
(ha)
Florestas de Araucaria 606 489,111
Bahia 248 245,200
Brejos Nordestinos 131 48,814
Diamantina 140 182,032
Florestas de Interior 1639 772,382
Pernambuco 206 63,390
Serra do Mar 265 548,188
Sao Francisco 154 327,245
2.2 Methodological Framework
2.2.1 Overview
The main objective was to compare the output of a spatial prioritisation
for two approaches: a static and a discrete dynamic approach. The
central difference between them was the incorporation of two feedback
effects of implementing agricultural set-asides in the dynamic approach;
changes in forest connectivity and in farmland rent extraction (figure 4.1).
The environmental feedback modelled the effect that agricultural set-
aside allocation has on forest connectivity. The economic feedback
modelled the effect that the allocation of payments for agricultural set-
aside has on future payment price through informational rent capture.
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The main implementation difference between the two approaches was
in the temporal scale (figure 4.2). The static approach entails one spatial
prioritisation event, and the sequential allocation of set-asides in three
time-steps. From now on the “dynamic approach” refers to a discrete
time step-wise approach to the spatial planning exercise, which includes
three spatial prioritisation events, one at each time step (for more details
see the “Temporal Scale” section below).
Figure 4.2. Time scale schedule for the static and dynamic spatial
prioritisation approaches. The prioritisation is run using Marxan. R=
farmland rent extraction ($/ha), forest connectivity increment (ha)
STATIC
Time
1.Calculate R
2.Calculate dIIC
3.Run prioritization
4.Set aside allocation
ts=1 ts=2
1.Update R
2.Update dIIC
3.Run prioritization
4.Set aside allocation
ts=3
1.Update R
2.Update dIIC
3.Run prioritization
4.Set aside allocation
DYNAMIC
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The spatial conservation planning exercise was set to meet two
conservation targets, a restoration and a forest connectivity target, at the
minimum possible cost. It involved four steps: (1) calculation of base
metrics from data, (2) calculation of prioritisation inputs, (3) spatial
prioritisation, and (4) solution assessment and implementation (figure
4.1). For the dynamic approach, there was a fifth step at each time step:
updating prioritisation input variables (figures 4.1 & 4. 2).
2.2.2 Scales, Units and Variables
Temporal scales
The static approach entailed one spatial conservation planning exercise
at time step one, that involved the four steps above mentioned (figures
4.1 & 4.2). Following the prioritisation solution, total set-aside allocation
is divided into three equal parts, and implemented one part at each time
step within a nine-year period. This is a meaningful time horizon both for
forest regeneration (Metzger et al. 2009) and program commitment
(Banks-Leite, pers. comm.).
The dynamic approach was discrete, where time moved forward in
steps. One time step represented three years, over a period of nine
years. In the first time step, I ran a spatial conservation planning exercise
in which municipalities were prioritised to be part of the set-aside
programme for the whole nine-year period, and the restoration target for
that time step was one-third of the total restoration target. For the second
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and third time steps, the same process was repeated with updated
prioritisation inputs, the only difference being the time for which
municipalities could be part of the programme (six and three years
respectively). At each time step, the approach entailed one spatial
conservation planning exercise that involved the four steps above
mentioned (figures 4.1 & 4.2).
Spatial scales
There were three spatial scales of relevance to the study: municipality,
biogeographical subregion (BR) level, and whole biome (BAF) level.
Approximately 3,400 municipalities were included in the analysis,
covering an area of 212M ha. Municipalities were grouped by the 8
biogeographical subregions that span the BAF, which were analysed
separately to ensure all subregions are represented in the priority areas,
thereby maximizing beta diversity for the whole Atlantic Forest biome
(after Tambosi et al. 2014).
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Figure 4.1. Methodological framework for restoration prioritisation approaches. The static approach involved four
steps: (1) calculation of base metrics from data, (2) calculation of prioritisation inputs, (3) spatial prioritisation, and (4)
solution assessment and implementation. The dynamic approach included updating metrics in step 1. In blue, all stages
that are updated via feedbacks. Ovals denote starting points, hexagons denote preparation steps, “D” shaped polygons
indicate that information is coming into the process, the rectangle indicates a process, the curved edged rectangle
denotes an output, and the rhombus indicates a decision (standard flow chart symbols).
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Units
The unit of analysis was a municipality because it is meaningful in policy
terms, and a good compromise between the ecological and social data
available (table 4.2). All municipalities that had at least 10 ha of forest
within them were included in the analysis.
Instead of using the municipality boundary as a hard limit for forest
connectivity, I calculated a one-kilometre buffer around the municipality’s
boundary and included all forest patches that fell within this buffer in the
calculation of forest connectivity. This was done to include information
about the municipality’s immediately neighbouring forest, as well as
avoiding problems in forest connectivity metrics created by the artificial
limits of municipalities’ boundaries.
For all forest patches, I delimited a one-kilometre buffer area where set-
asides could occur; meaning that in the forest increment experiments
new forest patches could only be created in this potential set-aside area
(PSA). This radius is considered a relevant landscape context for bird
species occurrence in the BAF (Boscolo & Metzger 2011), and provides
a good threshold distance for the establishment of early succession
woody species and natural regeneration (Scervino & Torezan 2015).
Land classes that cannot regenerate into forest, such as urban areas,
dunes, flood lands and large water bodies were excluded from the PSA.
- 110 -
Table 4.2. Datasets included in the analysis and their treatment.
Data Type Description Reference Treatment
Geopolitical
division
Spatial,
vector
Geopolitical administrative regions for
Brazil
IBGE1 Only municipalities that overlapped with forest were included
Forest cover Spatial,
vector
2011-2012 remnant data constructed
by visual interpretation of TM/Landsat-
5, ETM+/7 and CCD/CBERS-2 images,
at a scale of 1:50,000, delimiting more
than 260,000 forest remnants > 3 ha
SOS Mata
Atlantica and
INPE (2011)
The dataset was simplified in order to consider only two
classes: forest, non-forest. Non-forest was land classes that
are not forest but cannot regenerate into forest, including:
urban areas, dunes, and floodlands and large water bodies.
Biogeographical
subregion
Spatial,
vector
Biogeographical subregions of Brazil da Silva and
Casteleti
(2003)
Only subregions that overlapped with Atlantic forest were
included: Brejos Nordestinos, Pernambuco, Diamantina,
Bahia, Serra do Mar, Sao Francisco, the Interior Forests
(Florestas de Interior), and the Brazilian Pines Forests
(Florestas de Araucaria).
Farmland Table Amount of farmland per municipality,
2006 agricultural census
IBGE’s
SIDRA2
Price of farmland Spatial,
vector
Most frequent price of rural land
purchases in 2013, by homogeneous
region
IFNP (2013) The dataset is based on regions that are homogeneous in
terms of markets (main city for buying and selling agricultural
inputs and produce), land use type, and climatic variables.
The BAF area overlaps with 99 regions, which vary in sizes
and number of municipalities contained; it is due to their
homogeneous characteristics that I can use municipality as a
prioritisation unit.
1IBGE, www.ibge.gov.br, 2SIDRA, www.sidra.ibge.gov.br
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Within municipalities, I defined Forest Landscape (FL) as the area of
existing forest plus its corresponding PSA. Defining landscapes for
restoration is a controversial issue. Studies in the BAF region have used
a range of landscape sizes that vary from 10 to 10,000 hectares to define
landscapes for forest dwelling species (Tambosi et al. 2014).
Approximately 87% of FL areas fell within this size interval.
Variables
The variables used to evaluate restoration priorities, calculated in step 2
(figure 4.1), were forest connectivity increment (dIIC, ha), cost (USD,
from now on $) and contribution to the restoration target (amount of set-
aside (SA), ha) at the municipality level. I used dIIC to assess set-asides
that resulted in the largest increases in forest connectivity in the long
term, given that passive restoration is not an instant process of forest
restoration. Target achievement was assessed at the biogeographical
subregion level.
Variables used to compare approaches (static vs. dynamic) were cost
($), forest connectivity increment (ha), informational rent capture ($), set-
aside cost-effectiveness (ha/$), forest connectivity increment cost-
effectiveness (ha/$), and proportional informational rent capture
(proportion of each $ spent that is captured as informational rent). These
variables were compared for the whole BAF, as well as subregion and
municipality levels (variables were divided by hectares set-aside for
comparability), and across time (variables were divided by years in
programme for comparability).
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2.2.3 Data and software
Data
The datasets that form the basis for this analysis are forest cover,
geopolitical divisions, biogeographical subregions (BRs), farmland
availability and price of farmland (table 4.2).
Forest cover was based on the BAF 2011-2012 remnant data
constructed by visual interpretation of TM/Landsat-5, ETM+/7 and
CCD/CBERS-2 images, at a scale of 1:50,000, delimiting more than
260,000 forest remnants > 3 ha (SOS Mata Atlantica & INPE 2011). The
dataset was simplified in order to consider only two classes: forest, non-
forest. Non-forest included land classes that are not forest but cannot
regenerate into forest, including urban areas, dunes, and flood lands and
large water bodies.
Land price was based on the 2013 yearbook of the purchase price of
rural land (IFNP 2013). A survey of prices for properties bought/sold is
the central land price data. The structure of the dataset is based on
regions and land types. The country was divided into 133 regions that
are homogeneous considering markets (main city for buying and selling
agricultural inputs and produce), land use type, and climatic variables.
For each region, main “land types” were identified using a classification
based on land use type, distance to market, soil type, climatic variables,
level of agricultural intensification, mechanization possibilities, distance
to rivers, elevation and slope, current and past vegetation, and other
variables that affect land prices in each specific region. There are over
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1000 land types for Brazil, each with their land price. For each region
and land type, the most frequent purchase value is published in R$/ha
(reais per hectare) and USD/ha. The BAF area overlaps with 99 regions,
which vary in sizes and number of municipalities contained; it is due to
the regions' homogeneous characteristics that I can use municipality as
the prioritisation unit. For the analysis, the original dataset land-types
were re-classified into two categories: farmland (included pasture and
agricultural land types) and other (land that cannot be set-aside for
restoration because it would not regenerate into forest, including forest
itself, and ecosystems that are not forest, such as Cerrado and
Caatinga).
The geopolitical administrative regions (2013) spatial dataset was
obtained from the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE,
www.ibge.gov.br) in January 2015. Farmland availability per municipality
was obtained from Brazil’s 2006 agricultural census at IBGE’s Automatic
Recovery System (SIDRA, www.sidra.ibge.gov.br) in May 2015.
Farmland included the area of crops, pasture and agroforestry.
Biogeographical subregions (BR) data were obtained from da Silva and
Casteleti (2003).
Software
The central software used in this analysis was R 3.2.1 (R Core Team
2016), used for data manipulation, modelling, figure creation and from
which other software were called to run. ArcGIS 10 (Esri 2011) and
Python 3.5.2 (https://www.python.org) were used for data visualization,
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data manipulation and figure creation. Conefor Sensinode 2.5.8
command line version (Saura & Torné 2009) was used for forest
connectivity calculation, and MARXAN (Ball et al. 2009) was used for
spatial prioritisation planning.
2.2.4 Spatial conservation planning exercise (figure 4.1)
2.2.4 Step 1: Calculation of base metrics
Potential set-aside (PSA)
Potential set-aside (PSA) is the area of the forest landscape (FL) that is
available for regeneration, and it is calculated as FL area minus forest
area for each municipality.
Forest connectivity (ECA(IIC))
I used a graph theory approach to evaluate landscape connectivity, due
to its simplicity of representation, robustness, predictive power, and high
potential to incorporate connectivity functional attributes (Urban & Keitt
2001). The integral index of connectivity (IIC, Pascual-Hortal and Saura
2006) is recommended as the best binary index for the type of
connectivity analysis performed, presenting consistent and robust
behaviour for analysing landscape changes (Saura & Pascual-Hortal
2007). IIC has been applied in many conservation planning case studies
(Saura et al. 2011a), as well as for landscape monitoring purposes
(Rappaport et al. 2015a), due to its suitability for evaluating the impact
of spatial changes on functional landscape connectivity.
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To calculate IIC, each municipality is depicted as a graph in which forest
patches are the nodes, patch area is used as the node’s attribute, and
biological information on organisms’ dispersal capability is used to define
the links between nodes, which represent the functional connectivity. IIC
ranges from 0 to 1 and increases with improved connectivity. It is given
by:
, (4.1)
where n is the total number of forest patches in the municipality, ai and
aj are the sizes of patches i and j, nlij is the number of links in the shortest
path (topological distance) between patches i and j, and AL is the total
landscape area (comprising both habitat and non-habitat patches). For
nodes that are not connected (belong to different components), the
numerator in the equation for IIC equals zero (nlij=∞). When i=j then
nlij=0; this relates to the habitat availability (reachability) concept that
applies for IIC, in which a patch itself is considered as space where
connectivity exists. When all the landscape is occupied by habitat, then
IIC=1. IIC requires the calculation of shortest paths between every pair
of nodes, which makes it more computationally demanding than the
other binary indices (Saura & Pascual-Hortal 2007).
The IIC uses species' dispersal capability to calculate functional
connectivity. Defining this dispersal capability in a restoration strategy is
important because restoration actions based on less mobile species or
IIC =
aiaj
1+ nlijj=1
n
Â
i=1
n
Â
AL
2
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species with intermediate sensitivity to disturbance will not result in
benefits for other species (Lindenmayer et al. 2006). Tambosi (2014)
calculated changes in IIC under various restoration scenarios using 50,
200 and 500 meters as the dispersal capability, representing groups of
forest dwellers species with potentially high, intermediate and low
sensitivity to habitat loss and fragmentation. Species with similar
dispersal capability were reported in different regions of the Atlantic
Forest (Awade & Metzger 2008; Boscolo et al. 2008). For this case
study, I used 200 meters as the dispersal capability. This was because
under a similar scenario (10-hectare forest increment experiments,
landscapes under 30% forest cover, more than 3% of the landscape
restored, dynamic restoration strategy), improvements in habitat
connectivity for all three dispersal capability groups (50, 200 and 500
meters) were better than a random restoration strategy only when the
restoration strategy used the 200 meters dispersal capability.
The overall degree of connectivity of a forest landscape can be
evaluated through the IIC value or through the related Equivalent
Connected Area (ECA(IIC)), which I henceforth refer to as "connectivity".
ECA(IIC) is simply calculated as the square root of the numerator of IIC,
and it represents the size that a single forest habitat patch should have
in order to provide the same value of IIC as the actual forest habitat
pattern in the landscape (Saura et al. 2011a). I used ECA(IIC), which is
in general preferable to IIC as a summary of overall connectivity because
it has area units, it is easier to interpret, and has a more usable range of
variation (Saura et al. 2011b).
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Yearly farmland rent extraction
Farmland rent extraction (R), is estimated from the price of agricultural
land, based on the following formula:
Ri = Pi r (4.2)
where Ri is the farmland rent extraction for municipality i, Pi is the price
of farmland in municipality i, and r is the discount rate. This formula
works under the assumption of constant expected rents (R each year)
and constant discount rates (r each year), which despite being
restrictive, has been used as a “rule of thumb” to relate farmland rent
extractions to land prices (Harvey 1989; Patton et al. 2008).
2.2.4 Step 2: Calculation of prioritisation inputs
Amount of set-aside (SA)
The amount of set-aside was calculated as the set-aside required to
meet the restoration target, limited to the PSA area and the available
farmland for each municipality.
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Forest connectivity increment (dIIC)
The estimation of the forest connectivity increment (dIIC) involves two
steps: (i) forest increment experiments, and (ii) calculation of changes in
ECA(IIC).
The forest increment experiments consisted in simulating 100 times the
creation of 10-hectare patches of forest randomly within each
municipality’s potential set-aside area (PSA). This 10-ha patch size was
based on the size most commonly used in this sort of simulation
(Crouzeilles et al. 2014; Tambosi et al. 2014). The SA for each
municipality determines the total amount of potential forest increment for
the simulations.
I calculated the dIIC for each municipality i using the forest increment
simulation j such that:
(4.3)
where dIICij is the forest connectivity increment for municipality i
promoted by the forest increment simulation j. I calculated average dIIC
per municipality, and its standard error, using results from the
simulations.
Cost
The cost of including each municipality in the set-aside programme was
calculated as the annual farmland rent extraction per hectare (R,
dIICij = ECA(IIC)ij -ECA(IIC)i
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equation 4.2), multiplied by the set-aside area (SA) for each municipality
and the number of years within the programme.
Restoration Target
The restoration target in number of hectares was calculated as 15% of
the existing forest over all the BAF, which amounts to restoring a total of
2.68 million hectares. This was based on Brazil’s Convention on
Biological Diversity's Aichi Target of restoring at least 15% of degraded
ecosystems by 2020 (National Target 15, www.cbd.int).
Forest Connectivity Target
This target was set as a proxy for maximizing forest connectivity gains
for the restoration target. For each BR I calculated the total potential
forest connectivity increment for the restoration target, and set the forest
connectivity target to 90% of that total. The sensitivity of results to
different targets (80%, 90%, 100%) was tested as part of the sensitivity
analysis (supplementary materials, Annex 4); the results did not differ
substantially.
2.2.4 Step 3: Spatial prioritisation
Marxan (Ball et al. 2009) is a popular conservation planning software
with over 4200 active users from more than 180 countries (McIntosh et
al. 2016). It solves a form of the reserve selection problem whereby
planning units are selected to meet targets for a minimum total cost.
Marxan uses simulated annealing to find optimal solutions to the reserve
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selection type of problem. Simulated annealing is a probabilistic search
heuristic commonly used to optimise functions that are hard to optimise
with deterministic methods for two reasons: (1) it avoids an accumulation
of disadvantageous steps in the optimisation process; and (2) it avoids
being trapped in local optima (Maucher et al. 2011).
I used Marxan to find solutions to the problem: which municipalities do
we need to include in a set-aside programme to minimise total
programme cost subject to meeting all conservation targets, both
restoration and forest connectivity targets? Specifically, the problem that
Marxan solved was:
, (4.4)
subject to the constraint that both conservation targets (Tj) were met as
follows
(4.5)
where mk is the total number of municipalities in a given subregion k, cik
is the farmland rent extraction in municipality i in subregion k, xik is the
binary decision variable indicating whether municipality i is selected (xik
= 1) or not (xik = 0) for the solution group in subregion k, and Aijk is the
contribution of municipality i to the target j in subregion k. Units for Aijk
are in hectares for both restoration and connectivity targets.
minimise
ikc ikx
ik=1
mk
Â
ijkA ikx %
ik=1
mk
Â jkT " jk
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I set Marxan to find 1000 solutions to the objective function, with 95% as
the proportion of the target a conservation feature must reach for it to be
reported as met. Because simulated annealing is a local search
heuristic, for which the search could terminate at a local, rather than
global, optimum, the algorithm has to be repeated from different starting
solutions (Dowsland & Thompson 2012). Algorithm calibration and
sensitivity analyses were run to get robust results following the Good
Practices Handbook (Ardron et al. 2010). For details on this process see
supplementary materials (SM Annex 4).
Marxan has two spatial output files, the “best” solution and the “summed”
solution. The “best” solution is the solution with the best score amongst
all runs. The “summed” solution shows the selection frequency for each
municipality. It is good practice to use both solutions when interpreting
results and refining the algorithm (Ardron et al. 2010). I ran the complete
analysis using the best solution and found that results were not robust
enough for this type of comparative analysis with sequential
prioritisations. Following the logic behind the summed solution, I created
a “robust” solution, from now on referred to simply as “solution”, which I
used for the comparative analysis. This solution included municipalities
with the highest selection frequency decreasingly until both conservation
targets were met, using the summed solutions file.
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2.2.4 Step 4: Solution assessment and implementation
For all solutions, target achievement was assessed at the
biogeographical subregion (BR) level. For the static approach,
implementation of set-asides was done in three time-steps to match the
dynamic’s approach schedule for ease of comparison.
2.2.5 Modelling feedbacks
2.2.2.5.1 Basic principles
A static prioritisation approach assumes that the sequential allocation of
set-asides does not affect the prioritisation outcome itself. However, the
location and amount of set-aside allocation at any time-step has
environmental and economic feedback effects. The implementation of
set-asides has an effect on the prioritisation variables themselves in the
future (figure 4.1). This is modelled in the dynamic prioritisation approach
by updating both forest connectivity and farmland rent extraction before
re-prioritising at 3 time-steps (figure 4.2).
For the environmental feedback, I assumed that agricultural set-asides
regenerated into forest, increasing the forest connectivity metric in the
subsequent time step (figure 4.1). Taking into account the connectivity
value added by the set-aside could result in different prioritisation
outcomes.
The economic feedback modelled the effect that the allocation of
payments for agricultural set-aside can have on future payment price.
This feedback is caused by the informational rent capture derived from
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an asymmetry in the information on the opportunity cost of farmland
between landowners and the organization making the payments
(chapter 3). Given that the set-aside program is run at such a large scale,
I assumed a simplification in payment structure, where a single level of
payment is offered to set-aside farmland for each municipality, set at the
average rent extracted from farmland in that municipality (which from
now on I refer to as the opportunity cost of setting aside farmland).
Wherever the opportunity cost of farmland is lower than the offered set-
aside payment, additional rent is captured that increases average net
returns per farmland hectare. Assuming that the set-aside payment has
to at least match rent extraction as a condition for farmers to join the
program, increases in net returns generated by the set-aside program
could result in increases in set-aside payment in the future (figure 4.1).
Taking into account increases in set-aside payments due to set-aside
allocation could result in different prioritisation outcomes.
2.2.5.2 Environmental Feedback
Forest connectivity increment (dIIC) update
The allocation of farmland set-asides modifies forest configuration in the
future. I updated dIIC by re calculating ECA(IIC) and dIIC at each time
step with the new forest cover values. Because these metrics are based
on simulations, the mean value was employed, with the attached error.
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2.2.5.3 Economic Feedback
Informational rent calculation
In our case study, the conservation organization (principal) offers the
landowners (agents) a voluntary contract by which the principal offers an
incentive (yearly payment per agent, p (USD/ha·yr)) to the agents to set-
aside farmland (quantity, q (ha)). The minimum payment needed to
induce that action is private information for the landholder, and it varies
amongst landholders in the same municipality. The yearly payment
offered (p) by the conservation agent is determined by:
(4.6)
where i denotes the municipality, is the cost of setting aside farmland
for municipality i, and qi is the amount of farmland which the conservation
organization would like to set-aside in municipality i (determined by the
prioritisation outcome).
Each landowner (f) whose cost of setting aside farmland is lower (TL)
than the offered payment (p) captures an informational rent (Uf) defined
by:
fU = p - Lq fq (4.7)
However, the cost of setting aside farmland for the landowner is
unobservable to the principal, but it is assumed to be common
knowledge that the cost ( ) belongs to the set , with aq Q = q,qÈÎ
˘
˚
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cumulative distribution function and a density function on
. The total informational rent captured by landowners in a given
municipality depends on the distribution of opportunity costs for
that municipality. I used the estimated farmland rent extractions (R) and
created frequency histograms to estimate the probability distribution of
opportunity costs for each municipality (figure 4.3). Histogram bin
width is critical because it can change the shape of the probability
distribution. I tested three methods to calculate bin width: Sturges rule,
Friedman-Diaconis rule and Hideaki Shimazaki methodology. The effect
of bin width division method on yearly informational rent per hectare
showed no consistent bias; no method resulted in consistently
higher/lower informational rents across municipalities. I chose the
Friedman-Diaconis rule as it generated no “combed” histograms, and
created a histogram for each municipality i. For each histogram, I
calculated the mean cost ( i), mid-bin cost for bin j ( ) and probability
for the mid-bin cost for bin j ( ij). The total informational rent capture (U)
for municipality i is given by:
(4.8)
where i denotes the municipality, is the mean opportunity cost of
farmland for municipality i, and are the opportunity cost value and
its probability for bin j in municipality i respectively, and qi is the amount
F(q ) f (q)
q,qÈÎ ˘˚
F(q )
F(q )
q ij
n
q ij n ij
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of farmland which the conservation organization would like to set-aside 
in municipality i (figure 4.3). 
 
 
 
Figure 4.3. Visual aid for understanding the calculation of 
informational rent at the municipality level. The histogram shows the 
distribution of farmland rent extraction for a given municipality. I 
calculated the mean cost (  = USD $422/ha.yr-1), mid-bin cost for the 
three bins specified by the Friedman-Diaconis rule below the mean cost 
(θ1= USD $150/ha.yr-1, θ2= USD $250/ha.yr-1, θ3= USD $350/ha.yr-1) 
and the probability of those values occurring (n1, n2 and n3) in order to 
calculate total informational rent extracted by landowners for that 
municipality. 
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Farmland rent extraction update
The sum of the estimated yearly informational rent extraction per
municipality determines the increase in economic rent derived from
farmland for said municipality. However, the new opportunity cost
( ) on which to estimate payment (pi) for municipality i in the following
time step is defined as:
(4.9)
where i denotes the municipality, (t+1) denotes the subsequent time
step, is the mean farmland rent extraction for municipality i at time
step t, Ui,t is the total informational rent accrued for municipality i at time
step t, and qi,t is the total amount of farmland set-aside for municipality i
at time step t. For the calculation of Ui,t the temporal assumption is that
landowners at the lower bound of become part of the set-aside
programme first, and as time step increase landowners with increasing
set-aside cost get involved.
2.2.6 Modelling validation
Model validation and verification were an integral part of model
development to ensure an accurate representation of the real system.
There are four main areas of assessment for model validation and
F(q )
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verification (Sargent 2013): (1) data validity, (2) conceptual model
validation, (3) computerised model verification, and (4) operational
validity. Data validity was ensured by choosing best available data, data
examination for spatial consistency across relevant datasets, and
sensitivity analysis for important data transformation (for example,
generating opportunity cost histograms). Conceptual model validation
included face validation, structured walkthroughs (both supervisors, as
well as experts for the BAF system Dr Tambosi, Dr Igari, and Dr Banks-
Leite), model internal validity checks and parameter variability-sensitivity
checks (for example, this process identified Marxan’s “best solution” as
a weak step in the model, which lead to the use of the “robust solution”,
see page 119). Computerised model verification also included internal
validity checks, as well as output relationship correctness and
operational graphics (visually display results through time). Operational
validation was limited by the availability of data or results from other
studies comparing static and dynamic approaches (not found).
2.3 Regression model
Linear models were fitted to explore the effect of municipality
characteristics on the difference in results between static and dynamic
solutions. Different models were fitted for 6 response variables:
difference in opportunity cost per hectare, difference in informational rent
capture per hectare, difference in forest connectivity increment,
difference in set-aside cost-effectiveness, difference in forest
connectivity increment cost-effectiveness, and differences in the
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proportion of each dollar spent that is captured as informational rent. All
response variables were defined as differences in which negative
difference values mean that the dynamic solution has larger values than
the static solution, and positive difference values mean the opposite.
Explanatory variables included municipality size (ha), forest area (ha),
farmland area (ha), landscape area (ha), potential set-aside area (ha),
forest connectivity (ha), farmland average opportunity cost ($/ha), and
variation in opportunity cost of farmland measured by its standard
deviation ($/ha). Models were checked for multi-collinearity, and
municipality size (ha), forest area (ha), and landscape area (ha) were
excluded from all models as a result.
I expected spatial dependence in observations, and model fit
assessment showed heterogeneity of variance between regions.
Generalised least squares (GLS) models were selected in order to
account for variance structure as a function of the biogeographical
subregion. GLS are specifically weighted regressions in which a direct
marginal variance–covariance spatial structure of the responses can be
specified (Zuur et al. 2009). Model fit was assessed using residual plots
as recommended by Pinheiro and Bates (2000). For each dependent
variable, GLS model optimal residual variance structure was selected
using Akaike's Information Criterion (AIC), which takes into account both
goodness of fit and model complexity.
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3. Results
3.1 Differences in costs and benefits
The total cost of meeting the restoration target was $3,553 million (mill.
$) for the dynamic solution over the whole 9-year period (table 4.3). The
static estimation of the total cost was 3,480 mill. $ over the same period
of time. However, this did not account for the feedback on the opportunity
cost of land due to informational rent capture. When accounting for this
feedback, the total cost of the static approach was 3,797 mill. $ (table
4.3). This meant that for the static solution the programme either run out
of money and failed to fulfil the policy target, or found funds to cover the
317mill. $ deficit. In order to make results readily comparable, I assumed
the second scenario for the rest of the chapter. For a detailed description
of all results see supplementary materials Annex 5.
As expected, the total cost of meeting the government's reforestation
policy target was cheaper for the dynamic solution than the static
solution. This is because farmland opportunity costs increase over time
due the economic feedback, and in the dynamic approach cost was
updated at each time step, allowing the inclusion of the most cost-
effective municipalities every time. However, differences between
approaches were small in proportional terms at the BAF level. For each
hectare of land that was set-aside, the dynamic approach cost 6.4% less
and enabled the capture of 33.6% more informational rent than the static
approach. For each dollar spent in setting aside farmland, the dynamic
solution was 6.9% more cost effective than the static solution, and the
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proportion of a dollar captured in informational rent was 42.7% higher
than the static solution (table 4.3).
Accounting for the forest connectivity feedback did not, however, result
in a higher forest connectivity increment for the dynamic solution, which
was unexpected. At the BAF level, for each hectare of land that was set-
aside, the dynamic solution had an increase in forest connectivity that
was 4.4% smaller than the static solution. For each dollar spent the
dynamic solution was 2.2% less cost-effective in forest connectivity
terms than the static solution, though the difference was not significant
(table 4.3). Two methodological considerations explained these results,
both at BAF and BR levels. Firstly, due to the size of BRs, forest
connectivity cannot be assessed using the same methods for the whole
BR as a unit, so when comparing forest connectivity at BR level I used
summed dIIC. Summed forest connectivity increment did not account for
the improvement in forest connectivity for the BR as a unit, only how
much forest connectivity increased at the municipality level, aggregated.
Secondly, there is a non-linear relationship between forest cover and
forest connectivity, by which the same increment in forest cover results
in larger connectivity increment the larger the base forest cover is
(Rappaport et al. 2015a). The static approach resulted in a sequential
set-aside allocation in which the same municipalities received set-aside
allocations over time. Given the way the forest connectivity feedback
was defined, forest cover increased at each time step, consequently,
forest connectivity increment for the same set-aside amount increased
over time.
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Table 4.3. Comparison of results at Brazilian Atlantic Forest level. Cost, forest connectivity increment and
informational rent capture for static and dynamic prioritisation approaches for all time steps. The difference results from
subtracting dynamic from static results, negative % indicates the dynamic value is highest. For % differences, the static
results are taken as 100%. M ha: million hectares, mill. $: million USD.
Variable Units
Time Step 1 Time Step 2 Time Step 3 Total
Static Dynam. Diff.
(%)
Static Dynam. Diff.
(%)
StaticDynam. Diff.
(%)
Static Dynam. Diff.
(%)value value value value value value value value
Standardised setaside M ha 0.89 0.89 0.00 0.89 0.89 0.00 0.89 0.89 0.00 2.68 2.68 0.00
Cost mill.$ 1,756.791,703.13 3.101,335.61,185.64 11.20 704.7 658.40 6.603,797.1 3,553.46 6.40
Informational Rent mill.$ 739.63 756.00 -2.20 221.55 348.32 -57.20 1.85 177.99 -9,526.90 963.04 1,286.45 -33.60
Forest connectivity increment M ha 0.19 0.24 -27.80 0.26 0.22 14.70 0.30 0.25 15.50 0.74 0.71 4.40
Cost/ha usd/ha 1,969.231,909.08 3.101,497.11,329.02 11.20 789.9 738.02 6.601,418.7 1,327.72 6.40
Informational Rent/ha usd/ha 829.06 847.42 -2.20 248.34 390.44 -57.20 2.07 199.51 -9,526.90 359.83 480.67 -33.60
Forest connectivity incr./ha ha/ha 0.21 0.27 -27.80 0.29 0.25 14.70 0.33 0.28 15.50 0.28 0.26 4.40
Setaside cost effectiveness ha/usd 0.00 0.00 -3.20 0.00 0.00 -12.60 0.00 0.00 -7.00 0.00 0.00 -6.90
Informational Rent/cost usd/usd 0.42 0.44 -5.40 0.17 0.29 -77.10 0.00 0.27 -10,203.9 0.25 0.36 -42.70
Forest connectivity cost-eff. ha/usd 0.00 0.00 -31.80 0.00 0.00 4.00 0.00 0.00 9.50 0.00 0.00 -2.20
Yearly cost mill.$/yr 195.20 189.24 3.10 222.59 197.61 11.20 234.9 219.47 6.60 421.90 394.83 6.40
Yearly Informational Rent mill.$/yr 82.18 84.00 -2.20 36.92 58.05 -57.20 0.62 59.33 -9,526.90 107.00 142.94 -33.60
Yearly Forest connectivity incr. M ha/yr 0.02 0.03 -27.80 0.04 0.04 14.70 0.10 0.08 15.50 0.08 0.08 4.40
Yearly cost/ha usd/ha/yr 218.80 212.12 3.10 249.51 221.50 11.20 263.3 246.01 6.60 157.64 147.52 6.40
Yearly Informational Rent/ha usd/ha/yr 92.12 94.16 -2.20 41.39 65.07 -57.20 0.69 66.50 -9,526.90 39.98 53.41 -33.60
Yearly Forest connectivity
incr./ha ha/ha/yr 0.02 0.03 -27.80 0.05 0.04 14.70 0.11 0.09 15.50 0.03 0.03 4.40
Yearly setaside cost-eff. ha/usd/yr 0.00 0.00 -3.20 0.00 0.00 -12.60 0.00 0.00 -7.00 0.00 0.00 -6.90
Yearly Informational Rent/cost usd/usd/yr 0.05 0.05 -5.40 0.03 0.05 -77.10 0.00 0.09 -10,203.9 0.03 0.04 -42.70
Yearly forest connectivity cost-
effectiveness ha/usd/yr 0.00 0.00 -31.80 0.00 0.00 4.00 0.00 0.00 9.50 0.00 0.00 -2.20
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Table 4.4. Comparison of the total cost, forest connectivity increment and informational rent capture for static
and dynamic prioritisation approaches by biogeographical subregion. The difference results from subtracting
dynamic to static, and for percentile difference, static results are 100%.M ha: million hectares, mill. $: million USD.
Biogeograph.
subregion
Set-
aside
(M
ha)
Cost (mill. $) InformationalRent ()
Forest
connectivity
increment (M
ha)
Setaside cost-
effectiveness
(ha/usd)
Informational
Rent/cost
(ha/usd)
Forest
connectivity cost-
effectiveness
(ha/usd)
Static
solution
Diff. w/
dynamic
solution
(%)
Static
solution
Diff. w/
dynamic
solution
(%)
Static
solution
Diff. w/
dynamic
solution
(%)
Static
solution
Diff. w/
dynamic
solution
(%)
Static
solution
Diff. w/
dynamic
solution
(%)
Static
solution
Diff. w/
dynamic
solution
(%)
Florestas de
Araucaria 0.49 1,168.29 -3.43 210.29 -68.10 0.11 7.97 0.0004 3.31 0.18 -62.53 0.0001 11.02
Bahia 0.25 268.28 4.39 57.75 -81.02 0.06 28.49 0.0009 -4.59 0.22 -89.32 0.0002 25.21
Brejos
Nordestinos 0.05 5.58 2.00 2.47 -12.22 0.02 1.74 0.0088 -2.04 0.44 -14.51 0.0029 -0.27
Diamantina 0.18 83.63 2.12 31.44 -9.02 0.05 1.16 0.0022 -2.17 0.38 -11.38 0.0006 -0.99
Florestas de
Interior 0.77 967.12 29.00 256.85 -6.82 0.19 -6.61 0.0008 -40.84 0.27 -50.45 0.0002 -50.15
Pernambuco 0.06 68.57 1.03 20.97 -55.80 0.02 16.88 0.0009 -1.04 0.31 -57.43 0.0003 16.01
Serra do Mar 0.55 989.12 -0.98 298.10 -19.18 0.18 -0.64 0.0006 0.97 0.30 -18.02 0.0002 0.33
Sao Francisco 0.33 258.34 4.39 87.37 -47.41 0.11 13.27 0.0013 -4.59 0.34 -54.19 0.0004 9.29
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Large variability was observed in the difference in costs, benefits, and
cost-effectiveness between approaches at the BR level. Whether a static
or a dynamic approach was better varied with each subregion and
variable being assessed (figure 4.4, table 4.4). For six out of eight BRs
cost per hectare was lower for the dynamic solution, percent differences
varying between 1% and 29%. For the remaining BRs, percent
differences in cost per hectare had less variation (1-3.4%). A similar
result was observed for set-aside cost-effectiveness (set-aside hectares
per programme cost unit), with percent differences varying between 1-
5%, except Florestas de Interior where the dynamic solution was 41%
more cost-effective than the static solution. When comparing forest
connectivity increment per hectare, in six out of eight BRs the static
solution was highest, percent differences varying between 1.2% and
28.5%. For the remaining BRs, percent differences in forest connectivity
increment per hectare had less variation (0.6-6.6%). The difference in
forest connectivity increment cost-effectiveness between solutions was
more evenly distributed between BRs; in five out of eight BRs the static
solution was highest, percent differences varying between 0.3-25.2%.
For the remaining BRs, percent differences in forest connectivity
increment cost-effectiveness was small (0.3-1%), except Florestas de
Interior where the dynamic solution was 50% more cost-effective than
the static solution. Despite the variability, in general terms the dynamic
approach was a better solution in terms of cost per hectare and cost-
effectiveness, and the static solution in terms of dIIC and dIIC cost-
effectiveness.
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Figure 4.4. Distribution of differences between static and dynamic solution results. Boxplots show min, max,
median and interquartile range for municipality level observations, diamonds show the value of the variable at
biogeographical region level. In blue are the negative differences, where the dynamic solution is larger than the static
solution. In red the positive values. Biogeographical regions: Florestas de Araucaria (Ar), Bahia (Ba), Brejos Nordestinos
(BN), Diamantina (Di), Florestas de Interior (FdI), Pernambuco (Per), Serra do Mar (SdM), and Sao Francisco (SF).
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The differences between approaches through time depended on scale
and metric of difference considered (figure 4.5). At the BAF level, the
percent difference in annual cost increased between time steps one and
two, and slightly decreased between two and three (table 4.3, figure 4.6).
The opposite was observed for percent difference in set-aside cost-
effectiveness. Percent difference in both forest connectivity increment
and its cost-effectiveness between the static and dynamic solution
increased with time (table 4.3). For all four variables, the largest change
in the difference between approaches takes place between time steps
one and two, which means that it is in the second set-aside allocation
where the largest benefits of either approach were obtained. At the BR
level, however, the difference between static and dynamic solutions
across time did not follow the same patterns (figure 4.5). The most
different behaviour was observed in Florestas de Interior in terms of
percent difference in cost, cost-effectiveness and forest connectivity
increment cost-effectiveness. Behaviour was also markedly different for
Pernambuco in terms of percent difference in cost and cost-
effectiveness.
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Figure 4.5. Percentage difference between static and dynamic solution results, by biogeographical region,
through time. The difference results from subtracting dynamic to static, and using static results as 100%. such that
negative results mean the dynamic solution has a higher value, and positive the static. For informational rent related
variables, the maximum percentage difference has been capped at 200% for clarity reasons, the values over 200% are
in the thousand percent.
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Figure 4.6. Aggregate results through time at the Brazilian Atlantic
Forest level. TS represents each time step 1, 2, and 3 respectively.
Florestas de Interior was an exception for differences between
approaches in cost-effectiveness and dIIC cost-effectiveness, as well as
their behaviour over time. This BR was the largest in terms of area and
number of municipalities included (table 4.5), almost 3 times the second
largest (Florestas de Araucaria). It was also the only BR for which the
static approach included more municipalities in its solution than the
dynamic approach. These facts suggest a higher number of highly cost-
effective municipalities in this BR, and given that the proportion of
municipalities included in the solutions was small (5%), this could explain
the large differences in cost-effectiveness between dynamic and static
approaches.
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Table 4.5. The number of municipalities included in solution for
different prioritisation approaches by biogeographical region. The
proportional difference is calculated as the difference in number of
municipalities under the dynamic solution minus static solution, as a
percentage of the dynamic solution.
Biogeog. Region TotalMun.
Solutions
Static Dynamic Difference
Count % Count % Count %
Florestas de
Araucaria 606 31 5.1 64 10.6 33 51.6
Bahia 247 34 13.8 46 18.6 12 26.1
Brejos
Nordestinos 131 12 9.2 15 11.5 3 20.0
Diamantina 140 7 5.0 10 7.1 3 30.0
Florestas de
Interior 1634 80 4.9 76 4.7 -4 -5.3
Pernambuco 205 32 15.6 45 22.0 13 28.9
Serra do Mar 260 42 16.2 61 23.5 19 31.1
Sao Francisco 154 43 27.9 68 44.2 25 36.8
3.2 Differences in spatial configuration of priorities
Spatially the dynamic and static approaches provided very different
solutions, meaning that different areas would be prioritised to be part of
the programme under static and dynamic prioritisation approaches
(figure 4.7a). Of all municipalities included in either solution, only 26%
were included in the set-aside programme regardless of the approach.
One-third of municipalities were included in the dynamic solution only
(31.8%), and 6.6% in the static solution exclusively. These proportions
varied widely with BR, however: 6%-40% of municipalities in a given BR
were always included, 20%-50% were only included in the dynamic
solution, and 0%-24% were only included in the static solution (figure
4.7b). The BR that changed the least spatially depending on the
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prioritisation approach was Serra do Mar, and the one that changed the
most was Bahia. For Serra do Mar then, the approach did not make a
big difference in terms of which municipalities are included in the
programme, but for Bahia it did.
The number of municipalities included in the dynamic solution was
higher than the static solution, with the static solution including 20-50%
fewer municipalities than the dynamic solution depending on the BR (5%
more in Florestas de Interior, table 4.5). This difference in the number of
municipalities included between solutions was not explained by the size
of the BR (in terms of the number of municipalities) (SM figure 2). By
including more municipalities in the programme, the dynamic approach
could reach a wider group of landowners. Despite the larger forest
connectivity increment of the static solution at both BAF level and BR
level for most BRs, the number of municipalities in which forest
connectivity increment per hectare was largest for the dynamic solution
was similar to the number under the static solution (figure 4.8.c).
Furthermore, when the dynamic solution resulted in larger forest
connectivity increments the difference between approaches was highest
(figure 4.8c, the number of “+” signs). So if the objective of a prioritisation
were to increase forest connectivity more evenly and widely, the dynamic
approach would be a better option regardless of cost considerations.
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Figure 4.7. Municipalities included as part of a prioritisation
solution: (a) spatial distribution. Categories: Dyn. 1, 2, and 3 are
municipalities included in the dynamic solution only, at the first, second
or third time step respectively; St. & Dyn. 1, 2 and 3, are municipalities
included in both the static and dynamic solutions, at the first, second or
third time step of the dynamic solution respectively; Static are
municipalities included only in the static solution; and None are
municipalities never part of a solution. (b) The proportion of included
municipalities for each category. Categories are simplified to static only,
dynamic only (all three-time steps), “Always included”: municipalities
included in the static solution and in all time steps under the dynamic
approach, and “Other”: those included in some time steps under the
dynamic solution. Each ring represents one biogeographical subregion:
Florestas de Araucaria (Ar), Bahia (Ba), Brejos Nordestinos (BN),
Diamantina (Di), Florestas de Interior (FdI), Pernambuco (Per), Serra do
Mar (SdM), and Sao Francisco (SF). The number reflects municipalities
included in solutions.
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Figure 4.8. Map of feedback effects on: (a) increase in opportunity cost of land ($/ha), (b) informational rent capture
($/ha), and (c) increase in forest connectivity (ha/ha). In grey municipalities excluded from either solution, in green no
difference between approaches, in purple scale differences where the dynamic solution is larger than static, and orange
scale where the static solution is larger than dynamic. The number of “+” reflects the magnitude of the difference.
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For the dynamic approach, the prioritisation strategy over time varied
with BR (SM Table 1). For example, in Bahia, most municipalities were
included only once across time steps, with few municipalities included
for all three time-steps, whereas in Pernambuco most municipalities
were included in two time-steps. At each time step, the dynamic
approach was able to adjust municipality selection to allow for the most
cost-efficient solutions.
3.3 Informational rent capture
Accounting for the economic feedback resulted, as expected, in lower
cost and higher cost-effectiveness, with some biogeographical
variability. Given that the mechanism by which farmland opportunity cost
increased was informational rent capture, I expected a dynamic solution,
which cost less, to result in lower informational rent capture. However, I
found the opposite; informational rent capture was higher for the
dynamic solution (by 323.4 mill. $, 33.6%) despite its cost being lower
(table 4.3). For the dynamic solution, the proportion of each dollar spent
captured in informational rent was 42.7% higher than the static solution.
Even though some variability was observed in percent difference in
proportional informational rent capture between BRs (11.4%-89.3%,
table 4.4, figure 4.5), informational rent capture was always higher for
the dynamic approach (figure 4.4). In the dynamic approach, Marxan
provides the cheapest solution at each time step, regardless of
informational rent. Municipalities with lower farmland opportunity costs
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are prioritised over municipalities with higher opportunity costs, even if
the former entail higher informational rent capture than the latter. In this
way, the dynamic solution has a lower cost and captures more
informational rent.
Annual informational rent capture was highest for the dynamic solution
at all time steps, and decreased with time for both solutions (figure 4.6).
The difference between approaches in annual informational rent capture
increased with time both in absolute (figure 4.6) and percent (figure 4.5)
values. This behaviour was explained by a combination of factors. At the
municipality level, informational rent capture decreased over time
because there is only a limited number of hectares with farmland
opportunity cost lower than the incentive payment, and hectares with the
lowest opportunity cost were set-aside first. So, for the same
municipality, informational rent captured in the first set-aside allocation
was higher than the one captured in the second set-aside allocation, and
so on. Because in the static approach the same municipalities receive a
set-aside allocation at all time steps, informational rent capture for this
approach decreased over time. However, in the dynamic approach this
was not the case, and the difference between approaches, therefore,
increased over time.
There were more municipalities for which informational rent capture per
hectare was higher in the dynamic solution, and the differences reached
higher values (figure 4.8.b). Even in municipalities where the increase in
opportunity cost was larger for the static approach, informational rent
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capture was higher for the dynamic approach. This suggests that in the
dynamic approach not only do a wider range of landowners have an
incentive to participate in the programme due to informational rent
capture, but that those incentives are also higher.
3.4 Predicting the best approach
Models of the effect of municipality characteristics on the difference
between solutions showed that biogeographical subregion explained
most of the differences, suggesting that whether to use a dynamic or
static approach is region-dependent (table 4.6). The second variable that
explained most differences was variability of farmland opportunity cost,
with mostly small effects on dependent variables. Potential set-aside
(PSA) had very small effects on most dependent variables. Area of
farmland and forest connectivity were the least important variables in
explaining differences between approaches, with very small effects on
most dependent variables. For the detailed GLS tables for all models
see SM Table 6.
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Table 4.6. Summary of the effect of explanatory variables on differences between approaches. The size of effect
was determined by comparing the effect coefficient with the intercept; when numbers were of similar order the effect
was large. The number in parenthesis in the BR row shows the number of regions for which the effect size is as
mentioned, while the - or + in brackets for the remaining variables shows the direction of the effect. Δ= difference. 
Explanatory variable
Effect of explanatory variable on dependent variable
ΔCost/ha 
($/ha)
ΔCost-
effectiveness
(ha/$)
ΔdIIC cost-
effectiveness
(ha/$)
Δinfo. rent 
capture/ha
($/ha)
ΔdIIC/ha 
(prop)
Δinfo. rent 
capture/$ spent
(prop)
Biogeographical region Large (8) Large (8) Large (8) Large (7) Large (3) Large (6)
Area of Farmland (ha) ~ 0 (+) Very small (+) Very small (+) ~ 0 (+)
Very small
(+) Very small (+)
Potential set-aside area
(ha)
Very small
(-) Very small (+) Very small (+) Very small (-)
Very small
(+) Very small (+)
Forest connectivity (ha) ~ 0 (+) Very small (+) Very small (+) ~ 0 (+)
Very small
(+) Very small (+)
Variability in farmland
opportunity cost (s.d.) Small (-) Very small (+) Very small (+) Small (-) Small (-) Small (-)
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What the direction of the effect of explanatory variables means for each
dependent variable is not intuitive due to the nature of the dependent
variables, which are differences that have both negative and positive
values. This will depend on whether the value of the intercept for each
BR is positive (value of the variable for the static solution is higher than
the dynamic solution) or negative (the opposite). Table 4.7 explains what
the direction of the effect of explanatory variables means under different
BR intercept conditions. Most commonly, across BRs, increasing
farmland area and forest connectivity had the effect of increasing the
difference between approaches on all response variables except cost
effectiveness (table4.7). This means that even though the dynamic
approach is best in terms of cost/ha, informational rent capture/ha, forest
connectivity/ha, informational rent/$ and forest connectivity cost-
effectiveness, for regions with small farmland area and forest
connectivity the difference between approaches might not be enough to
offset the transaction cost of implementing the dynamic approach (which
requires three implementations rather than one). PSA and variability in
farmland opportunity cost had the effect of increasing the difference
between approaches in cost-effectiveness (table 4.7), meaning that
even though the dynamic approach was more cost-effective than the
static approach always, for regions with small PSA and variability in
farmland opportunity cost the difference between approaches might not
be. However, increasing PSA and variability in farmland opportunity cost
would increase that difference, making the dynamic approach more
desirable. Large PSA values reflect areas of high forest cover and high
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fragmentation, so the result that municipalities with high fragmentation
and farmland price variability would benefit the most from a dynamic
approach in terms of cost-effectiveness makes sense because the
feedbacks modelled are forest connectivity and farmland rent extraction.
The effect of forest connectivity across BRs was mostly to increase the
difference in cost per hectare with increasing connectivity values (table
4.7). This means that the higher the forest connectivity, the larger the
difference in cost per hectare, with the static approach always having
higher cost/ha than the dynamic approach. In general, municipalities
with higher forest connectivity values have larger set-aside allocations,
because of how the reforestation target was defined. Larger set-aside
allocations could result in decreased cost-effectiveness because the
municipalities that are less cost-effective have to be included in the
solution to meet the higher set-aside allocation. Because the static
approach involves the sequential allocation of set-asides within the
same municipalities, the impact that larger set-aside allocation has of
decreasing cost-effectiveness could be larger for the static approach,
thereby increasing the difference in cost per hectare between
approaches.
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Table 4.7. Summary of possible relationships between explanatory and dependent variables. “Most common”
refers to a relationship present for the majority of biogeographical subregions.
Average value
of difference
Direction
of effect Relationship explained Most common relationship for Exceptions
(+)
Positive
difference
(+) same
direction
The difference between static and dynamic
solutions increases with the value of the
explanatory variable.
The effect of farmland area and
forest connectivity on the
difference in:
- cost/ha;
- informational rent capture/ha;
- dIIC/ha;
-informational rent capture/$
- dIIC cost-effectiveness.
The effect of farmland area and forest connectivity
on the difference in:
-cost/ha in Florestas de Araucaria, and Brejos
Nordestinos;
-dIIC/ha in Brejos Nordestinos;
-informational rent capture/$ in Bahia, Brejos
Nordestinos and Sao Francisco;
-dIIC cost-effectiveness in Brejos Nordestinos and
Diamantina.
(-) opposite
direction
The difference between static and dynamic
solutions decreases with the value of the
explanatory variable up to a certain value.
There is a threshold explanatory variable
value at which the difference between
solutions is zero, after which the difference
starts increasing now with the static solution
having higher values than the dynamic
solution.
The effect of PSA and variability
of farmland opportunity cost on
the difference in:
- cost/ha;
- informational rent capture/ha;
- dIIC/ha;
-informational rent capture/$
- dIIC cost-effectiveness.
The effect of PSA and variability of farmland
opportunity cost on the difference in:
-cost/ha in Florestas de Araucaria, and Serra do
Mar;
-dIIC/ha in Brejos Nordestinos;
-informational rent capture/$ in Bahia, Brejos
Nordestinos and Sao Francisco;
-dIIC cost-effectiveness in Brejos Nordestinos and
Diamantina.
(-)
Negative
difference
(+) same
direction
The difference between static and dynamic
solutions decreases with the value of the
explanatory variable up to a certain value.
There is a threshold explanatory variable
value at which the difference between
solutions is zero, after which the difference
starts increasing now with the dynamic
solution having higher values than the static
solution.
The effect of farmland area and
forest connectivity on the
difference in:
- cost-effectiveness.
The effect of farmland area and forest connectivity
on the difference in:
- cost-effectiveness in Florestas de Araucaria,
Florestas de Interior and Serra do Mar.
(-) opposite
direction
The difference between static and dynamic
solutions increases with the value of the
explanatory variable.
The effect of PSA and variability
of farmland opportunity cost on
the difference in:
- cost-effectiveness.
The effect of PSA and variability of farmland
opportunity cost on the difference in:
- cost-effectiveness in Florestas de Araucaria,
Florestas de Interior and Serra do Mar.
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There was a third type of relationship between explanatory variables and
dependent variables, in which the difference between approaches
decreased until a threshold value was met for the explanatory variable,
at which point the difference started to increase again, but in favour of
the opposite approach (table 4.7). This was common for example for the
effect of PSA on the difference in cost per hectare; at low PSA values
improvement in forest connectivity per ha was highest for the static
solution, but after reaching a PSA threshold value the dynamic approach
became increasingly more desirable as PSA increased This is because
at low PSA, implying low forest cover with high connectivity, the
sequential allocation to the same municipality of the static approach
results in a greater improvement in connectivity. The difference reduces
with intermediate PSA values, in which either approach provides the
same forest connectivity increment per hectare. However, at high forest
cover and high fragmentation (high PSA), the static approach of
sequential allocation to the same municipality no longer provides such
an advantage, and the benefits of the dynamic approach increase. An
example where the opposite happens was the effect of forest
connectivity on the difference in cost-effectiveness.
For most regions, the dynamic solution was a better option in terms of
cost per hectare and cost-effectiveness. Exceptions included Florestas
de Interior, Florestas de Araucaria, and Serra do Mar, though in the latter
the effect was non-significant. For these regions, models suggested a
threshold relationship, in which at certain large forest connectivity values
the dynamic approach could provide more benefits in terms of cost and
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cost-effectiveness. This explained why prioritisation results show that
the dynamic approach for Florestas de Interior provided high benefits
compared to the static approach. Interestingly, these three regions
presented the highest variability in cost per hectare, and the lowest
variability in set-aside cost-effectiveness (figure 4.4).
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4. Discussion
4.1 Cost-effective conservation planning
In the late 1990s, the importance of cost-effective conservation planning
gained in prominence with numerous studies showing that conservation
priorities changed if spatial heterogeneity in costs was accounted for
(Ando 1998; Polasky et al. 2001). Conservation costs play a central role
in shaping outcomes of spatial planning, and the inability to preserve the
underlying variation in costs during spatial prioritisations has important
consequences on the preferred strategy (Armsworth 2014). The
proposed framework is able to account for both spatial and temporal
variability in cost due to the way the economic feedback was
characterised, addressing one of the main limitations in current practices
of accounting for heterogeneity in costs.
The increases in solution cost-effectiveness derived from accounting for
spatial heterogeneity in opportunity costs have been shown to be
significant (Naidoo et al. 2006). However, increases in solution cost-
effectiveness of accounting for economic dynamics are not so clear.
Studies that have shown significant increases in the cost-effectiveness
of reserve selection have accounted for land market feedbacks
(Armsworth et al. 2006), and amenity-driven land price feedbacks
(Dissanayake & Önal 2011). These were based on theoretical models
with simulated data. An empirical assessment of accounting for land
market feedbacks in reserve selection in Vilas County, USA, found only
small increases in cost-effectiveness (Butsic et al. 2013).
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Studies accounting for economic feedbacks in spatial conservation
outcomes all found that the extent to which accounting for the feedback
improved cost-effectiveness depended on system and location
characteristics (Armsworth et al. 2006; Dissanayake & Önal 2011; Butsic
et al. 2013). In this study, cost-effectiveness improvement for the
dynamic approach also varied widely with biogeographical subregion,
and the subregion was the variable that explained most of the difference
in cost-effectiveness in the regression analyses. However, I found that
the dynamic approach would be more desirable when the feedback
effect is strong and there are alternative planning units that, once
chosen, allow escaping the deleterious effect of the feedback. If the
feedback is small and there are no other “low hanging fruits” in terms of
planning units, then there will be little gains to be obtained from the
dynamic approach. More case studies are needed to generalise these
findings, and better understand the circumstances under which a
dynamic approach yields more benefits than a static approach, including
different geographical regions, reforestation targets and conservation
interventions.
4.2 The role of informational rent capture
Most literature on informational rent in conservation focuses on the need
to minimise its capture to improve cost-effectiveness (Ferraro 2008;
White & Hanley 2016). Several studies have used contract theory to
show how auctions help reveal hidden costs and avoid adverse
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selection, especially in the context of agri-environmental policies
(Latacz-Lohmann & Schilizzi 2005). However, the prospect of
informational rent capture acts as an economic incentive for programme
participation which can be used to improve resource use efficiency
(Scheufele & Bennett 2017). The dynamic framework proposed in this
study not only improved overall cost-effectiveness, but increased
informational rent capture, in so doing also involving more municipalities
in the programme. Given that asymmetric information is bound to exist,
especially at large scales, the dynamic framework can be a valuable new
tool to get informational rent capture working for conservation instead of
attempting to minimise it.
Conservation on private lands plays a crucial role in the conservation of
biodiversity in highly fragmented areas (Paloniemi & Tikka 2008).
Traditional regulation has not provided a complete solution due to the
large numbers of private landowners and the hidden nature of their
activities, which has led to an increasing emphasis on offering financial
incentives for conservation (Stern 2006). Conservation payments can
either aim to offset costs, or aim to change behaviour, or do both (Vatn
2010; Muradian & Rival 2012). Using the proposed dynamic
prioritisation, the set-aside programme moves away from being only an
offset payment to including an incentive to change behaviour as well by
increasing and optimising informational rent capture without increasing
the cost of the programme. The fact that more informational rent is
captured, and in a more even way across municipalities, could be an
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invaluable benefit of the dynamic approach in regions where there is low
willingness to join this type of programme.
Real and perceived equity pay a crucial role in conservation payment
success by increasing the probability of self-enforcement because
people perceive the restrictions as fair (White et al. 2012). Increases in
equity are typically believed to come at the cost of financially optimal
conservation solutions, but the degree of equity in an intervention can
affect social and ecological outcomes in myriad ways (Pascual et al.
2010). Optimisation studies in the PES literature and spatial planning
literature have begun to incorporate dimensions of equity (Halpern et al.
2013; Narloch et al. 2013). Equity has multiple dimensions: procedural
legitimacy (i.e., the degree of participation in decision-making); the
distribution of costs and benefits of conservation; and the recognition of
stakeholder rights, norms and values (Pascual et al. 2014). Two
potential issues with this large scale set-aside payment programme
could be the distribution of costs (land-use restrictions) and benefits
(economic incentive) of the programme. The payment in the programme
aims to offset the cost, but it also provides an economic incentive when
informational rent is captured. The dynamic solution provides a more
equitable outcome than the static solution without any loss in cost-
effectiveness, in terms of both cost and benefit distributions, because
more municipalities are included in the solution. The fact that a wider
group of landowners is included in the programme with the dynamic
solution may also play a role in increasing perceived fairness, which
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added to the increase in equity may significantly increase the probability
of success (Pascual et al. 2014).
4.3 Trade-off assessment
Running the static prioritisation has computational and data
requirements that are not hard to meet. Most of the data are free to
access, except for the cost of farmland that needs to be purchased.
Marxan is freely available, widely used in conservation prioritisations,
and does not require highly trained specialists or an exceptionally
powerful computer to run. However, the dynamic approach involves high
skills, informatics and time requirements. For this analysis, Python, R
and Linux coding skills were necessary, as well as access to high-
performance computing. Time requirements were also high,
approximately three months of running computing time to generate
results exclusive to the dynamic approach. The main limiting
computational step was the calculation of the forest connectivity metric
(ECA(IIC)), which requires metrics for patch area and distance between
patches for all forest patches within a municipality (see pages 112-114),
and municipalities had up to 20,000 forest patches. This index was
calculated for each forest simulation (100), for each municipality (3,500),
and for each time step (3), resulting in it being calculated over one million
times.
Increasing model complexity increases uncertainty and reduces model
predictability. Uncertainty increases with model complexity due to the
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testing of all hypotheses upon which these models are based (Bradshaw
& Borchers 2000), as well as uncertainty propagation of multiple model
parameters. In this way, the dynamic solution could have higher
uncertainty levels. Quantifying and accounting for uncertainty in outputs
for both solutions is needed to communicate the reliability of results to
decision-makers, and avoid suboptimal allocation of management
actions (Langford et al. 2009). This could be achieved by exploring the
consequences of using different parameters through the use of
sensitivity analyses, scenario planning, and simulation modelling,
facilitating integrated modelling (Álvarez-Romero et al. 2015).
Both increased uncertainty and computational requirements need to be
considered when deciding on the optimal approach for a given
biogeographical region. For example, if I consider the effect of
accounting for environmental and economic feedbacks on cost and cost-
effectiveness, it is crucial to assess the reduction in total cost against the
increase in cost that the dynamic approach entails. The 0.7 mill. $
reduction in cost for Pernambuco might not be enough to offset the
increase in cost brought by the increased technical and computing
requirements of the dynamic approach, as well as the administrative
costs of repeating the prioritisation at regular intervals. However, a larger
reduction, such as the 280.4 mill. $ reduction for Florestas de Interior,
might make the dynamic approach more cost-effective.
In this study, only incentive payment costs were considered in the
prioritisation. These estimates based on farmland cost data were based
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on the best available data (see pages 87-88 for detailed description).
However, there are transaction costs associated with the set-aside
programme, which include the operation, maintenance, and
administration of the programme (Zheng et al. 2013). Acquisition costs
and transaction costs do not necessarily reflect each other, and
accounting for both of them can affect prioritisation output (Armsworth
2014). However, to account for spatial heterogeneity in transaction
costs, data on what these costs entail are necessary, which were not
available at the time of analysis.
4.4 Implications for conservation and decision-making
Ignoring the economic feedback resulted in the static approach costing
$317 mill. more than the static cost estimation of meeting the restoration
target. This extra cost is large enough that the restoration target would
not be met over the nine-year period. Nowadays, rigorous planning
methods are especially needed given that collaborative conservation
action is on the rise and global financial crises restrict conservation
investments (Mazor et al. 2014). Simply applying the economic feedback
to the static solution can provide an estimation of how short the budget
will fall, improving budget estimation.
In the move towards cost-efficient conservation planning, a large body
of literature has been developed to make conservation as efficient as
possible at meeting stated goals (Naidoo et al. 2006; Klein et al. 2008;
Nelson et al. 2009). The most common focus has been on the
opportunity cost of land (for a review see Armsworth 2014). However,
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this study shows that focusing on informational rents could potentially
increase benefits in terms of programme participation, equity and
potentially perceived fairness, without compromising cost-effectiveness.
Finding new ways of using informational rents in systematic
conservation planning is an important next step in improving
conservation success.
4.5 Recommendations for future work
In this case study, I chose Marxan as the prioritisation tool due to its
widespread use in spatial conservation planning. Marxan is based on a
minimisation optimisation problem, and in doing so it minimises the cost
of meeting targets (Ball et al. 2009). This results in an inclusion criterion
that does not necessarily include the municipalities with the highest
forest connectivity increment per hectare. An optimisation that minimises
cost whilst maximising forest connectivity increase subject to the
restoration target would maximise the benefits of accounting for the
environmental feedback. ConsNet (Ciarleglio et al. 2009) is a
conservation planning software that uses a multi-criteria analysis
approach with a meta-heuristic algorithm and could allow these types of
objectives, but has not been so widely implemented.
Sequential assessment of benefits and costs tends to be suboptimal in
reserve allocation (Duke et al. 2013). The timing of allocation can be
critical in terms of biodiversity protection in reserve selection problems
(Costello & Polasky 2004). Dynamic optimisation methods solve the
general management problem that involves a temporal sequence of
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decisions, where the action at each decision point may differ depending
on time and/or system state (Possingham 1997). They have been
applied in natural resource management problems, and ways to deal
with uncertainty in the optimisation have been suggested (Williams &
Johnson 2013). Using a smaller, and therefore more computationally
tractable, case study, for example a biogeographical subregion, a
dynamic optimisation method based on a continuous informational rent
approach could be used to test differences in outputs.
Our study only modelled two feedbacks, chosen because they are
relevant to the scale and circumstances of the BAF (chapter 3).
However, complex dynamics are at play at multiple temporal and spatial
scales in any conservation intervention (Guerrero et al. 2013b)
Environmental dynamics are changing with climate change in both
terrestrial and marine ecosystems (Doney et al. 2012; Garcia et al.
2014). As shown in chapter 3, multiple economic feedback effects act at
the same time at different levels. For example, payments for ecosystem
services influence local land and labour markets (Wunder 2006), are
affected by trends in agricultural productivity (Phelps et al. 2013) and
increase landowners' perceptions of the value of fallow land (Rico
García-Amado et al. 2013) leading to unpredictable outcomes in terms
of conservation cost (Curran et al. 2016). A better understanding of
which feedbacks are most relevant under various circumstances is
needed in order to address the challenge of accounting for system
dynamics in conservation planning.
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5. Conclusion
Accounting for environmental and social dynamics of the systems to be
intervened in is crucial if conservation planners are to provide more
realistic conservation recommendations. The methodology developed in
this chapter is the first attempt to account for both environmental and
economic dynamics in spatial conservation planning.
Evidence from this chapter is not conclusive in terms of which is the best
approach. Prioritisation outcomes were significantly different depending
on the geographical area, and in terms of the number of farms involved
in the scheme and the degree of informational rent capture. However,
differences were proportionally small in terms of cost-effectiveness, and
the geographical area mostly determined which approach was best.
A dynamic approach to spatial conservation planning does entail higher
computational requirements and transactions costs, but the potential
benefits in terms of increased cost-effectiveness could offset them. Most
importantly, the dynamic approach makes the most of the economic
incentive for participation from informational rents, and still has a similar
or lower overall cost. These results could potentially re-define the way in
which conservation projects manage informational rent extraction, away
from minimisation and towards exploiting the opportunities that it
provides. There is still much work to do in dynamic systematic
conservation planning, but these results already show an important
benefit in terms of understanding, and then working with, the feedbacks
that inevitably accompany large-scale conservation interventions.
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Chapter 5: Restoring the Brazilian Atlantic Forest:
understanding the role of multiple restoration targets
and prioritisation approaches
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1. Introduction
The level of threat facing the Brazilian Atlantic Forest (BAF), and the
importance of its restoration for the preservation of its biodiversity and
ecosystem services, have been highlighted by numerous studies (for a
recent overview see Eisenlohr et al. 2015). Despite a multitude of small-
scale forest restoration initiatives in the BAF since the 2000s, there has
been no significant expansion of native forests (Pinto et al. 2014). For
restoration to become an effective means of conserving the BAF,
challenges include reducing costs, planning restoration actions at the
landscape level, and addressing socio-political issues (Rodrigues et al.
2009; Melo et al. 2013b).
Systematic conservation planning is an area of conservation specifically
focused on optimizing conservation outcomes cost-effectively;
thousands of systematic conservation plans have been developed
around the globe (McIntosh et al. 2016). It involves a systematic
structured approach to the selection of areas for conservation action
(including preservation, restoration and management), using limited
resources to achieve clear conservation goals in the face of competing
land uses, and with outcomes open to critical review (Margules &
Pressey 2000a; Kukkala & Moilanen 2013). A critical element of
systematic conservation planning is spatial prioritisation, and various
software have been built for this purpose (e.g. Marxan (Ball et al. 2009),
C-Plan (Pressey et al. 2009) and Zonation (Lehtomäki & Moilanen
2013)). The application of a systematic conservation planning approach
at the landscape level for the BAF would, in theory, help solve two of the
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main challenges to restoring it (landscape-level planning and cost-
effectiveness).
A few studies have applied a systematic conservation planning approach
to set priorities for restoration at the BAF level. Most of the conservation
planning exercises carried out for the BAF produce priorities based on
ecological features, with only some of them including social or cost data.
Some studies use complex ecological techniques such as ecological
niche modelling (Lemes & Loyola 2013) and habitat removal
experiments (Tambosi et al. 2014) to set priorities, but exclude socio-
economic data from their analyses. The Atlantic Forest Restoration Pact
(AFRP, see chapter 1) prioritised areas for restoration based on an
assessment of deforested lands protected by the Brazilian Forest Code,
as well as extensive, low-productivity pasturelands with few cattle
(Calmon et al. 2011). The AFRP’s prioritisation criteria were mainly
socio-economic, but they additionally produced thematic maps that can
be overlaid to guide restoration efforts depending on the funder’s
objective (Brancalion et al. 2013b). More recently, two BAF-level spatial
conservation planning approaches included both ecosystem and
economic criteria in prioritising areas for restoration. In 2014 using data
from a large field study surveying mammals, amphibians and birds,
restoration priorities were identified in terms of community integrity and
phylogenetic integrity, and cost of agricultural set-asides (Banks-Leite et
al. 2014b). In 2015, priorities for restoration were identified in terms of
expected post-restoration habitat availability per USD for two mammal
species with widely different dispersal abilities and habitat patch
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requirements (Crouzeilles et al. 2015). All of these prioritisations had
very different objectives when setting priorities to restore the BAF,
resulting in restoration targets that ranged between 424,000 ha and 15
million hectares for the whole biome. However, to build one consistent
approach to restoring the BAF, priority areas need to be identified in the
context of diverse targets.
Important assumptions underlie the systematic conservation planning
approach, one of them being that environmental and economic
conditions remain static over time (Meir et al. 2004). However,
commonly these assumptions do not hold, which can lead to reduced
cost-effectiveness of conservation programmes or even to misleading
recommendations (chapter 2). Studies that account directly or indirectly
for ecosystem dynamics when prioritising areas for conservation in the
Atlantic Forest, rather than taking a static approach, include those using
climate models to predict the effect of climate change on species
distributions (Loyola et al. 2012; Faleiro et al. 2013) and habitat
availability improvement triggered by the restoration itself (Crouzeilles et
al. 2015; Rappaport et al. 2015b; Tambosi & Metzger 2015). Most
recently, temporal dynamics were included in an assessment of priorities
for restoration at a site in the BAF accounting for the time-lagged
response of bird functional-group richness to fragmentation (Uezu &
Metzger 2016). However, no studies were found that included economic
dynamics into conservation planning exercises in the BAF, and in fact,
both economic and ecological dynamics are rarely included in
systematic conservation planning (chapter 3).
- 166 -
Roughly 53% of Brazil’s native vegetation occurs on private properties,
and in order to comply with the new Forest Code (FC) (National Law No.
12.651/2012), Brazilian landowners need to collectively restore ~6.2
million hectares within the Atlantic Forest hotspot (Soares-Filho et al.
2014). The FC provides a legal framework for control and incentives for
the protection of forest, promoting mechanisms and policies to support
forest restoration (Brancalion et al. 2016). However, the history of the
FC showed that the implementation of restoration on farmlands is
challenging to enforce (Alves-Pinto et al. 2017). Using multiple
correspondence analyses, Trevisan et al. (2016) identified three types
of farmers in Santa Catarina: those who understood the FC and its
ecological impacts and were willing to comply; those who understood
the ecological benefits of restoration but were unwilling to comply; and
those with little knowledge of benefits or interest in compliance.
Compliance comes at a cost for landowners, and as for any type of
conservation on private lands, an incentive is needed (Stern 2006;
Latawiec et al. 2015). Payment for ecosystem services (PES) schemes
in Brazil have been growing for the last 10 years (Richards et al. 2015),
and PES has been put forward as one of many mechanisms for making
restoration in the BAF economically sustainable (Brancalion et al. 2012;
Lopes et al. 2013; Soares-filho et al. 2014; Trevisan et al. 2016). If the
groups of landowners with no interest or willingness to comply are to be
part of a PES programme to restore the BAF, incentive payments need
to do more than offset the cost of restoration, they need to provide an
economic incentive to change behaviour (Vatn 2010; de Rezende et al.
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2015). Ways to provide this type of incentive in the most cost-effective
way, and to structure these incentives into priority-setting for to BAF
restoration are still missing.
Considering setting aside agricultural land as the minimum level of
action to allow for natural regeneration (Strassburg et al. 2016), I applied
a spatial conservation planning approach to prioritising natural
restoration on farmland in the BAF. In the context of diverse restoration
targets, I compared prioritisation solutions for both the static and
dynamic approaches defined in chapter four, assessing informational
rent capture as an economic incentive for restoration for all solutions.
Specifically, the objectives of this chapter were to: (1) identify priority
areas for natural restoration in the BAF that are robust to diverse targets
and approaches; (2) compare costs and benefits for each of the chosen
targets; (3) assess the effect of changing targets on the difference in
outputs between static and dynamic approaches; and (4) provide
recommendations regarding the choice of prioritisation approach in the
context of diverse targets for the BAF.
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2. Methods
2.1 Methodological framework
Methods were based on the framework developed in chapter 4. To
assess the robustness of the allocation to different targets, the
framework was applied at the biogeographical subregion level for the
BAF, for three different restoration targets (low, medium, high). To
improve readability of this chapter, table 5.1 summarises some key
definitions from chapter 4.
The spatial conservation planning exercise involved four steps: (1)
calculation of base metrics from data, (2) calculation of prioritisation
inputs, (3) spatial prioritisation, and (4) solution assessment and
implementation (figure 4.1, chapter 4).
2.2 Data and software
The same data that were used in chapter 4 I used for this analysis (table
4.1, chapter 4). Additionally, values of gross domestic product (GDP)
were obtained from the United Nations Statistics Division
(http://unstats.un.org/unsd/snaama/selectionbasicFast.asp), and
agricultural subsidies were obtained from the Brazilian Ministry of
Finances (http://www.orcamentofederal.gov.br), both for the year 2015.
Software used for analyses include R 3.2.1 (R Core Team 2016), ArcGIS
10 (Esri 2011), Conefor Sensinode 2.5.8 command line version (Saura
& Torné 2009), and MARXAN (Ball et al. 2009). The University of Oxford
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Advanced Research Computing (ARC) facility was used to carry out this
work.
2.3 Model validation
Model validation and verification include the same methods used for the
model in Chapter Four. Additionally, operational validity was subjectively
assessed by comparison with other studies other studies that produced
priorities for forest restoration in the BAF, with restoration targets within
the range used in this chapter.
2.4 Restoration Targets
I chose three different restoration targets, all of which are based on
stated objectives for restoring the BAF. The targets vary in terms of the
number of hectares restored and the rationale behind the target. At the
BAF level, the number of hectares to be restored quantitatively increases
from target one to three. At the BR level however, this is not always the
case due to the qualitative definition of targets (see below and Table
5.2).
Target 1: Low target
This target is based on Brazil’s international commitment to the
Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) Aichi targets. Under National
Target 15, Brazil has set a target of restoring at least 15% of degraded
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ecosystems by 2020 (www.cbd.int). By calculating the restoration of
15% of existing forest in each biogeographical subregion, target one
amounts to restoring a total of 2.7 million hectares (M ha; table 5.2). This
target is the same target used in Chapter four, and results based on this
target derive from the analysis done for that chapter.
Target two: Medium target
Using data from a large field study in the BAF surveying mammals,
amphibians and birds, it was suggested that to maintain biodiversity both
in terms of community integrity and phylogenetic integrity, a minimum of
30% of forest cover is required across the BAF (Banks-Leite et al.
2014b). By calculating the restoration needed to bring each forest
landscape (FL; see Table 5.1) to 30% forest cover for every municipality,
target two amounts to restoring a total of 10.6M ha (table 5.2). This
amount was estimated by calculating 30% of each forest landscape for
all municipalities, and subtracting existing forest to that value. Some
municipalities’ FL forest cover was higher than 30%, and these were
excluded from restoration allocations.
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Table 5.1. Summary of key concepts for methodology developed in chapter 4.
Concept Synonym Definition
Forest connectivity feedback
Environmental
feedback
Farmland set-aside allocation in time step one changes forest connectivity metrics in time
step two, changing the connectivity prioritisation criterion (dIIC) at time step 2.
Farmland rent extraction feedback
Economic
feedback
Farmland set-aside allocation in time step one changes farmland rent extraction in time
step two, changing the cost prioritisation criterion (incentive payment) at time step two.
Static approach -
Run spatial prioritisation once, divide total set-aside allocation into three equal parts, and
use prioritisation solution to implement one-third of the set-aside allocation at each time
step within a nine-year period.
Dynamic approach -
Discrete time-scale, where time moved forward in steps: one time-step represented three
years, over a period of nine years. At each time step, the approach entailed one spatial
conservation planning exercise because prioritisation criteria were updated by accounting
for economic and environmental feedback.
Biogeographical subregion BR
The Brazilian Atlantic Forest biome can be divided into 8 BRs: Brejos Nordestinos,
Pernambuco, Diamantina, Bahia, Serra do Mar, Sao Francisco, the Interior Forests
(Florestas de Interior), and the Brazilian Pines Forests (Florestas de Araucaria). The
division is based on their environmental and biotic characteristics and levels of habitat
loss and fragmentation.
Forest connectivity ECA(IIC)
Equivalent Connected Area is metric of forest connectivity based on graph theory, it
represents the size that a single forest habitat patch should have in order to provide the
same value of connectivity than the actual forest habitat pattern in the landscape.
Forest connectivity increment dIIC
Change in ECA(IIC) after a forest increment experiment. The amount of forest increment
is defined by restoration target and time step.
Potential set-aside area PSA
The buffer area created by adding a one-kilometre buffer to all forest within a
municipality. New forest patch creation is restricted to this area.
Forest Landscape FL The area of existing forest plus its corresponding PSA for each municipality.
Farmland rent extraction R
R represents the income from a hectare of farmland per year, and is estimated from the
price of farmland obtained in the IFNP dataset.
Informational rent capture U
Surplus rent extracted by landowners from the incentive payment due to asymmetry in
the information of the cost of setting aside land. Measured at the municipality level.
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Table 5.2. Forest restoration targets. By biogeographical subregion, and time step.
Biogeographical
Subregion
Restoration Target
one(ha)
Restoration Target
two(ha)
Restoration Target three
(ha)
Total by time step Total by time step Total by time step
Florestas de Araucaria 489,111 163,037 2,203,242 734,414 3,099,100 1,033,033
Bahia 245,200 81,733 956,184 318,728 1,475,547 491,849
Brejos Nordestinos 48,814 16,271 88,478 29,493 227,963 75,988
Diamantina 182,032 60,677 479,630 159,877 976,623 325,541
Florestas de Interior 772,382 257,461 5,998,673 1,999,558 6,415,807 2,138,602
Pernambuco 63,390 21,130 308,309 102,770 429,682 143,227
Serra do Mar 548,188 182,729 327,979 109,326 1,458,540 486,180
Sao Francisco 327,245 109,082 232,020 77,340 916,739 305,580
Total 2,676,360 892,120 10,594,515 3,531,505 15,000,000 5,000,000
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Target three: High target
In 2009, a group of NGOs, private companies, governments, and
research institutions launched one of the most ambitious ecological
restoration programs in the world – the Atlantic Forest (Mata Atlântica)
Restoration Pact (AFRP). The program has more than 260 members
and has a mission to restore 15M ha of the forest by 2050 using native
species (Brancalion et al. 2012). I used their mission target as target
three, and the 15M ha were distributed proportionally to the total FL
across biogeographical subregions (table 5.2). I tested other ways of
distributing the 15M ha, such as proportional to existing forest and
potential set-aside area (PSA): the resultant allocations were similar
except the chosen allocation gave more weight to highly fragmented
areas.
2.5 Variables
Spatial configuration
One of Marxan’s outputs provides selection frequency for each
municipality. The selection frequency shows how many times out of a
thousand Marxan runs the municipality was included as part of a
solution. For each restoration target and approach, I chose only
solutions that met both restoration and connectivity targets, and
calculated the percent selection frequency for each municipality. Percent
selection frequency represented the probability of a municipality being
included as part of the spatial prioritisation solution, as a percentage. I
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used this as a basis for the calculation of two variables: (1) concordance
score and (2) difference in percent selection frequency (dSF).
(1) Concordance score: the minimum percent selection frequency
common to all target and approach combinations for each municipality.
This score represents the minimum probability of a municipality being
included in a solution for all restoration targets and approaches.
(2) Difference in percent selection frequency (dSF): simply the difference
in percent selection frequency for each municipality between the static
and dynamic approaches for each restoration target individually. This
variable represents how much the probability of a municipality being
included in the solution changed with prioritisation approach, rather than
the target. A -100 score shows municipalities always included in the
dynamic solution and never in the static, a 100 score shows
municipalities always included in the static solution and never in the
dynamic one, and values close to zero show municipalities whose
probabilities of being included in the solution did not change significantly
with prioritisation approach.
Costs and Benefits
Solutions for the 3 restoration targets under both static and dynamic
approaches were compared spatially and through time on the basis of
cost (USD, $), cost-effectiveness (ha/USD), forest connectivity
increment (ha), informational rent capture (USD, $) and proportional
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informational rent capture (informational rent capture as a proportion of
USD spent). Temporal comparisons were on a per year basis, and
regional comparisons on a per hectare basis (cf Armsworth 2014).
2.6 Testing importance of restoration target and prioritisation approach
Linear models were fitted to test the effect of restoration target and
prioritisation approach on the solution obtained. Different models were
fitted for 3 response variables: cost-effectiveness, connectivity (dIIC/ha),
and proportional informational rent capture (see table 5.1 and chapter
4). Models were fitted for each BR individually because the objective was
to understand the relative importance of restoration target and
prioritisation approach for each BR independently.
Two-way ANOVAs were fitted using the lm() function in R, and model fit
was assessed using residual plots as recommended by Pinheiro and
Bates (2000). Box-cox transformations were applied to the response
variables to solve non-linearity issues (Box & Cox 1964; Kato 2012).
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3. Results
3.1 Costs and benefits of meeting restoration targets
The total cost of achieving restoration targets via a payment scheme was
approximately 3,553-3,797 million USD (mill. $) for restoration target
one, 20,400- 20,640 mill. $ for restoration target two, and 30,010-30,358
mill. $ for restoration target three (table 5.3). These costs represented
half of the cost of purchasing farmland for the same solutions: 7,400,
40,900 and 60,100 mill. $ for targets one, two and three respectively.
The dynamic solution was 243-347 mill. $ cheaper than the static
solution depending on the restoration target.
Cost-effectiveness, the number of hectares set-aside per USD spent,
increased at each time step in the dynamic prioritisation, but decreased
with the number of hectares to be restored (SM Table 8). Cost-
effectiveness for the dynamic solution under targets two and three were
31% and 34% lower than target one respectively (SM Table 8). The cost-
effectiveness difference between targets was slightly smaller for the
static approach, but followed the same trend (SM Table 8). This
decrease in cost-effectiveness could be expected because the Marxan’s
solution includes municipalities in decreasing order of cost-
effectiveness, so a larger target meant decreased overall cost-
effectiveness.
The restoration targets defined forest cover benefits, and the total forest
connectivity increment promoted by those targets defined forest
connectivity benefits (dIIC, table 5.3). Total dIIC ranged between 0.71-
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0.74, 2.22-2.37, and 3.16-3.42 million hectares (M ha) for restoration
targets one, two and three respectively; the lower value of the range
belonged to the dynamic solutions (table 5.3). Forest connectivity
increment per restored hectare (dIIC/ha) had a similar behaviour to cost-
effectiveness at the BAF level; decreasing with restoration target. For
the dynamic approach, dIIC/ha decreased by 21% between targets one
and two, but the difference between targets two and three were close to
0% (SM Table 8). The difference in dIIC/ha between targets was slightly
smaller for the static approach, but followed the same trend. This
decrease in dIIC/ha was explained by the same mechanism that
explains decreasing cost-effectiveness. However, the fact the
magnitude of the difference decreased with restoration target could be
explained by the logarithmic-type relationship between forest cover and
dIIC. This relationship seems to have decreasing marginal returns that
are hit at ~10M ha (target two). The increase in forest connectivity
promoted by a set number of hectares at lower forest cover values is
smaller than the one promoted by the same amount at higher forest
cover values. In target one dIIC/ha reached higher values and larger
differences between approaches, but with increasing target, dIIC/ha and
its differences between approaches became much smaller.
At the BR level, the same BAF level trends in cost per hectare (SM
Figure 3) and cost-effectiveness (figure 5.1a) across targets were
observed for most subregions. The largest drop in cost-effectiveness
was observed between targets one and two for most regions (figure
5.1a). The most common trend for dIIC/ha was decreasing dIIC/ha with
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increasing number of hectares set-aside, but dIIC/ha varied widely as a
function of target and approach (figure 5.1b). In Diamantina, Florestas
de Interior and Sao Francisco dIIC/ha for both approaches had a similar
behaviour across restoration targets; in Florestas de Araucaria, Bahia
and Pernambuco, the behaviour of dIIC/ha across targets was very
different between approaches. These results implied that increasing
targets could result in reduced cost-effectiveness, however, the effect of
target on dIIC/ha depends on where the prioritisation takes place (BR),
the objective of the prioritisation (restoration target), and the approach
(static vs. dynamic).
Exceptional BRs in terms of cost-effectiveness included Florestas de
Araucaria for target one, Diamantina for target three, Pernambuco for
targets two and three, and Serra do Mar across targets. For these BR
and target combinations, the static approach was most cost-effective.
Whether the dynamic approach or the static approach provided more
forest connectivity benefits at the BR level varied with BR and restoration
target (table 5.3). However, the probability that the static approach
provided higher connectivity benefits than the dynamic approach
increased with restoration target from approximately 0.4 to 0.9.
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Table 5.3. Comparison of total costs and benefits of prioritisation solutions. Total forest cover, connectivity and
cost at the biogeographical subregion level and for all the Brazilian Atlantic Forest, by restoration target and
prioritisation approach.
Results
Biogeographical
Subregion
Restoration Target 1 Restoration Target two Restoration Target three
Static Dynamic Static Dynamic Static Dynamic
Increase in
Forest Cover (M
ha)
Bahia 0.245 0.245 0.956 0.956 1.476 1.476
Brejos Nordestinos 0.049 0.049 0.088 0.088 0.228 0.228
Diamantina 0.182 0.182 0.480 0.480 0.977 0.977
Florestas de Araucaria 0.489 0.489 2.203 2.203 3.099 3.099
Florestas de Interior 0.772 0.772 5.999 5.999 6.416 6.416
Pernambuco 0.063 0.063 0.308 0.308 0.430 0.430
Sao Francisco 0.327 0.327 0.232 0.232 0.917 0.917
Serra do Mar 0.548 0.548 0.328 0.328 1.459 1.459
Brazilian Atlantic Forest 2.676 2.676 10.595 10.595 15.000 15.000
Increase in
Forest
Connectivity (M
ha)
Bahia 0.06 ±9.4E-09 0.04 ±5.9E-07 0.24 ±1.2E-07 0.20 ±2.9E-06 0.34 ±2.4E-07 0.32 ±2.1E-06
Brejos Nordestinos 0.02 ±0.0E+0 0.02 ±4.3E-08 0.03 ±5.5E-08 0.03 ±5.5E-08 0.07 ±6.7E-08 0.06 ±1.5E-07
Diamantina 0.05 ±7.4E-08 0.05 ±1.4E-07 0.12 ±1.1E-07 0.12 ±1.2E-06 0.23 ±1.3E-07 0.21 ±5.9E-07
Florestas de Araucaria 0.11 ±6.8E-07 0.10 ±1.7E-06 0.48 ±1.5E-06 0.47 ±3.4E-06 0.69 ±2.1E-06 0.59 ±4.4E-06
Florestas de Interior 0.19 ±1.8E-07 0.20 ±2.7E-06 1.24 ±4.2E-06 1.14 ±6.0E-06 1.33 ±4.3E-06 1.24 ±6.2E-06
Pernambuco 0.02 ±1.8E-08 0.02 ±9.7E-08 0.08 ±1.2E-07 0.08 ±1.4E-07 0.12 ±1.3E-07 0.11 ±2.8E-07
Sao Francisco 0.11 ±1.4E-06 0.10 ±2.4E-06 0.08 ±1.4E-06 0.07 ±3.1E-06 0.24 ±1.5E-06 0.22 ±2.7E-06
Serra do Mar 0.18 ±9.9E-07 0.18 ±4.0E-06 0.09 ±3.9E-07 0.11 ±5.1E-06 0.41 ±2.7E-06 0.41 ±4.8E-06
Brazilian Atlantic Forest 0.74 ±3.4E-06 0.71 ±1.1E-05 2.37 ±8.0E-06 2.22 ±2.2E-05 3.42 ±1.1E-05 3.16 ±2.1E-05
Total cost (mill.
$)
Bahia 268.3 256.5 1,135.4 1,109.7 1,832.9 1,800.5
Brejos Nordestinos 5.6 5.5 10.9 10.9 63.5 61.9
Diamantina 83.6 81.9 346.8 335.4 851.5 858.5
Florestas de Araucaria 1,168.3 1,208.3 6,768.0 6,679.3 9,978.0 9,785.5
Florestas de Interior 967.1 686.7 11,227.2 11,089.6 12,162.3 12,041.6
Pernambuco 68.6 67.9 475.1 479.0 732.2 734.6
Sao Francisco 258.3 247.0 175.5 166.6 1,141.6 1,092.9
Serra do Mar 989.1 998.8 521.9 531.6 3,538.6 3,564.6
Brazilian Atlantic Forest 3,797.1 3,553.5 20,640.5 20,400.4 30,358.1 30,010.9
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Figure 5.1. Changes in cost effectiveness and proportional forest
increment. (a) Cost effectiveness and (B) forest connectivity increment
for all prioritisation solutions by biogeographical subregions.
Florestas de Araucaria Bahia Brejos Nordestinos Diamantina
Florestas de Interior Pernambuco Serra do Mar Sao Francisco
3.25e−04
3.50e−04
3.75e−04
4.00e−04
8.0e−04
8.5e−04
9.0e−04
9.5e−04
4e−03
5e−03
6e−03
7e−03
8e−03
9e−03
1.25e−03
1.50e−03
1.75e−03
2.00e−03
2.25e−03
6e−04
8e−04
1e−03
6e−04
7e−04
8e−04
9e−04
4.0e−04
4.5e−04
5.0e−04
5.5e−04
6.0e−04
8.0e−04
1.0e−03
1.2e−03
1.4e−03
T1 T2 T3 T1 T2 T3 T1 T2 T3 T1 T2 T3
T1 T2 T3 T1 T2 T3 T1 T2 T3 T1 T2 T3
Restoration Target
C
os
te
ffe
ct
iv
en
es
s
(h
a/
us
d)
Solution
Dynamic
Static
(A) Cost effectiveness
Florestas de Araucaria Bahia Brejos Nordestinos Diamantina
Florestas de Interior Pernambuco Serra do Mar Sao Francisco
0.20
0.25
0.30
0.35
0.20
0.25
0.30
0.35
T1 T2 T3 T1 T2 T3 T1 T2 T3 T1 T2 T3
Restoration Target
Fo
re
st
co
nn
ec
tiv
ity
in
cr
em
en
tp
er
se
ta
si
de
he
ct
ar
e
(p
ro
po
rti
on
)
Solution
Dynamic
Static
(B) Forest connectivity change
- 181 -
3.2 Spatial prioritisation agreement
All BRs had high concordance areas, meaning groups of municipalities
with concordance scores of 50% or higher, except for Pernambuco
(figure 5.2). However, the proportion of BRs with municipalities with high
concordance scores varied widely, with Bahia having the smallest and
Florestas de Araucaria the largest. The highest concordance scores (75-
100%) were found in Serra do Mar, Brejos Nordestinos and Diamantina
(figures 5.2 & 5.3).
There were five BRs with a high proportion of 0% concordance scores:
Florestas de Araucaria, Florestas de Interior, Brejos Nordestinos,
Diamantina, and Serra do Mar (figure 5.3). For each of these BRs, of all
municipalities included in any given solution, more than 75% had at least
one solution for which the municipality had not been included. However,
the concordance score was created to look at strong agreement, not lack
of it, so a 0% score simply suggests no agreement in the solution across
approach/target combinations, but not the degree of disagreement.
Studies looking at congruence among spatial prioritisation for different
taxonomic groups in Brazil have also found low congruence across large
areas (Sobral et al. 2012).
Three groups of BRs could be identified based on distribution of
concordance scores different to zero: (1) low, (3) intermediate, and (3)
high. These groups were defined on the basis of score value and
representation. Pernambuco had the lowest concordance, never
reaching concordance scores higher than 10% (figure 5.3). The
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“intermediate concordance” group included Florestas de Interior,
Florestas de Araucaria, Brejos Nordestinos, Diamantina, and Serra do
Mar. Scores varied widely for these BRs, but not one score category was
representative of more than 8% of the BR (excluding 0% category).
Bahia also belonged to the intermediate concordance group, with one-
third of it having scored 30% or lower. Finally, Sao Francisco was the
only BR in the high concordance category, because one-quarter of it had
concordance scores between 30-75%. The majority of BRs (6 out of
eight) had intermediate concordance scores, highlighting Pernambuco
and Sao Francisco as BRs where the choice of approach/target
combination had a high and low impact on the spatial solution,
respectively.
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Figure 5.2. Map of prioritisation concordance by biogeographical subregion. The map shows the concordance
score between restoration targets and prioritisation approaches. The concordance score is simply the minimum percent
selection frequency common to all target and approach combinations. It represents priority agreement across targets
and approaches. In grey municipalities never included in a solution.
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Figure 5.3. Prioritisation concordance by biogeographical subregion. The proportion of each biogeographical
region that have different concordance scores. The concordance score is simply the minimum percentage selection
frequency common to all target and approach combinations, representing agreement across targets and approaches.
Proportions were calculated in terms of number of municipalities.
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3.3 Differences between static and dynamic solutions across targets
3.3.1 Differences in spatial configuration
At the BAF level, differences in spatial output between static and
dynamic solutions in terms of the distribution of the absolute difference
in percent selection frequency (dSF) was relatively small; median
absolute dSF was largest for target two (9.4%), and similar between the
remaining targets (~8.4%). However, the difference in the spatial
configuration of dSF did change markedly with restoration target (figure
5.4). The proportion of municipalities for which selection frequency was
highest for the dynamic and static approaches was similar across targets
(0.4-0.5), but the highest dSF values were found for the dynamic
solutions. These were municipalities whose probabilities of being
included in the solution decreased significantly for the static approach.
The proportion of municipalities for which approach did not affect the
probability of being included in the solution (<5% dSF) was near 40% for
restoration targets one and three. However, it was smaller (30%) for
target two, suggesting that the way this target was defined had the
highest impact on the difference in spatial configuration between
approaches.
Absolute dSF showed how municipalities’ probabilities of being in the
solution changed with target, regardless of the approach it favoured
(figure 5.5). At BR level there was no specific trend in absolute dSF with
target. Most commonly, absolute dSF increased between restoration
targets one and two in terms of median dSF or interquartile range, and
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decreased between targets two and three. This showed that at BR level,
target two could also be responsible for the largest differences in
selection frequency (figure 5.5).
The information provided by concordance scores and dSF is different
and complementary in that the former shows agreement across targets
as well as approaches, and the latter shows changes in selection
frequency between approaches within targets. For example, Florestas
de Interior, which had the lowest median dSF across targets (figure 5.5),
was in the intermediate concordance group. For this BR, there was no
strong agreement in selection frequency across targets and approaches,
however, changes in selection frequency between approaches within
targets were small, suggesting that the source of disagreement in
selection frequency across targets and approaches might be the
changes in the restoration target. Sao Francisco was another particular
case, for it had the highest median dSF across targets and was in the
high concordance group. For this BR, prioritisation approach was
responsible for the largest changes in spatial configuration. In this way,
concordance and dSF jointly help unravel the effect of restoration and
prioritisation approach on the spatial configuration of solutions.
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Figure 5.4. Changes in the spatial configuration of solutions. The map shows the difference in the percentage
times a municipality is included in the solution between static and dynamic approaches, for the three restoration targets.
In grey municipalities that are never included in a solution, in dark blue municipalities where the difference in selection
frequency between static and dynamic solutions is under 5%. From blue to green increasing differences where the
dynamic approach has higher selection frequencies than the static approach. From blue to pink increasing differences
where the static approach has higher selection frequencies than the dynamic approach.
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Figure 5.5. The absolute difference in percent selection frequency by biogeographical subregion. Boxplots show
the distribution of the absolute differences by restoration target for all biogeographical subregions. Dots in green and
pink show the differences where percent selection frequency is higher for the dynamic and static solutions respectively.
Dashed line marks a difference between solutions of 30%.
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3.3.2 Differences in costs and benefits
The difference in cost-effectiveness between static and dynamic approaches at
the BAF level decreased with restoration target, from 7% to 1%, with almost no
difference between approaches for targets two and three (SM Table 8).
Increasing the number of hectares to be allocated decreased the potential for
different allocations, which explained the decreasing difference in cost-
effectiveness. This decreasing trend was clear at the BAF level, but not at the BR
level (figure 5.6a, figure 5.7). The largest differences in cost-effectiveness were
observed in Florestas de Interior and Brejos Nordestinos for restoration target
one, the dynamic approach being most cost-effective. However, differences were
in general small, the largest one representing an extra 3 hectares for every
10,000$ spent. The proportion of each BR for which the dynamic approach was
most cost-effective varied between 0.2 and 0.8, showing that the difference in
cost-effectiveness was observable at the BR level rather than municipality level
(figure 5.6a).
The difference in dIIC per restored hectare between static and dynamic
approaches at the BAF level slightly decreased with restoration target (figure
5.6b). However, at BR level the 95% confidence interval for most differences
overlapped with zero (figure 5.7), suggesting that for most BRs, the benefits of
the static approach in terms of dIIC/ha were only significant for target three, with
the benefits being small. For at least one-third of each BR, dIIC/ha was highest
in the dynamic approach in most BR/restoration target combinations (figure 5.6b),
showing that the dIIC benefits of a dynamic approach were spread across each
BR.
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3.4 Informational rent capture
BRs with higher median informational rent capture are expected to have a higher
incentive to join the set-aside programme than for BRs with lower values.
Informational rent capture was always highest for the dynamic approach, whether
measured as a total, per hectare or as a proportion of each USD spent (Table
5.4). This was true for all biogeographical subregions and across all restoration
targets, with the exception of Brejos Nordestinos for target two where static and
dynamic solutions were identical. This was expected given the results from
chapter 4.
Informational rent capture per hectare at the BAF level increased with the
restoration target for both static and dynamic approaches in similar proportions;
capture per hectare for targets two and three was ~25% and ~40% higher than
for target one respectively (SM Table 8). At the BR level this increase with
restoration target was not so clear; for example, see Florestas de Interior between
targets two and three (figure 5.8). Higher capture per hectare was not only due
to the dynamic approach reaching higher values at the municipality level, but also
to the increased number of municipalities capturing informational rent (figure 5.8).
Subregions with the highest median informational rent capture per hectare were
Florestas de Araucaria, Serra do Mar, and Sao Francisco for target three, and
the one with the lowest was Brejos Nordestinos for targets one and two (figure
5.8).
At the BAF level, the difference in informational rent capture between static and
dynamic approaches decreased as a function of restoration target (as a
proportion of total area, figure 5.8c). However, this was not true at BR level for all
regions. In most cases, for at least half of each BR informational rent capture was
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highest for the dynamic approach. So even though there was a clear benefit to
the dynamic approach in terms of incentives for participation, the advantage
against the static approach reduced with increasing restoration target.
3.4 Importance of restoration target and prioritisation approach
Prioritisation approach had a large effect on municipality level average cost-
effectiveness, dIIC/ha, or proportional informational rent capture for all of BRs
(table 5.5, in purple). Most commonly, cost-effectiveness, dIIC/ha and
proportional informational rent capture all decreased for the static approach (SM
Table 9). However, only for some BRs prioritisation approach had a large effect
on response variables (table 5.5, in purple). For all BRs, prioritisation approach
had the most important effect on outcomes (either in terms of cost-effectiveness,
dIIC/ha or proportional informational rent capture), and in these instances, the
dynamic approach was best. For example, in Diamantina, Florestas de Araucaria,
San Francisco and Serra do Mar the dynamic solution was better in terms of the
three variables: cost-effectiveness, dIIC/ha and proportional informational rent
capture. Of these, only Diamantina and Serra do Mar showed large effects of
approach on cost effectiveness. In Florestas de Araucaria, the dynamic approach
was better only in terms of dIIC/ha and informational rent capture. However, all
BRs, the interaction between prioritisation approach and restoration target was
large, indicating that the relationship between restoration target and cost-
effectiveness, dIIC/ha and proportional informational rent capture depended on
the prioritisation approach (table 5.5). This means that the best prioritisation
approach depends on the restoration target for those BRs.
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Figure 5.6. Variation in differences between static and dynamic solutions
across restoration targets, where a negative value means the dynamic
approach reached higher values than the static approach. (a) differences in
cost-effectiveness (ha/usd); (b) differences in forest connectivity increment
(ha/ha); and (c) Differences in informational rent capture (proportion of USD
spent).
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Figure 5.7. Differences between approaches in cost effectiveness and proportional forest increment.Differences
between static and dynamic solutions and their change with different restoration targets, by biogeographical subregion.
Negative changes show cost effectiveness and forest connectivity increment values are higher in the dynamic solution,
positive values show the opposite. Dashed blue line shows where the difference in zero.
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Table 5.4. Comparison of informational rent capture. Total informational rent capture, informational rent capture
per hectare and proportional informational rent capture by restoration target and prioritisation approach.
Results Biogeographical Subregion
Restoration Target 1 Restoration Target two Restoration Target three
Static Dynamic Static Dynamic Static Dynamic
Total informational
rent capture (mill. $)
Bahia 57.75 104.54 258.40 381.84 409.60 550.79
Brejos Nordestinos 2.47 2.77 4.14 4.14 20.80 27.64
Diamantina 31.44 34.27 85.66 122.28 178.64 266.66
Florestas de Araucaria 210.29 353.49 1,667.74 2,040.75 2,449.60 3,519.69
Florestas de Interior 256.85 274.37 2,491.18 3,264.49 2,769.90 3,438.44
Pernambuco 20.97 32.67 123.82 118.39 182.15 206.00
Sao Francisco 87.37 128.79 59.14 98.94 501.22 662.40
Serra do Mar 298.10 355.28 117.25 163.04 1,075.74 1,242.88
Brazilian Atlantic Forest 963.04 1,286.45 4,802.70 6,192.14 7,597.81 9,935.19
Informational rent
capture per set-
aside hectare
(usd/ha)
Bahia 235.51 426.33 270.24 399.34 277.59 373.28
Brejos Nordestinos 50.56 56.74 46.79 46.79 91.24 121.26
Diamantina 172.71 188.29 178.60 254.94 182.91 273.05
Florestas de Araucaria 429.94 722.72 756.95 926.25 790.42 1,135.71
Florestas de Interior 332.54 355.23 415.29 544.20 431.73 535.93
Pernambuco 330.80 515.40 401.60 384.00 423.92 479.43
Sao Francisco 266.98 393.57 254.87 426.42 546.74 722.56
Serra do Mar 543.79 648.09 357.49 497.10 737.55 852.14
Brazilian Atlantic Forest 359.83 480.67 453.32 584.47 506.52 662.35
Proportion of cost
captured as
informational rent
Bahia 0.215 0.408 0.228 0.344 0.223 0.306
Brejos Nordestinos 0.443 0.507 0.380 0.380 0.327 0.447
Diamantina 0.376 0.419 0.247 0.365 0.210 0.311
Florestas de Araucaria 0.180 0.293 0.246 0.306 0.246 0.360
Florestas de Interior 0.266 0.400 0.222 0.294 0.228 0.286
Pernambuco 0.306 0.481 0.261 0.247 0.249 0.280
Sao Francisco 0.338 0.521 0.337 0.594 0.439 0.606
Serra do Mar 0.301 0.356 0.225 0.307 0.304 0.349
Brazilian Atlantic Forest 0.254 0.362 0.233 0.304 0.250 0.331
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Figure 5.8. Distribution of informational rent capture. Boxplots show the distribution of informational rent capture
per hectare at municipality level by restoration target for all biogeographical subregions. The “X” shows the subregion’s
average informational rent capture per hectare for each restoration target and approach combination
.
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●●
●● ●●
● ●●
● ●●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
● ●
●
●
●
●
●
●
Florestas de Araucaria Bahia Brejos Nordestinos Diamantina
Florestas de Interior Pernambuco Serra do Mar Sao Francisco
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
T1 T2 T3 T1 T2 T3 T1 T2 T3 T1 T2 T3
Restoration Target
In
fo
rm
at
io
na
lr
en
tc
ap
tu
re
d
pe
rs
et
as
id
e
he
ct
ar
e
(u
sd
/h
a)
Solution
Dynamic
Static
- 196 -
Restoration target level was associated with different cost-effectiveness,
dIIC/ha and proportional informational rent capture, but not so widely across
BRs as prioritisation approach (table 5.5). In most of the cases in which
restoration target had a large effect on variable value, the interaction term with
prioritisation approach was also important, so the effect depended on
prioritisation approach. This was true for the effect of restoration target on cost-
effectiveness and proportional informal rent extraction. dIIC/ha had more
exceptions, for example Florestas de Interior, where there was a clear effect of
restoration target: dIIC increased between target one and two and three, but
not between target two and three. Although the effects shown in table 5.5 were
medium to large, as they varied between BRs the direction of the effect was not
consistent (SM Tables 9 and 10).
Overall, when deciding prioritisation approach and restoration target for a given
BR, the former had significant effects across more BRs and variables.
However, for most BRs the best approach depended on the combination of
target and approach. Brejos Nordestinos was an exceptional BR in this context:
in terms of cost-effectiveness and dIIC/ha, only restoration target had a large
effect (table 5.5). This was a special case because for restoration target two,
the dynamic and static solution were identical, and it was the BR with the
smallest number of municipalities within each target/approach combination
(n=18 for some treatment combinations) which might not be enough to detect
small differences.
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Table 5.5. Summary of effects of restoration target and prioritisation
approach on prioritisation outcomes. The table shows the response
variables that had the largest effect (of all explanatory variables, for each
model) on outcomes in terms of cost-effectiveness, forest connectivity
increment per hectare and proportional informational rent capture. In violet, I
highlight where the size of the named effects are of the same order of
magnitude that the intercept. The remaining, one order of magnitude smaller.
Biogeographical
Subregion
Solution
Cost-effectiveness
Forest connectivity
increment/ha (dIIC/ha)
Proportional
informational rent
capture
Florestas de Araucaria
Prioritisation
approach,
Restoration Target,
Interaction Prioritisation approach Prioritisation approach
Bahia
Prioritisation
approach,
Restoration Target,
Interaction Restoration Target
Prioritisation approach,
Restoration Target,
Interaction
Brejos Nordestinos Restoration Target Restoration Target
Prioritisation approach,
Restoration Target,
Interaction
Diamantina
Prioritisation
approach Prioritisation approach
Prioritisation approach,
Interaction
Florestas de Interior
Prioritisation
approach Restoration Target
Prioritisation Target
Interaction
Pernambuco
Prioritisation
approach,
Restoration Target,
Interaction
Prioritisation approach,
Restoration Target,
Interaction Prioritisation approach
Serra do Mar
Prioritisation
approach,
Restoration Target,
Interaction Prioritisation approach Prioritisation approach
Sao Francisco
Prioritisation
approach,
Restoration Target
Prioritisation approach,
Restoration Target,
Interaction
Prioritisation approach,
Restoration Target,
Interaction
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4. Discussion
4.1 Priority areas for natural restoration in the BAF
Over the last 5 years, four regional-scale plans for restoration priority areas
have been developed for the BAF (Calmon et al. 2011; Banks-Leite et al.
2014b; Tambosi et al. 2014; Crouzeilles et al. 2015). Even though a variety of
perspectives and approaches to restoring the BAF can encourage open debate
(Stewart & Possingham 2005), these initiatives involve publishing different
outcomes, which can create policy confusion (Mace 2000; Brooks et al. 2006b).
Without a clear message to decision-makers, opportunities to catalyse efforts
to restore the BAF could be lost. This study is another effort to provide a plan
of priorities to restore the BAF, however, by looking for agreement between two
prioritisation approaches and three different targets, it provides information on
areas that have a high probability of being priority areas regardless of target
and approach. In the midst of multiple targets and objectives, our map provides
a starting point for priority restoration areas based on three important
considerations; potential to improve forest connectivity, cost effectiveness, and
potential to incentivise participation through informational rent.
This study identified all BRs (except Pernambuco) as having some areas of
high concordance, and Sao Francisco had the most extensive areas of
concordance. Priority areas of high concordance within each BR were not the
same as the priority areas highlighted by the other four regional-scale plans for
restoration priority areas developed for the BAF, probably because they were
generally prioritising on static ecological criteria. However, there was overlap
between areas with concordance, even if low, and some of the other priority
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areas. The AFRP’s prioritisation mapped 17M ha of illegally deforested land
according to forest code, and most of their priority areas were in Florestas de
Interior and Florestas de Araucaria (Calmon et al., 2011). These BRs had
intermediate concordance scores, but the areas prioritised by the AFRP did
overlap with low concordance areas. Tambosi et al. (2014) ranked landscapes
for restoration considering habitat amount and connectivity, identifying
landscapes within Serra do Mar and Bahia as restoration priorities. Very similar
areas had >25% concordance scores for those BRs in this study. Banks-Leite
et al. (2014) prioritised landscapes in terms of community integrity and
economic costs and most priority areas fell within Diamantina, Bahia, Florestas
de Interior, Florestas de Araucaria and Serra do Mar. All of those BRs had high
concordance scores areas that overlapped loosely with their priority
landscapes. Finally, Crouzeilles et al. (2015) prioritised areas for restoration
incorporating the ecological value of habitat patch, while also considering BR
representation and cost-effectiveness. Most of their priority areas fell in
Florestas de Interior and Florestas de Araucaria, and the ones in the latter
overlapped with the areas of high concordance scores in this study. This study
complements previous studies as none of them considered ecologic and
economic feedback effects, as well as multiple restoration objectives.
Additionally, by providing results at both low and high resolutions, for socially
meaningful units (BRs and municipalities), this study facilitates top-down
implementation considerations, as well as providing enough flexibility to
consider local context as restoration is not tied to specific locations beyond
municipality level.
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4.2 Feasibility of costs of meeting targets
Of the four above-mentioned previous studies, only two included direct cost
considerations with very different cost estimates. The cost of purchasing land
for restoration to improve habitat availability for two species, ensuring 20%
forest cover within each BR, was estimated by Crouzeilles et al. (2015) as
$17,500-$20,500 million ($1,534-$1,597 per hectare). The cost of payments to
set-aside agricultural land for restoration to reach a restoration target of 30%
forest cover in priority landscapes was estimated by Banks-Leite et al. (2014)
at $56.3 million per year (range $25.7 million to $91.6 million), based on the
average PES values across the biome, equivalent to $132.73 per hectare per
year. In our study, the cost of agricultural set-asides for restoration was
approximately $147.5, $214, and $222.3 per hectare per year for targets one,
two and three respectively. These estimates are within the range of PES in
Brazil used in Banks-Leite et al. (2014), the increasing cost per hectare being
explained by the decrease in the cost-effectiveness of the solution as the
amount of restoration required increased. However, our estimates of the cost
of purchasing the set-asides were much higher than the estimates of
Crouzeilles et al. (2015); $2,765/ha, $3,860/ha and $4,007/ha for targets one,
two and three respectively. Crouzeilles et al. (2015) had most of their priority
areas in Florestas de interior and Florestas de Araucaria, which are cheaper
and less degraded than the rest of BAF. Because I forced priority areas in all
BRs by analysing each separately, it could be expected our estimates to be
higher.
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Estimates of total cost per year for targets 1 2 and 3 were $394.8-$422 mill.,
$2267-$2293 mill., and $3335-$3373 mill. respectively. The feasibility of these
targets being implemented can be assessed by comparison with yearly
subsidies for agriculture, one of the most important economic sectors in the
BAF region (Soares-filho et al. 2014). Comparatively, the cost of payment per
year of set-asides for target one is 15-17% of Brazil’s annual expenditure on
agricultural subsidies, which makes it achievable. However, costs for targets
two and three respectively represent 89-90% and 130-133% of annual
agricultural subsidies, which makes their implementation highly unlikely.
Furthermore, cost estimates only involve the cost of the payment the farmer
would receive. There are additional costs that cannot be ignored, such as
hidden natural regeneration costs and transaction costs. Although most areas
would follow natural regeneration simply by ceasing the drivers of disturbance
(Melo et al. 2013b), passive restoration in abandoned pastures does have
some financial costs, e.g. establishing fences (Zahawi et al. 2014), and these
costs can reach USD $ 850 – 1200 per ha in the Atlantic Forest (Alves-Pinto et
al. 2017). It has also been estimated that 20% of the area considered for
restoration would require active reforestation practices, with associated costs
of up to $5000/ha during the first 3 years (Melo et al. 2013b). This means that
during the first years of implementation there would be additional costs related
to regeneration if restoration were to be successful.
A clear understanding of transaction costs is needed before concluding whether
a PES programme is cost-effective or not. However, PES transaction costs are
poorly understood both at small and large scales (Wunder et al. 2008), in
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general and specifically for the BAF (Finney 2015). Costa Rica’s Fonafifo,
which operates at scale, reported transaction costs of 19 to 25% of total project
costs (Wunder 2007). In the BAF, grey literature on one case shows a
transaction cost of 21% of total project cost, compared with incentive payments
of 23% (Finney 2015). Estimating a transaction cost similar to payment cost
would bring the cost of meeting target one to ~$800 mill. per year; ~0.045% of
Brazil’s GDP for 2015. This, however, is a high transaction cost estimate,
because 55% of transaction costs in the mentioned case study consist of
general assessment, property mapping and monitoring, things that are already
under way in the BAF (Banks-Leite et al. 2014a).
4.3 Static vs. Dynamic approaches and the importance of the restoration target
This chapter advances understanding on the effects of employing a dynamic
approach to prioritisation on outcomes, by also evaluating the role of the target
set for restoration. There was a trend of decreasing cost-effectiveness with
increasing restoration target (in terms of hectares set-aside), which is a relevant
trade-off for decision-making. Similar to chapter 4, the cost-effectiveness
benefits of a dynamic approach were geographically variable, and restoration
target played an important role in determining these benefits in interaction with
BR. The fact that target definition is crucial in defining spatial conservation
planning priorities was not a surprise (Margules & Pressey 2000b; Kukkala &
Moilanen 2013); other studies have found priority areas vary widely with
different targets based on taxonomic, phylogenetic and functional diversity for
mammals and birds occurring in Brazil (Sobral et al. 2012).
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4.4 Informational rent as a cost-effective incentive to set-aside farmland
As a consequence of the Forest Code, landholders have collectively accrued a
large “environmental debt” in the BAF, which are hectares that have to be
reforested by law (Soares-Filho et al. 2014). However, due to the lost
opportunity costs of land, and lack of enforcement, achieving compliance
remains a challenge (Latawiec et al. 2015; Alves-Pinto et al. 2017). It has been
suggested that to achieve compliance, restoration needs to be an economically
sustainable activity in the BAF, and several mechanisms have been put forward
(Brancalion et al. 2012; Lopes et al. 2013; Soares-filho et al. 2014; Trevisan et
al. 2016). These include agricultural intensification to offset the lost farmland,
diversification by sustainably exploiting restored forest, and implementing
payments for ecosystems services for carbon and water (Brancalion et al. 2012;
Strassburg et al. 2014b; Alves-Pinto et al. 2017). These are all key steps in
long-term compliance, but require longer time-lines and high investment. In
chapter 4, I proposed the use of informational rent extraction as a fast, cost-
effective way of incentivising landholders to comply, that complements the
other longer-term mechanisms. The priority areas resulting from this analysis
already optimise the use of the existing potential informational rent capture,
proving a valuable addition to existing cost-based prioritisations.
Large-scale restoration can act as another factor in the demand for agricultural
land, and one of the main challenges in the BAF is integrating large-scale
restoration and increasing demand for food production, avoiding displacement
to other biomes (Latawiec et al. 2015). The BAF presents a huge opportunity
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for establishing forest restoration as an economically viable practice due to its
large potential for agricultural productivity improvement (Joly et al. 2010;
Strassburg et al. 2014a). Using informational rent capture as an incentive for
restoration at large scales would complement the goal of improving productivity,
as in order to make the largest informational rent capture the lowest productivity
land needs to be set-aside. If complementary activities are implemented to
increase the productivity of lands currently under agriculture, tropical forest
restoration could be supported without risking perverse outcomes for food
production (Brancalion et al. 2012).
4.5 Future work
The BAF is thought to be particularly vulnerable to climate change both socially
and in biodiversity terms (Bellard et al. 2014; Scarano & Ceotto 2015). Including
climate change and its impact on biodiversity and agricultural yields is a crucial
next step in setting priorities for restoration.
The implementation crisis in conservation planning is one of conservation's
greatest challenges (Biggs et al. 2011). Many conservation planning
approaches continue to emphasize ecological over social considerations
(Knight et al. 2006), and translating assessments into conservation actions
remains a challenge (Knight et al. 2013). The BAF presents a great opportunity
to bridge this planning-implementation gap due to the existence of the AFRP.
Core to the planning–implementation gap is the failure to achieve the necessary
shared vision and collaboration among typically diverse stakeholder groups
(Biggs et al. 2011), which is particularly hard to achieve at large scales.
However, the AFRP, funded 7 years ago, is currently a coalition of 260+
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stakeholders across the BAF, including governmental agencies, the private
sector, NGOs and research institutions (Pinto et al. 2014). This provides a
unique opportunity for success, if collaboration is possible. Even though the
AFRP has their own priority areas for restoration (Calmon et al. 2011), they also
work with thematic maps that can be overlaid to their priorities, which include
(a) eligible areas for carbon restoration projects under the Verified Carbon
Standard; (b) key areas for urban water supply; and (c) priority areas for
improving landscape connectivity (Brancalion et al. 2013a). Our approach
would add information on incentives for setting aside land to their priorities, and
could usefully be integrated into their existing prioritisations.
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5. Conclusion
Priority areas for natural regeneration of forests in the BAF vary widely, but
agreement was found between existing assessments and this study’s results.
These areas of consistent priority are a good starting point for decision making
to restore the BAF. Our results suggested that the costs of meeting targets 2
(scientifically suggested target for ecological integrity) and 3 (AFRP target) are
too high for realistic implementation, but that implementing target 1 (the
government's 15% set-aside CBD target) at the BR level would be realistic. Our
estimates of cost are, however, very different to other estimates for same
targets, as shown in the discussion.
This chapter suggests that definition of the target to be met in prioritisations is
as important as regional characteristics in determining whether a static or a
dynamic approach is best. Exploring the implications of different targets for the
outcome of prioritisations is not often done, but this work highlights the
importance of recognising that different target specifications can lead to very
different outcomes on the ground.
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Chapter 6: Discussion
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6.1 Overview
In assessing the role of unintended feedback effects of conservation
interventions in conservation science and practice, three cross-cutting themes
emerged. For conservation to be able to plan for and manage unintended
feedback effects, these themes need to be addressed. The first theme is the
need for collection of real-world evidence of feedback effects; the second
theme concerns understanding when a dynamic approach to conservation
planning outperforms a simple static approach, and the third theme is
assessing the spatial and temporal interactions of unintended feedbacks. This
thesis advanced knowledge on each of these themes working with the empirical
case study of the BAF, and in the next sections, I discuss each of them in turn.
6.2 Empirical evidence
Conservation science, defined as the interdisciplinary field that explicitly
recognizes the tight coupling of social and natural systems, is a relatively new
discipline (Kareiva & Marvier 2012). It is not surprising then that many important
questions in the field initially find that the literature can be of anecdotal nature
and cannot support systematic reviews. Similar issues were faced by
researchers studying the shifting baseline syndrome (Papworth et al. 2009) and
determinants of conservation success (Brooks et al. 2012). In chapter two I
found that the current state of the literature that provides evidence on
unintended feedback effects of conservation interventions is not enough to
support a systematic review and provide generalisations on minimising their
effects. To understand drivers, mechanisms and circumstances that enhance
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or dampen unintended feedbacks, there is a need to establish comparative
databases to collate case studies that provide an evidence base (Sutherland et
al. 2004). Additionally, focusing on finding and studying examples in which
unintended feedbacks were overcome and managed could provide invaluable
insight. Such an initiative could work with existing similar efforts in the SES
framework. For example, the social-ecological systems meta-analysis
database, an on-going effort to collate examples of SESs, could facilitate such
an enterprise (Cox 2015). A posteriori empirical evidence could be collected
from evaluations of conservation impact that, by considering feedbacks
operating in an SES, could help identify the true drivers of observed patterns
(Lambin & Meyfroidt 2010).
Interdisciplinary empirical approaches present challenges across conservation
sectors. Most of the work on coupled social and ecological systems has been
theoretical (Liu et al. 2007). Results from Chapters three and four provide
evidence on the importance of empirical models. Despite numerous studies
addressing market feedback effects of reserve allocation, few of them were
based on empirical data (chapter 3). Additionally, results varied somewhat
between theoretical approaches and those based on real-life case studies.
Theoretical approaches tended to find larger differences in the cost-
effectiveness of reserve allocation between static and dynamic approaches
(Armsworth et al. 2006; Dissanayake & Önal 2011; Zvoleff & An 2014b), and
empirical case studies had more conservative results (Walker 2012b; Butsic et
al. 2013). Results from chapter four are aligned with the other empirical studies
in that differences in cost-effectiveness between approaches were small.
However, modelling the feedback effect caused by informational rent capture
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in chapter four lead to important and unexpected results: that informational rent
capture can be maximised to provide incentives for conservation without losing
project cost-effectiveness. These results highlight the importance of real-life
case studies, as a key factor in unravelling the true nature of the feedback
effects that are likely to be encountered in the real world.
The challenges of interdisciplinary models include the integration and scaling
of data to make them compatible on input (Dumanski et al. 1998). I found this
was also the case for modelling both environmental and economic feedbacks
of conservation interventions based on empirical case studies (chapter 3). In
addition, I found that modelling land market feedbacks requires temporal series
of spatially explicit data on land markets (chapter 3) which are commonly
available at a much coarser spatial grain that the prioritisation needs to respond
to on the conservation side (Armsworth 2014). Reconciling this mismatch
between the scale at which socio-economic data are available for modelling,
and the scale at which priorities need to be set (for ecological or institutional
reasons) is the first obstacle to modelling market feedbacks in empirical spatial
planning prioritisations. Using simulations, the approach selected for this work,
is time and data hungry, but provide a statistically robust way of reconciling the
data’s spatio-temporal resolution.
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6.3 Static vs. Dynamic approach to conservation planning
In chapters two and four, I identified the need to understand under which
circumstances accounting for feedback effects was key for conservation
success, and when a static approach would be good enough. Several tools
have been developed to explore the potential impacts of conservation
interventions and support decision-making, such as InVEST and Marxan (Ball
et al. 2009; Nelson et al. 2009). These are widely used, and even though
mechanisms for feedback effects could be included in their analyses, this would
be a substantial addition to complexity, both in terms of data requirements,
technical capacity for analysis and computing speed. There is, therefore, a
trade-off that needs to be assessed before investing in making these tools more
realistically dynamic. This assessment is required for a range of case studies,
and through conceptual modelling of when feedbacks are most likely to be
severe, backed up by a systematic review of evidence (once it becomes
available). This research agenda would then enable conservation scientists and
managers to find the balance between too many recommendations, which can
create policy confusion (Mace 2000; Brooks et al. 2006b), and provide
misleading recommendations from static tools.
Chapter four aimed to address this trade-off for the first time by comparing
prioritisation solutions for a static and a dynamic approach in circumstances
where there is both an ecological and an economic feedback as a result of
conservation intervention. In this case, the intervention is set-aside of private
agricultural land for forest restoration and the feedbacks are changes in forest
connectivity as a result of set-aside placement, and changes in the opportunity
cost of land set-aside as a result of informational rent capture by landowners.
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Results showed a clear trade-off between approaches in terms of the resources
required to generate a prioritisation based on modelling the system using a
static or dynamic approach and potential improvements in the cost-
effectiveness of the prioritisation. However, the outcome of the trade-off, i.e.
which approach was more desirable, varied widely with the region. In chapter
five I showed that the outcome of this trade-off also varied for different
conservation targets. This provides a challenge to conservation planners, and
suggests that more case studies that vary in terms of targets and geographical
regions are needed to provide general principles on the optimal approach, as
well as considering other types of feedback.
Two factors need to be included in the trade-off analysis in addition to cost-
effectiveness considerations. The first factor is uncertainty; increases in
uncertainty due to model complexity need to be quantified and included in the
trade-off assessments. The second factor is consideration of the wider socio-
ecological context. Results from chapter four showed that the dynamic
prioritisation approach resulted in higher informational rent capture, increasing
incentives for conservation without decreasing programme cost-effectiveness,
thereby potentially enhancing the probability of success in terms of increased
participation in the programme by landowners (Scheufele & Bennett 2017). The
wider range of areas included in the dynamic prioritisation may also increase
the equity and perceived fairness of the programme (Pascual et al. 2014).
These considerations could prove more important advantages over the static
approach than reductions in cost-effectiveness under certain circumstances.
For example, in the BAF case study, where a large portion of a restoration
target could be achieved by compliance with an existing law (chapter 5), the
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incentive for compliance provided by the dynamic approach may be most
desirable even if there were no differences in cost-effectiveness between static
and dynamic approaches.
The question then is whether the potential increase in transactions costs
engendered by the dynamic approach is worthwhile. It is worth noting that the
capacity, computational and time costs of implementing dynamic prioritisation
approaches are likely to diminish relatively rapidly once the approach becomes
widespread and accepted; as experience, frameworks and tools accumulate
subsequent prioritisations will be less arduous. This is evidenced for example
in the massive increase in the use of Marxan, and then the more sophisticated
Marxan with zones, and then Zonation, in conservation planning both by
practitioners and researchers over the last decade (McIntosh et al. 2016).
Therefore, to a great extent the adoption of more complex methods, when they
would make a substantive difference to outcomes, depends on the will to make
this change, rather than analytical or budgetary limitations, particularly when
conservation programmes are large and expensive, such as in the BAF. My
crude comparison of the relative cost of dynamic rather than static analysis,
compared to the cost-saving power of its implementation, suggested the cost
savings over the whole BAF set-aside areas were an order of magnitude larger
than the cost of implementing the approach.
There are benefits to models such as the one developed in this thesis beyond
answering academic questions. The first benefit is providing broad insight,
when results are not obvious beforehand. The two main insights from this
model, representing a valuable contribution to knowledge, are that: (1) adding
- 214 -
complexity does not necessarily mean improved project cost-effectiveness, but
results are significantly different in terms of geographic areas selected for
prioritisation, number of farms included in the scheme, and the degree of
informational rent capture, and this needs to be further explored; (2)
implementing these models on a real case study sheds light on the system and
lead to unexpected insights, such as the potential benefit of using informational
rent capture in favour of conservation projects. A second benefit is to provide
specific quantitative guidance at a scale and reliability useful for policy-making.
This was achieved by implementing the model to a real case study (restoring
the BAF). The approach implemented to chapter 5 was intended to identify
spatial priorities that are robust, and by assessing selection frequency and
concordance across approaches and targets, the outputs are reliable enough
for decision-making. At least as reliable as (or more) than currently used
prioritisations based on limited social data and/or narrow ecological targets (see
pages 162-163 for a summary of existing approaches).
6.4 Spatial and temporal interactions between feedbacks
In chapters four and five, I showed how complex feedbacks can be when
accounting for spatial variation. For either the environmental or economic
feedback, region and its interaction with target explained most of the
differences in results. Very few generalisations could be drawn from these
results in terms of whether the static or dynamic approaches were most
desirable for a given planning unit. For any given conservation intervention
complex dynamics are at play at multiple temporal and spatial scales (Guerrero
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et al. 2013b). Other dynamics including the effects of climate change (Doney et
al. 2012; Garcia et al. 2014) or trends in agricultural productivity (Phelps et al.
2013) could be more or less important than the modelled feedbacks in
determining conservation outcome. There is a need, therefore, to start
addressing multiple feedback effects and their relative importance in
conservation outcomes. The SES framework (Ostrom 2007) and systems
dynamics modelling (Sterman 2000) approaches have vast literature with case
studies that consider multiple feedbacks simultaneously, providing a good
starting point. Chapter three identified Sao Paulo state as a region where all
four economic feedbacks have the potential to be important in terms of moving
the price of agricultural land. This is also a data-rich state, which presents a
unique opportunity for a comparative empirical assessment of the relative
importance of feedbacks via the price of land in the developing world.
6.5 Conclusion
Conservationists rely on the fact that people adapt their behaviour based on
changes in incentives. However, this same fact is being overlooked when
unintended changes in incentives occur as a result of conservation
interventions. This thesis found an urgent need to collect evidence to
understand mechanisms for unintended feedback effects at multiple scales.
Large-scale conservation interventions have the potential to trigger economic
feedbacks with significant socio-economic consequences. However, socio-
economic data availability, a mismatch in scale between data availability and
prioritisation grain, and economic model complexity present restrictions to
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accounting for these feedbacks in spatial conservation planning. A dynamic
approach to spatial conservation planning does entail higher computational
requirements and transactions costs, but the potential benefits in terms of
increased cost-effectiveness could offset them. Particularly, the dynamic
approach makes the most of the economic incentive for participation from
informational rents, and still has a lower overall cost.
The restoration of the BAF presented a unique opportunity, in terms of the scale
of conservation intervention and policy relevance, for accounting for economic
and configuration feedbacks in conservation planning. The dynamic approach,
by using informational rent capture to map and optimise incentives for
restoration provides a new tool for compliance with the Forest Code.
There is still much work to do for conservation to be able to plan for and manage
unintended feedbacks, but these results already show the importance of
modelling feedbacks in real-world case studies, and identifies avenues for
future research.
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Annex 1: Tables
Table 1. Frameworks considered for the analysis of unintended feedbacks in conservation.
The table summarizes the findings of the review by Binder et al. (2013), which compares ten frameworks for analysing social-
ecological systems based on frameworks that were explicitly designed for use by both researchers and practitioners. The fields for
comparison in this table were chosen to highlight structural and conceptual differences between frameworks, and not contextual
differences. Only three of the frameworks compared by Binder et al. (2013) can be used to study unintended feedbacks because
they explicitly address the bi-directional interactions between the social and the ecological systems: Human Environment Systems
Framework (HES), MTF Management and Transition Framework (MTF) and Social-ecological Systems Framework (SESF). Of these
three, SESF is the only one that allows for an almost equal degree of representation of both social and ecological systems.
Framework Selected
references
Conceptualization of social
system
Conceptualization of
ecological system
Conceptualization of
interaction between social and
ecological systems
Degree of
equal
representation
Guidance for
application
Scale Dynamics Scale Dynamics Type Dynamics
Driver,
Pressure,
State, Impact,
Response
(DIPSIR)
Carr et al.
2007
Decision
makers
Social dynamics
are not
conceptualized
Can be
applied at
any scale
The dynamics
are addressed
implicitly
through
measurement of
the state of the
environment
over time
Address
how
human
actions
affect
ecological
system
Not
conceptualized
Social system
more in depth
than ecological
system
Guidance for
selection of
variables and
standardized
procedure for
application
Earth
Systems
Analysis
(ESA)
Schellnhuber
et al. 2005
Society Social dynamics
are not
conceptualized
Global
scale
Ecological
dynamics are
represented as
feedbacks in the
flow of energy
or matter
between the
Address
how
human
actions
affect
Not
conceptualized
Ecological
system more
in depth than
social system
No guidance
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Framework Selected
references
Conceptualization of social
system
Conceptualization of
ecological system
Conceptualization of
interaction between social and
ecological systems
Degree of
equal
representation
Guidance for
application
Scale Dynamics Scale Dynamics Type Dynamics
subsystems of
the ecosphere
ecological
system
Ecosystem
Services (ES)
Limburg et
al. 2002
Society Social dynamics
are not
conceptualized
Can be
applied at
any scale;
favours
regional,
national
scale
Dynamics of the
ecological
system are not
conceptualized
Address
how
human
actions
affect
ecological
system
Not
conceptualized
Ecological
system more
in depth than
social system
Guidance for
methodologies
to be applied
Human
Environment
Systems
Framework
(HES)
Scholz and
Binder 2004
Includes all
hierarchical
levels
Learning
processes and
interferences
between and
within different
levels of the
social system are
the drivers of the
dynamics
Can be
applied at
any scale;
favours
regional,
national
scale
Dynamics of the
ecological
system are not
explicitly
mentioned, but
feedbacks within
ecological
system can be
analysed in form
of stocks and
flows
Address
reciprocity
between
social and
ecological
systems
Primary and
secondary
feedback loops
between the
social and the
ecological
systems
Social system
more in depth
than ecological
system
Guidance for
methodologies
to be applied
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Framework Selected
references
Conceptualization of social
system
Conceptualization of
ecological system
Conceptualization of
interaction between social and
ecological systems
Degree of
equal
representation
Guidance for
application
Scale Dynamics Scale Dynamics Type Dynamics
Material and
Energy Flow
Analysis
(MEFA)
Haberl et al.
2004
Society Social dynamics
are not
conceptualized
Can be
applied at
any scale;
favours
regional,
national
scale
Dynamics are
analysed as
changes in stock
and flows
Address
how
human
actions
affect
ecological
system
Not
conceptualized
Ecological
system more
in depth than
social system
Standardised
procedure for
application
Management
and
Transition
Framework
(MTF)
Pahl-Wostl
2009
Includes all
hierarchical
levels
Decision making
and learning
processes within
an action
situation context
but also
multilevel and
multiloop
processes of
learning,
negotiation, and
policy
development
Can be
applied at
any scale;
favours
regional,
national
scale
Only trends are
captured that
show the state of
the ecological
system but no
feedbacks within
the ecological
system are
addressed
Address
reciprocity
between
social and
ecological
systems
Single, double,
and triple loop
learning of the
social system as
a reaction to
changes in the
ecological
system.
Formalized
representation of
action situations
without using
mathematical
descriptions.
Social system
more in depth
than ecological
system
Guidance for
selection of
variables and
methodologies
to be applied
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Framework Selected
references
Conceptualization of social
system
Conceptualization of
ecological system
Conceptualization of
interaction between social and
ecological systems
Degree of
equal
representation
Guidance for
application
Scale Dynamics Scale Dynamics Type Dynamics
Social-
ecological
Systems
Framework
(SESF)
Ostrom
2007, 2009
Includes all
hierarchical
levels
Conceptualized
textually by a
number of
variables such as
“information
sharing,”
“deliberation
processes,” and
“self-
organization
activities”
grouped under
the label
“interaction”
Local and
regional
scale,
allows for
nesting
The dynamics
are considered
by a number of
variables of the
resource system
and resource
units such as
growth rate,
equilibrium
properties, and
productivity
Address
reciprocity
between
social and
ecological
systems
Feedback
between the
resource
conditions and
the rules
determining the
harvesting rates
of the resource
Allows for
both social and
ecological
systems to be
represented in
almost equal
depth
Guidance for
selection of
variables and
methodologies
to be applied
Sustainable
Livelihoods
Approach
(SLA)
Ashley and
Carney 1999
Local
stakeholders
Social dynamics
are not
conceptualized
Local and
regional
scale
Dynamics of the
ecological
system are not
conceptualized
Address
how
ecological
system
affects the
social
system
Not
conceptualized
Social system
more in depth
than ecological
system
No guidance
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Framework Selected
references
Conceptualization of social
system
Conceptualization of
ecological system
Conceptualization of
interaction between social and
ecological systems
Degree of
equal
representation
Guidance for
application
Scale Dynamics Scale Dynamics Type Dynamics
The Natural
Step (TNS)
Upham 2000 Businesses
or regions
Social dynamics
are induced
through a
scenario/
visioning and
backward
planning process
Businesses
and regions
Dynamics of the
ecological
system are not
conceptualized
Address
how
human
actions
affect
ecological
system
Not
conceptualized
Ecological
system more
in depth than
social system
Standardised
procedure for
application
Vulnerability
Framework
(TVUL)
Turner et al.
2003
Local
communities
Social dynamics
are not
conceptualized
Local scale Dynamics of the
ecological
system are not
conceptualized
Address
how
ecological
system
affects the
social
system
Not
conceptualized
Social system
more in depth
than ecological
system
No guidance
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Table 2. Brazil’s country profile. “-“: No available data. Source: (FAO 2015)
Brazil Country Profile 2000 2014 Trend (% diff)
General
Population, total (mill.) 175 202 15.8%
Population, rural (mill.) 33 29 -10.4%
Area harvested (mill. ha) 328 739 125.3%
Cropping intensity ratio 1 - -
Employment in agriculture (%) 21 15 -26.1%
Hunger dimensions
Dietary energy supply (kcal/pc/day) 2,879 3,302 14.7%
Average dietary energy supply adequacy (%) 122 135 10.7%
GDP per capita (USD, PPP) 11,015 14,555 32.1%
Food supply
Food production value, (2004-2006 mill. I$) 78,722 140,046 77.9%
Agriculture, value added (% GDP) 6 6 0.0%
Food exports (mill. USD) 8,031 59,994 647.0%
Food imports (mill. USD) 3,373 8,276 145.4%
Food Net trade (mill. USD)
Cereals -1,586 3,439 316.8%
Fruit and vegetables 985 1,491 51.4%
Meat 1,795 14,937 732.1%
Dairy products -374 -536 43.3%
Fish -85 -1,036 1118.8%
Environment
Forest area (%) 65 62 -4.6%
Terrestrial protect areas (% total land area) 14 26 85.7%
Water withdrawal by agriculture (% of total) - 60 -
Net GHG emissions from AFOLU1 (CO2 eq, Mt) 1,387 1,255 -9.5%
1 Agriculture, Forestry and other Land Uses
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Table 3. Main agricultural commodities produced in Brazil. Global
production for 2014, and percentage of the global commodity produced in
Brazil, and in the Brazilian Atlantic Forest (BAF). Sources: (FAO United Nations
Food and Agriculture Organization 2015; IBGE 2016). * This is an estimate of
the 2014 production based on what percentage of Brazil’s production took place
in the BAF’s Federative Units in the agricultural census 2006 (table 2.4).
Commodity
Production (Million tonnes)
Global
Brazil
(% of global)
BAF*
(% of global)
Sugar cane 1,884.2 39.07% 34.53%
Coffee, green 8.8 31.90% 30.62%
Soybeans 306.5 28.31% 14.15%
Oranges 70.9 23.89% 23.53%
Meat, cattle 64.7 15.03% 6.67%
Meat, chicken 100.4 12.48% 10.85%
Maize 1,037.8 7.70% 6.47%
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Table 4. Production of main agricultural commodities of Brazil by federative unit within the Brazilian Atlantic Forest (BAF).
Source: IBGE, agricultural census 2006. Mato Grosso do Sul and Goias federative units were excluded due to the small area that
overlaps with BAF.
Federative Unit
(UF)
Sugarcane Coffee Soybean Oranges Cattle Poultry Maize
Thousan
d tonnes
% of
national
productio
n
Thousan
d tonnes
% of
national
productio
n
Thousan
d tonnes
% of
national
productio
n
Thousan
d fruits
% of
national
productio
n
Thousan
d heads
% of
national
productio
n
Millio
n
head
s
% of
national
productio
n
Thousan
d tonnes
% of
national
productio
n
Santa Catarina 145.6 0.0% 0.0 0.0% 726.5 1.6% 464.9 0.6% 3,126.0 1.8% 179.9 15.7% 12.2 4.3%
Parana 28,672.3 7.0% 169.3 7.0% 8,763.8 19.0% 1,497.4 2.0% 9,118.1 5.2% 223.7 19.6% 13.8 4.9%
Sao Paulo
241,346.
4 59.2% 282.2 11.7% 1,025.0 2.2% 63,968.1 84.1% 10,506.4 6.0% 236.1 20.7% 52.6 18.7%
Pernambuco 17,150.9 4.2% 2.3 0.1% 0.1 0.0% 74.9 0.1% 1,880.4 1.1% 36.6 3.2% 35.6 12.7%
Bahia 2,856.7 0.7% 152.6 6.3% 2,348.8 5.1% 2,622.1 3.4% 10,229.5 5.8% 21.0 1.8% 21.9 7.8%
Espirito Santo 3,796.5 0.9% 404.4 16.7% 0.0 0.0% 66.2 0.1% 1,791.5 1.0% 16.4 1.4% 2.2 0.8%
Minas Gerais 20,663.1 5.1% 1,301.4 53.7% 2,022.6 4.4% 1,432.9 1.9% 20,332.3 11.5% 83.5 7.3% 23.0 8.2%
Rio de Janeiro 3,577.9 0.9% 10.6 0.4% 0.0 0.0% 122.3 0.2% 1,924.2 1.1% 12.8 1.1% 10.7 3.8%
Rio Grande do Norte 1,520.2 0.4% 0.0 0.0% 0.0 0.0% 1.3 0.0% 907.2 0.5% 6.1 0.5% 1.7 0.6%
Rio Grande do Sul 724.9 0.2% 0.0 0.0% 7,929.8 17.2% 640.3 0.8% 11,334.5 6.4% 130.0 11.4% 10.2 3.6%
Ceara 721.4 0.2% 1.1 0.0% 1.4 0.0% 31.8 0.0% 2,162.8 1.2% 20.6 1.8% 12.1 4.3%
Paraiba 3,600.4 0.9% 0.0 0.0% 0.0 0.0% 94.0 0.1% 1,354.5 0.8% 9.5 0.8% 26.8 9.5%
Alagoas 34,268.2 8.4% 0.1 0.0% 0.6 0.0% 991.9 1.3% 919.9 0.5% 5.6 0.5% 5.7 2.0%
Piaui 552.8 0.1% 0.0 0.0% 577.7 1.3% 5.2 0.0% 1,667.5 0.9% 8.0 0.7% 0.9 0.3%
Sergipe 675.7 0.2%- - 0.0 0.0% 2,955.1 3.9% 899.3 0.5% 5.4 0.5% 6.9 2.4%
Total for UFs w/
BAF
360,272.
9 88.4% 2,324.0 96.0% 23,396.3 50.6% 74,968.3 98.5% 78,154.1 44.4% 995.1 87.0% 236.2 84.0%
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Table 5. Characteristics of Federative Units that overlap with Brazilian
Atlantic Forest (BAF). Source: IBGE.
Federative Unit
(UF)
Area Population (2014) GDP (2012)
(km2) (% of total) (people) (% of total) (% of total)
Alagoas 27,768 0.3% 3,321,730 1.6% 0.7%
Bahia 564,693 6.6% 15,126,371 7.5% 3.8%
Ceará 148,826 1.7% 8,842,791 4.4% 2.0%
Espírito Santo 46,078 0.5% 3,885,049 1.9% 2.2%
Goiás 340,087 4.0% 6,523,222 3.2% 2.4%
Mato Grosso do Sul 357,125 4.2% 2,619,657 1.3% 1.0%
Minas Gerais 586,528 6.9% 20,734,097 10.2% 9.2%
Paraíba 56,440 0.7% 3,943,885 1.9% 0.8%
Paraná 199,315 2.3% 11,081,692 5.5% 5.8%
Pernambuco 98,312 1.2% 9,277,727 4.6% 2.3%
Piauí 251,529 3.0% 3,194,178 1.6% 0.5%
Rio de Janeiro 43,696 0.5% 16,461,173 8.1% 11.5%
Rio Grande do Norte 52,797 0.6% 3,408,510 1.7% 0.9%
Rio Grande do Sul 281,749 3.3% 11,207,274 5.5% 6.3%
Santa Catarina 95,346 1.1% 6,727,148 3.3% 4.0%
São Paulo 248,209 2.9% 44,035,304 21.7% 32.1%
Total for UFs w/BAF 3,398,496 39.9% 170,389,808 84.0% 85.5%
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Table 6. Generalized least squares model details for differences between static and dynamic solutions: cost/ha,
informational rent/ha, forest connectivity change/ha, and all cost effectiveness measures. Variance structure ~1|BR, n=412.
Model Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-value p-value Res. Std. Error Res.d.f.
(1) Difference in Cost/ha ~ Biogeographical region + Area of Farmland + Potential set-aside + Forest connectivity + Std. Dev. farmland opportunity cost
Intercept -747.084 277.929 -2.688 0.007 268.93 400
BR-Bahia 831.260 254.125 3.271 0.001
BR- Brejos Nordestinos 807.543 273.238 2.955 0.003
BR- Diamantina 1013.343 271.397 3.734 0.000
BR- Florestas de Interior 1872.182 264.726 7.072 0.000
BR- Pernambuco 776.428 280.565 2.767 0.006
BR- Serra do Mar 615.683 301.520 2.042 0.042
BR- Sao Francisco 936.725 244.497 3.831 0.000
Area of Farmland 0.000 0.000 0.102 0.919
Potential set-aside -0.006 0.002 -3.277 0.001
Forest connectivity 0.000 0.000 3.551 0.000
Std. Dev. farmland opportunity cost -5.011 0.831 -6.029 0.000
(2) Difference in inf. Rent/ha ~ Biogeographical region + Area of Farmland + Potential set-aside + Forest connectivity + Std. Dev. farmland opportunity cost
Intercept 43.288 130.271 0.332 0.740 179.1 400
BR-Bahia 34.624 113.639 0.305 0.761
BR- Brejos Nordestinos -3.432 127.258 -0.027 0.978
BR- Diamantina 180.533 123.795 1.458 0.146
BR- Florestas de Interior 536.043 114.726 4.672 0.000
BR- Pernambuco 144.816 119.681 1.210 0.227
BR- Serra do Mar 199.437 131.811 1.513 0.131
BR- Sao Francisco 155.437 110.785 1.403 0.161
Area of Farmland 0.000 0.000 0.405 0.686
Potential set-aside -0.003 0.001 -3.459 0.001
Forest connectivity 0.000 0.000 3.277 0.001
Std. Dev. farmland opportunity cost -5.094 0.436 -11.682 0.000
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Table 6 (cont.). Generalized least squares model details for differences between static and dynamic solutions: cost/ha,
informational rent/ha, forest connectivity change/ha, and all cost effectiveness measures. Variance structure ~1|BR, n=412.
Model Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-value p-value Res. Std. Error Res.d.f.
(3) Difference in forest connectivity change/ha ~ Biogeographical region + Area of Farmland + Potential set-aside + Forest connectivity + Std. Dev. farmland
opportunity cost
Intercept 0.254 0.042 6.004 0.000 0.12 400
BR-Bahia -0.061 0.030 -1.993 0.047
BR- Brejos Nordestinos -0.260 0.052 -4.979 0.000
BR- Diamantina -0.205 0.066 -3.115 0.002
BR- Florestas de Interior 0.039 0.033 1.175 0.241
BR- Pernambuco -0.118 0.040 -2.951 0.003
BR- Serra do Mar -0.091 0.044 -2.063 0.040
BR- Sao Francisco -0.092 0.028 -3.247 0.001
Area of Farmland 0.000 0.000 0.414 0.679
Potential set-aside 0.000 0.000 -3.419 0.001
Forest connectivity 0.000 0.000 0.846 0.398
Std. Dev. farmland opportunity cost -0.002 0.000 -8.901 0.000
(4) Difference in set-aside cost effectiveness ~ Biogeographical region + Area of Farmland + Potential set-aside + Forest connectivity + Std. Dev. farmland
opportunity cost
Intercept 0.00005 0.00008 0.70097 0.48373 0.00100 400
BR-Bahia -0.00014 0.00011 -1.23983 0.21577
BR- Brejos Nordestinos -0.00352 0.00106 -3.31393 0.00100
BR- Diamantina -0.00085 0.00040 -2.11686 0.03489
BR- Florestas de Interior -0.00002 0.00007 -0.28619 0.77488
BR- Pernambuco -0.00017 0.00008 -2.25631 0.02459
BR- Serra do Mar -0.00001 0.00005 -0.10291 0.91809
BR- Sao Francisco -0.00052 0.00012 -4.30138 0.00002
Area of Farmland 0.00000 0.00000 1.39434 0.16399
Potential set-aside 0.00000 0.00000 -4.43306 0.00001
Forest connectivity 0.00000 0.00000 2.86374 0.00441
Std. Dev. farmland opportunity cost 0.00000 0.00000 -2.99260 0.00294
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Table 6 (cont.). Generalized least squares model details for differences between static and dynamic solutions: cost/ha,
informational rent/ha, forest connectivity change/ha, and all cost effectiveness measures. Variance structure ~1|BR, n=412.
Model Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-value p-value Res. Std. Error Res.d.f.
(5) Difference in inf. Rent/$ ~ Biogeographical region + Area of Farmland + Potential set-aside + Forest connectivity + Std. Dev. farmland opportunity cost
Intercept 0.1989 0.0704 2.8235 0.0050 0.3800 400
BR-Bahia -0.2630 0.0642 -4.0935 0.0001
BR- Brejos Nordestinos -0.3767 0.0876 -4.3013 0.0000
BR- Diamantina -0.1939 0.1015 -1.9103 0.0568
BR- Florestas de Interior 0.0006 0.0553 0.0106 0.9915
BR- Pernambuco -0.1738 0.0589 -2.9499 0.0034
BR- Serra do Mar -0.0149 0.0510 -0.2924 0.7701
BR- Sao Francisco -0.3630 0.0668 -5.4308 0.0000
Area of Farmland 0.0000 0.0000 0.8107 0.4180
Potential set-aside 0.0000 0.0000 -3.8318 0.0001
Forest connectivity 0.0000 0.0000 3.9496 0.0001
Std. Dev. farmland opportunity cost -0.0025 0.0003 -8.2614 0.0000
(6) Difference in forest connectivity change cost effectiveness ~ Biogeographical region + Area of Farmland + Potential set-aside + Forest connectivity + Std.
Dev. farmland opportunity cost
Intercept 0.00007 0.00002 4.74829 0.00000 0.00020 400
BR-Bahia -0.00001 0.00002 -0.63167 0.52796
BR- Brejos Nordestinos -0.00073 0.00030 -2.42158 0.01590
BR- Diamantina -0.00032 0.00013 -2.39626 0.01702
BR- Florestas de Interior -0.00002 0.00002 -1.44945 0.14800
BR- Pernambuco -0.00004 0.00002 -1.77339 0.07692
BR- Serra do Mar -0.00002 0.00001 -1.84439 0.06587
BR- Sao Francisco -0.00007 0.00002 -3.18464 0.00156
Area of Farmland 0.00000 0.00000 0.69939 0.48472
Potential set-aside 0.00000 0.00000 -2.04142 0.04186
Forest connectivity 0.00000 0.00000 0.26147 0.79386
Std. Dev. farmland opportunity cost 0.00000 0.00000 -6.94882 0.00000
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Table 7. Main variable results at BAF level by restoration target
Variable
Absolute values
Restoration Target one(T1) Restoration Target two(T2) Restoration Target three(T3)
Static Dynamic Static Dynamic Static Dynamic
Cost effectiveness (ha/usd) 7.05E-04 7.53E-04 5.13E-04 5.19E-04 4.94E-04 5.00E-04
Forest connectivity increase per ha (%) 2.76E-01 2.64E-01 2.24E-01 2.10E-01 2.28E-01 2.11E-01
Total informational rent capture () 9.63E+02 1.29E+03 4.80E+03 6.19E+03 7.60E+03 9.94E+03
Informational rent capture per hectare set-aside (usd/ha) 3.60E+02 4.81E+02 4.53E+02 5.84E+02 5.07E+02 6.62E+02
Proportion of cost captured as informational rent 2.54E-01 3.62E-01 2.33E-01 3.04E-01 2.50E-01 3.31E-01
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Table 8. Differences between approaches in main variable values, and how they change with target.
Variable
Absolute differences
Between approaches Between Targets
T1 T2 T3 Static Dynamic
Stat. - Dyn. Stat. - Dyn. Stat. - Dyn. T1-T2 T1-T3 T2-T3 T1-T2 T1-T3 T2-T3
Cost effectiveness (ha/usd) -4.83E-05 -6.04E-06 -5.72E-06 1.92E-04 2.11E-04 1.92E-05 2.34E-04 2.53E-04 1.95E-05
Forest connectivity increase per ha (%) 1.20E-02 1.46E-02 1.75E-02 5.20E-02 4.79E-02 -4.11E-03 5.46E-02 5.34E-02 -1.21E-03
Total informational rent capture () -3.23E+02 -1.39E+03 -2.34E+03 -3.84E+03 -6.63E+03 -2.80E+03 -4.91E+03 -8.65E+03 -3.74E+03
Informational rent capture per hectare set-
aside (usd/ha) -1.21E+02 -1.31E+02 -1.56E+02 -9.35E+01 -1.47E+02 -5.32E+01 -1.04E+02 -1.82E+02 -7.79E+01
Proportion of cost captured as informational
rent -1.08E-01 -7.08E-02 -8.08E-02 2.09E-02 3.35E-03 -1.76E-02 5.85E-02 3.10E-02 -2.75E-02
Variable
Percent Differences
Between approaches Between Targets
T1 T2 T3 Static Dynamic
Stat. - Dyn. Stat. - Dyn. Stat. - Dyn. T1-T2 T1-T3 T2-T3 T1-T2 T1-T3 T2-T3
Cost effectiveness (ha/usd) -7% -1% -1% 27% 30% 3% 31% 34% 3%
Forest connectivity increase per ha (%) 4% 7% 8% 19% 17% -1% 21% 20% 0%
Total informational rent capture () -34% -29% -31% -399% -689% -290% -381% -672% -291%
Informational rent capture per hectare set-
aside (usd/ha) -34% -29% -31% -26% -41% -15% -22% -38% -16%
Proportion of cost captured as informational
rent -43% -30% -32% 8% 1% -7% 16% 9% -8%
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Table 9. Results for ANOVA models.
Model Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-value p-value Res. Std. Error Res.d.f.
(1) lm(formula = t.costeff ~ prior * pTarget, data = Ar)
(Intercept) 0.8238 0.0122 67.5290 <2.00E-16 0.1279 1988
priorstatic 0.0871 0.0173 5.0510 0.0000
pTargetT2 0.0295 0.0139 2.1240 0.0338
pTargetT3 -0.0275 0.0134 -2.0480 0.0407
priorstatic:pTargetT2 -0.0756 0.0196 -3.8520 0.0001
priorstatic:pTargetT3 -0.0001 0.0190 -0.0040 0.9965
(2) lm(formula = t.costeff ~ prior * pTarget, data = Ba)
(Intercept) 0.9219 0.0081 113.3340 < 0.0837 764
priorstatic 0.0216 0.0115 1.8790 0.0606
pTargetT2 -0.0823 0.0109 -7.5610 0.0000
pTargetT3 -0.0828 0.0107 -7.7330 0.0000
priorstatic:pTargetT2 0.0338 0.0154 2.1960 0.0284
priorstatic:pTargetT3 0.0497 0.0151 3.2840 0.0011
(3) lm(formula = t.costeff ~ prior * pTarget, data = FdI)
(Intercept) 0.8536 0.0099 86.2140 < 0.1612 2900
priorstatic 0.0246 0.0140 1.7600 0.0785
pTargetT2 -0.2040 0.0119 -17.1230 <
pTargetT3 -0.2036 0.0119 -17.1110 <
priorstatic:pTargetT2 0.0963 0.0168 5.7160 0.0000
priorstatic:pTargetT3 0.0968 0.0168 5.7490 0.0000
(4) lm(formula = t.costeff ~ prior * pTarget, data = SF)
(Intercept) 0.4417 0.0304 14.5240 < 0.2526 580
priorstatic 0.2026 0.0430 4.7110 0.0000
pTargetT2 0.0163 0.0427 0.3820 0.7027
pTargetT3 0.2254 0.0366 6.1540 0.0000
priorstatic:pTargetT2 0.0400 0.0604 0.6620 0.5083
priorstatic:pTargetT3 -0.1681 0.0518 -3.2450 0.0012
(5) lm(formula = t.costeff ~ prior * pTarget, data = Di)
(Intercept) 0.5969 0.0576 10.3560 <2e-16 0.2376 422
priorstatic 0.1399 0.0815 1.7160 0.0868
pTargetT2 0.0588 0.0631 0.9310 0.3523
pTargetT3 0.0672 0.0619 1.0860 0.2782
priorstatic:pTargetT2 0.0377 0.0893 0.4220 0.6733
priorstatic:pTargetT3 -0.0022 0.0875 -0.0250 0.9803
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Model Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-value p-value Res. Std. Error Res.d.f.
(6) lm(formula = t.costeff ~ prior * pTarget, data = Per)
(Intercept) 0.7145 0.0296 24.1480 <2e-16 0.2884 938
priorstatic 0.0766 0.0418 1.8300 0.0676
pTargetT2 -0.0396 0.0368 -1.0760 0.2822
pTargetT3 -0.0430 0.0358 -1.1990 0.2309
priorstatic:pTargetT2 -0.0301 0.0520 -0.5780 0.5634
priorstatic:pTargetT3 -0.0010 0.0507 -0.0200 0.9843
(7) lm(formula = t.costeff ~ prior * pTarget, data = SdM)
(Intercept) 0.8134 0.0141 57.4970 <2e-16 0.1364 694
priorstatic 0.0503 0.0200 2.5140 0.0122
pTargetT2 0.0111 0.0230 0.4850 0.6275
pTargetT3 0.0024 0.0171 0.1400 0.8885
priorstatic:pTargetT2 -0.0183 0.0325 -0.5640 0.5726
priorstatic:pTargetT3 -0.0142 0.0242 -0.5850 0.5585
(8) lm(formula = t.costeff ~ prior * pTarget, data = BN)
(Intercept) 0.6874 0.0250 27.4480 < 0.1062 216
priorstatic 0.0972 0.0354 2.7450 0.0066
pTargetT2 -0.0038 0.0365 -0.1040 0.9176
pTargetT3 0.1732 0.0278 6.2250 0.0000
priorstatic:pTargetT2 -0.0972 0.0516 -1.8830 0.0610
priorstatic:pTargetT3 -0.0884 0.0393 -2.2480 0.0256
(9) lm(formula = t.forinc ~ prior * pTarget, data = Ar)
(Intercept) 0.7637 0.0220 34.6670 <2.00E-16 0.2310 1988
priorstatic 0.1090 0.0312 3.4970 0.0005
pTargetT2 -0.0380 0.0251 -1.5140 0.1302
pTargetT3 -0.0532 0.0243 -2.1910 0.0286
priorstatic:pTargetT2 -0.0942 0.0355 -2.6580 0.0079
priorstatic:pTargetT3 -0.0488 0.0343 -1.4220 0.1552
(10) lm(formula = t.forinc ~ prior * pTarget, data = Ba)
(Intercept) 0.8767 0.0176 49.7900 <2.00E-16 0.1813 764
priorstatic 0.0022 0.0249 0.0870 0.9310
pTargetT2 -0.1667 0.0236 -7.0740 0.0000
pTargetT3 -0.1644 0.0232 -7.0980 0.0000
priorstatic:pTargetT2 0.0433 0.0333 1.3000 0.1940
priorstatic:pTargetT3 0.0835 0.0328 2.5480 0.0110
(11) lm(formula = t.forinc ~ prior * pTarget, data = BN)
(Intercept) 1.3950 0.0625 22.3100 <2e-16 0.2653 216
priorstatic -0.0462 0.0884 -0.5230 0.6020
pTargetT2 0.1337 0.0911 1.4670 0.1440
pTargetT3 0.0033 0.0695 0.0470 0.9620
priorstatic:pTargetT2 0.0462 0.1289 0.3590 0.7200
priorstatic:pTargetT3 0.1126 0.0982 1.1460 0.2530
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Model Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-value p-value Res. Std. Error Res.d.f.
(12) lm(formula = t.forinc ~ prior * pTarget, data = Di)
(Intercept) 0.6793 0.0620 10.9610 <2e-16 0.2555 422
priorstatic 0.0939 0.0876 1.0710 0.2850
pTargetT2 0.0109 0.0679 0.1600 0.8730
pTargetT3 -0.0236 0.0665 -0.3550 0.7220
priorstatic:pTargetT2 0.0333 0.0960 0.3470 0.7290
priorstatic:pTargetT3 -0.0019 0.0941 -0.0200 0.9840
(13) lm(formula = t.forinc ~ prior * pTarget, data = FdI)
(Intercept) 0.8784 0.0105 83.7170 <2.00E-16 0.1708 2900
priorstatic -0.0215 0.0148 -1.4510 0.1470
pTargetT2 -0.1624 0.0126 -12.8600 <2.00E-16
pTargetT3 -0.1736 0.0126 -13.7610 <2.00E-16
priorstatic:pTargetT2 0.0758 0.0179 4.2430 0.0000
priorstatic:pTargetT3 0.0891 0.0178 4.9960 0.0000
(14) lm(formula = t.forinc ~ prior * pTarget, data = Per)
(Intercept) 0.7439 0.0301 24.7260 <2e-16 0.2932 938
priorstatic 0.0427 0.0425 1.0030 0.3160
pTargetT2 -0.0519 0.0374 -1.3870 0.1660
pTargetT3 -0.0551 0.0364 -1.5130 0.1310
priorstatic:pTargetT2 -0.0316 0.0529 -0.5970 0.5500
priorstatic:pTargetT3 -0.0043 0.0515 -0.0840 0.9330
(15) lm(formula = t.forinc ~ prior * pTarget, data = SdM)
(Intercept) 0.6797 0.0267 25.4780 <2e-16 0.2573 694
priorstatic 0.1011 0.0377 2.6780 0.0076
pTargetT2 0.0453 0.0433 1.0470 0.2955
pTargetT3 -0.0626 0.0323 -1.9400 0.0528
priorstatic:pTargetT2 -0.0282 0.0612 -0.4610 0.6453
priorstatic:pTargetT3 -0.0194 0.0457 -0.4240 0.6717
(16) lm(formula = t.forinc ~ prior * pTarget, data = SF)
(Intercept) 0.7448 0.0188 39.5290 <2e-16 0.1565 580
priorstatic 0.0425 0.0266 1.5930 0.1117
pTargetT2 0.0130 0.0265 0.4890 0.6248
pTargetT3 0.0441 0.0227 1.9430 0.0525
priorstatic:pTargetT2 0.0284 0.0374 0.7580 0.4487
priorstatic:pTargetT3 -0.0361 0.0321 -1.1240 0.2613
(17) lm(formula = t.infrent ~ prior * pTarget, data = Ar)
(Intercept) 0.7089 0.0228 31.1390 <2.00E-16 0.2388 1988
priorstatic 0.1986 0.0322 6.1690 0.0000
pTargetT2 -0.0211 0.0259 -0.8120 0.4166
pTargetT3 -0.1569 0.0251 -6.2550 0.0000
priorstatic:pTargetT2 -0.1089 0.0366 -2.9720 0.0030
priorstatic:pTargetT3 0.0536 0.0355 1.5100 0.1312
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Model Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-value p-value Res. Std. Error Res.d.f.
(18) lm(formula = t.infrent ~ prior * pTarget, data = Ba)
(Intercept) 0.7731 0.0188 41.2280 <2.00E-16 0.1931 764
priorstatic 0.1186 0.0265 4.4730 0.0000
pTargetT2 -0.1821 0.0251 -7.2570 0.0000
pTargetT3 -0.1701 0.0247 -6.8960 0.0000
priorstatic:pTargetT2 0.0817 0.0355 2.3020 0.0216
priorstatic:pTargetT3 0.1012 0.0349 2.9000 0.0038
(19) lm(formula = t.infrent ~ prior * pTarget, data = BN)
(Intercept) 1.1124 0.0129 86.0740 <2e-16 0.0548 216
priorstatic -0.0415 0.0183 -2.2700 0.0242
pTargetT2 -0.0114 0.0188 -0.6060 0.5452
pTargetT3 0.0111 0.0144 0.7760 0.4384
priorstatic:pTargetT2 0.0415 0.0266 1.5580 0.1208
priorstatic:pTargetT3 -0.0059 0.0203 -0.2920 0.7709
(20) lm(formula = t.infrent ~ prior * pTarget, data = Di)
(Intercept) 0.7214 0.0502 14.3840 <2e-16 0.2068 422
priorstatic 0.1062 0.0709 1.4980 0.1350
pTargetT2 -0.0678 0.0549 -1.2350 0.2180
pTargetT3 -0.0767 0.0538 -1.4260 0.1550
priorstatic:pTargetT2 0.1152 0.0777 1.4830 0.1390
priorstatic:pTargetT3 0.0956 0.0761 1.2560 0.2100
(21) lm(formula = t.infrent ~ prior * pTarget, data = FdI)
(Intercept) 0.8608 0.0112 76.7760 <2.00E-16 0.1825 2900
priorstatic 0.0337 0.0159 2.1240 0.0338
pTargetT2 -0.3034 0.0135 -22.4930 <2.00E-16
pTargetT3 -0.2855 0.0135 -21.1840 <2.00E-16
priorstatic:pTargetT2 0.1992 0.0191 10.4420 <2.00E-16
priorstatic:pTargetT3 0.1787 0.0191 9.3760 <2.00E-16
(22) lm(formula = t.infrent ~ prior * pTarget, data = Per)
(Intercept) 0.6942 0.0301 23.0660 <2e-16 0.2937 938
priorstatic 0.1203 0.0426 2.8270 0.0048
pTargetT2 -0.0169 0.0374 -0.4520 0.6511
pTargetT3 -0.0426 0.0365 -1.1670 0.2433
priorstatic:pTargetT2 -0.0627 0.0529 -1.1850 0.2362
priorstatic:pTargetT3 -0.0192 0.0516 -0.3720 0.7100
(23) lm(formula = t.infrent ~ prior * pTarget, data = SdM)
(Intercept) 0.6988 0.0228 30.5930 <2e-16 0.2203 694
priorstatic 0.1285 0.0323 3.9780 0.0001
pTargetT2 0.0740 0.0371 1.9970 0.0462
pTargetT3 -0.0729 0.0276 -2.6380 0.0085
priorstatic:pTargetT2 -0.0463 0.0524 -0.8840 0.3769
priorstatic:pTargetT3 -0.0030 0.0391 -0.0750 0.9399
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Model Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-value p-value Res. Std. Error Res.d.f.
(24) lm(formula = t.infrent ~ prior * pTarget, data = SF)
(Intercept) 0.8364 0.0083 100.3830 <2.00E-16 0.0692 580
priorstatic 0.0958 0.0118 8.1290 0.0000
pTargetT2 -0.0016 0.0117 -0.1350 0.8923
pTargetT3 0.0331 0.0100 3.2980 0.0010
priorstatic:pTargetT2 0.0172 0.0165 1.0380 0.2998
priorstatic:pTargetT3 -0.0560 0.0142 -3.9470 0.0001
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Table 10. ANOVA tables for models.
Model Factor Df SumSq MeanSq F-value Pr(>F)
(1) lm(formula = t.costeff ~ prior * pTarget, data = Ar)
prior 1 1.72 1.7241 105.33 <2E-16
pTarget 2 0.23 0.1171 7.15 8.04E-04
prior:pTarget 2 0.67 0.3331 20.35 1.78E-09
Residuals 1988 32.54 0.0164
(2) lm(formula = t.costeff ~ prior * pTarget, data = Ba)
prior 1 0.52 0.5225 74509.00 <2.00E-16
pTarget 2 0.59 0.2945 41992.00 <2.00E-16
prior:pTarget 2 0.08 0.0384 5473.00 4.36E-03
Residuals 764 5358.00 0.0070
(3) lm(formula = t.costeff ~ prior * pTarget, data = FdI)
prior 1 7.79 7.7930 300.00 <2E-16
pTarget 2 10.48 5.2420 201.77 <2E-16
prior:pTarget 2 1.01 0.5050 19.43 4.15E-09
Residuals 2900 75.34 0.0260
(4) lm(formula = t.costeff ~ prior * pTarget, data = SF)
prior 1 2.27 2.2720 35.61 4.20E-09
pTarget 2 2.30 1.1519 18.05 2.47E-08
prior:pTarget 2 1.32 0.6623 10.38 3.72E-05
Residuals 580 37.00 0.0638
(5) lm(formula = t.costeff ~ prior * pTarget, data = Di)
prior 1 2.53 2.5288 44.78 7.04E-11
pTarget 2 0.17 0.0855 1.51 2.21E-01
prior:pTarget 2 0.04 0.0200 0.36 7.01E-01
Residuals 422 23.83 0.0565
(6) lm(formula = t.costeff ~ prior * pTarget, data = Per)
prior 1 1.00 0.9987 12.01 5.54E-04
pTarget 2 0.38 0.1910 2.30 1.01E-01
prior:pTarget 2 0.05 0.0237 0.29 7.52E-01
Residuals 938 78.01 0.0832
(7) lm(formula = t.costeff ~ prior * pTarget, data = SdM)
prior 1 0.27 0.2690 14.45 1.56E-04
pTarget 2 0.01 0.0027 0.14 8.66E-01
prior:pTarget 2 0.01 0.0041 0.22 8.03E-01
Residuals 694 12.92 0.0186
(8) lm(formula = t.costeff ~ prior * pTarget, data = BN)
prior 1 0.03 0.0265 2.35 1.27E-01
pTarget 2 1.16 0.5797 51.35 <2e-16
prior:pTarget 2 0.06 0.0308 2.73 6.78E-02
Residuals 216 2.44 0.0113
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(9) lm(formula = t.forinc ~ prior * pTarget, data = Ar)
prior 1 1.17 1.1746 22.01 2.90E-06
pTarget 2 1.30 0.6499 12.18 5.55E-06
prior:pTarget 2 0.45 0.2243 4.20 1.51E-02
Residuals 1988 106.12 0.0534
(10) lm(formula = t.forinc ~ prior * pTarget, data = Ba)
prior 1 0.46 0.4563 13.88 2.09E-04
pTarget 2 2.81 1.4023 42.67 <2.00E-16
prior:pTarget 2 0.21 0.1072 3.26 3.88E-02
Residuals 764 25.11 0.0329
(11) lm(formula = t.forinc ~ prior * pTarget, data = BN)
prior 1 0.08 0.0825 1.17 2.80E-01
pTarget 2 0.43 0.2131 3.03 5.05E-02
prior:pTarget 2 0.11 0.0532 0.76 4.71E-01
Residuals 216 15.20 0.0704
(12) lm(formula = t.forinc ~ prior * pTarget, data = Di)
prior 1 1.20 1.2045 18.45 2.17E-05
pTarget 2 0.26 0.1311 2.01 1.36E-01
prior:pTarget 2 0.03 0.0156 0.24 7.87E-01
Residuals 422 27.56 0.0653
(13) lm(formula = t.forinc ~ prior * pTarget, data = FdI)
prior 1 1.53 1.5300 52.43 5.68E-13
pTarget 2 6.97 3.4870 119.50 <2.00E-16
prior:pTarget 2 0.76 0.3810 13.07 2.23E-06
Residuals 2900 84.61 0.0290
(14) lm(formula = t.forinc ~ prior * pTarget, data = Per)
prior 1 0.20 0.2007 2.33 1.27E-01
pTarget 2 0.61 0.3026 3.52 3.00E-02
prior:pTarget 2 0.05 0.0228 0.27 7.67E-01
Residuals 938 80.65 0.0860
(15) lm(formula = t.forinc ~ prior * pTarget, data = SdM)
prior 1 1.28 1.2764 19.28 1.30E-05
pTarget 2 1.28 0.6419 9.70 7.03E-05
prior:pTarget 2 0.02 0.0086 0.13 8.78E-01
Residuals 694 45.94 0.0662
(16) lm(formula = t.forinc ~ prior * pTarget, data = SF)
prior 1 0.14 0.1361 5.56 1.88E-02
pTarget 2 0.07 0.0368 1.50 2.24E-01
prior:pTarget 2 0.11 0.0536 2.19 1.13E-01
Residuals 580 14.21 0.0245
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(17) lm(formula = t.infrent ~ prior * pTarget, data = Ar)
prior 1 17.15 17.1480 300.82 <2.00E-16
pTarget 2 3.54 1.7680 31.02 5.42E-14
prior:pTarget 2 2.86 1.4320 25.11 1.70E-11
Residuals 1988 113.32 0.0570
(18) lm(formula = t.infrent ~ prior * pTarget, data = Ba)
prior 1 6.60 6.6000 177.08 <2.00E-16
pTarget 2 2.66 1.3300 35.69 1.51E-15
prior:pTarget 2 0.34 0.1690 4.52 1.12E-02
Residuals 764 28.48 0.0370
(19) lm(formula = t.infrent ~ prior * pTarget, data = BN)
prior 1 0.09 0.0871 28.98 1.90E-07
pTarget 2 0.00 0.0011 0.36 6.99E-01
prior:pTarget 2 0.01 0.0075 2.48 8.59E-02
Residuals 216 0.65 0.0030
(20) lm(formula = t.infrent ~ prior * pTarget, data = Di)
prior 1 4.37 4.3660 102.13 <2e-16
pTarget 2 0.05 0.0240 0.56 5.74E-01
prior:pTarget 2 0.09 0.0470 1.10 3.34E-01
Residuals 422 18.04 0.0430
(21) lm(formula = t.infrent ~ prior * pTarget, data = FdI)
prior 1 25.71 25.7130 771.88 <2.00E-16
pTarget 2 17.36 8.6810 260.61 <2.00E-16
prior:pTarget 2 3.93 1.9640 58.96 <2.00E-16
Residuals 2900 96.61 0.0330
(22) lm(formula = t.infrent ~ prior * pTarget, data = Per)
prior 1 1.87 1.8666 21.69 3.67E-06
pTarget 2 0.39 0.1940 2.25 1.06E-01
prior:pTarget 2 0.15 0.0737 0.86 4.25E-01
Residuals 938 80.72 0.0861
(23) lm(formula = t.infrent ~ prior * pTarget, data = SdM)
prior 1 2.49 2.4893 51.31 2.02E-12
pTarget 2 1.69 0.8443 17.40 4.22E-08
prior:pTarget 2 0.05 0.0236 0.49 6.15E-01
Residuals 694 33.67 0.0485
(24) lm(formula = t.infrent ~ prior * pTarget, data = SF)
prior 1 0.73 0.7322 152.84 <2.00E-16
pTarget 2 0.00 0.0019 0.39 6.75E-01
prior:pTarget 2 0.16 0.0792 16.53 1.05E-07
Residuals 580 2.78 0.0048
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Annex 2: Figures
Figure 1. Number of municipalities included in solution by prioritisation type and
biogeographical subregion. The municipalities excluded from Marxan’s best solution
output are not included in the figure. The “Dynamic Binary” category was created to
be able to compare how many municipalities were included in the solution for static
vs. dynamic. It was created by labelling “1” if a municipality was included at any time
step of the dynamic approach, regardless of how many times across time it was
included. The “Dynamic” category shows how many times a given municipality was
included across time steps.
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Figure 2. Correlation between the size of biogeographical subregion (in number of
municipalities) and the difference in the proportion of municipalities included in static
vs dynamic.
Figure 3. BAF total cost per hectare set-aside by restoration target and
biogeographical region.
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Annex 3: Example of GTAP-VonThunen coupled model
The theoretical framework consists of coupling a spatially explicit land rent model with
a global general equilibrium trade model (Figure A3.1). The land rent von Thünen
model will determine the area of forest that is transformed to oil palm in Indonesia if
super-yielding varieties are widely available. The increase in supply feeds into the
global general equilibrium international trade model, the global trade analysis project
(GTAP), which as a consequence finds a new price for palm oil. This new price is the
input for the von Thünen model to find a new palm oil area. The feedback between
models runs, determining at each time step a new price and oil palm area. Depending
on market assumptions, such as projections of demand or other countries’ change in
oil palm production, a new equilibrium might be found or not.
There are important assumptions to this approach. For example, the simplification of
the supply chain of palm oil from a 4-step process (plantation-mill-refinery-market) to
a 2-step process (plantation-market). Another important assumption is that
sustainable timber exploitation and palm oil production trade-off, and do not
accumulate. It is known that what can occur is a one-time fee for timber and after that
the oil palm plantation. Implications of these assumptions need to be explored.
Figure A3.1 Theoretical framework for the coupled land rent model with a global
general equilibrium trade model. The von Thünen model determines which pixels will
be converted to oil palm by comparing land rent from palm oil (ra) with land rent from
forests (rf). The land use with the highest rent is allocated to a pixel. An initial increase
in yield will provide a new oil palm area, which is the input to the GTAP model. This
global general equilibrium trade model estimates price effects, amongst other
parameters, taking into account inter-industry linkages as well as effects mediated
through factor markets and trade. The new palm oil price is input for the von Thünen
model again, and the process is repeated for each time step or until a new equilibrium
is met.
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2.2.1 VON THÜNEN MODEL
The von Thünen model (von Thünen 1966) is a model of land use that illustrates the
trade-off between land values and the distance from points of attraction, e.g. markets.
It is commonly applied to agricultural land use and to explain urban land use patterns.
The primary conclusion is that agricultural rent is inversely correlated to distance to
markets. This model has been used to analyse forest cover change by considering a
simple model where land has two uses: agriculture and forest (Angelsen 2007b). In
this way, land is allocated to the use that yields the highest rent (Equation A3.1 vs.
Equation A3.2), and the rents of various land uses are determined by location. This
dual model simplification is sufficient to capture key policy issues (Angelsen 2010;
Phelps et al. 2013).
In this model, agricultural rent is determined by Equation A3.1. Agricultural production
per hectare (yield), in this case, oil palm yield (ya) is given by the newly improved
yields. The produce is sold to mills, and the palm oil is sold to refineries in cities or
ports at a given price (pa). The labour (la) and capital (ka) required per hectare vary
with crop, with input prices being the wage (w) and annual costs of capital (q). The
fixed wage assumption implies that labour can move freely in and out of agriculture
(Angelsen 2010). Transport costs are the product of costs per distance unit (va) and
distance from selling points (d).
ra = pa*ya - w*la - q*ka - va*d Equation A3.1
Forest rent is determined by Equation A3.2. Angelsen et al. (Angelsen 2010)
distinguish three forest product types: (1) private forest products such as sustainable
timber exploitation, (2) local public goods such as water catchment services, and (3)
global public goods such as carbon sequestration and storage. The extractive rent
varies with timber prices (pt); yield (yt), labour (lt), and capital (kt) required per hectare;
as well as wages (w), capital (q), and transport (vt) costs. Local (pl) and global (pg)
forest public goods can be captured with a PES scheme, increasing the overall forest
rent from sustainable use.
rf =(pt*yt – w*lt – q*kt – vt*d)+ pl*yl + pg*yg Equation A3.2
There are several assumptions to the von Thünen model that are commonly accepted
but whose implications for the system would need to be examined. For example, the
land manager has well-established property rights, acts independently, has perfect
information and seeks to maximise economic yield from the land. Other assumptions
are that transportation costs increase with distance and weight, and that there are two
possible land uses, development opportunity costs not included.
2.2.2 GLOBAL TRADE ANALYSIS PROJECT (GTAP)
The GTAP Database records the annual flows of goods and services for the entire
world economy in the benchmark years (2004 and 2007); it consists of bilateral trade,
transport, and protection matrices that link individual country/regional economic
databases (Walmsley et al. 2012). The most updated version (2012, eighth version)
covers 129 countries, 57 sectors, 5 factors for the two base years (Narayana et al.
2012). The GTAP Data Base can be used in comparative static and dynamic
- 273 -
computable general equilibrium models, which are applied to the economic analysis
of current global policy issues related to trade, energy and the environment.
Standard GTAP model that is a multi-region, multi-sector, computable general
equilibrium model (Hertel 1997b). From the initial shock of increased production due
to high yields, the model estimates consumption, trade, and price effects taking into
account inter-industry linkages as well as effects mediated through factor markets and
trade. Model assumptions are perfect competition, constant returns to scale, no inter-
temporal choice, and international trade in differentiated products (Armington
assumption).
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Annex 4: Ensuring a robust Marxan analysis
Marxan requires a significant investment in setting up the problem, calibrating the
algorithm, and running sensitivity tests to get robust results. I followed the Good
Practices Handbook (Ardron et al. 2010) guidance on the necessary steps in that
process. These included: (1) testing sensitivity of solutions to changes in parameters
and targets, (2) for solutions at all time steps checking both targets were met, (3) re-
adjusting parameters at each time step, (4) evaluating the quality of solutions in terms
of cost and objective function.
(1) The first step was to run Marxan for different conservation penalty factors (SPFs)
and conservation targets. The “Getting Started” manual recommended SPFs values
are 1, 2, 3 for each target, and their combinations (Game et al. 2008). The restoration
target was set by the different policy targets (targets one, two and three). Forest
connectivity targets tested were 80%, 90% and 100% of the total potential forest
connectivity change for that biogeographical subregion at that time step.
x Forest connectivity target at 90% was the best target in terms of a compromise
between solution cost-effectiveness and target met. This value was estimated
at each time step for the dynamic approach for all restoration targets.
x SPF combinations generated solutions in which targets were met for all runs,
or no target was met for any run. The best SPF combination will have some
runs meeting both targets, and some runs that don’t. I increased the SPF
combinations to test solutions and choose the best SPF combination for each
bioregion (table A4.1).
(2) At each time step, after the solution was obtained, I checked targets were met.
(3) For all targets, all SPF combinations were tested and the best combination for each
bioregion was chosen at each time step, and once for the static approach (figure A4.1
by restoration target). The final SPF combination for each region at each time step is
provided in tables A4.2, A4.3 and A4.4 by restoration target.
(4) For chosen solutions, I checked cost and targets met following the objective
function and compared with “best solution” outputs from Marxan.
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Table A4.1. Combinations of conservation penalty factors (SPFs) tested for targets
one and two. Target 1: restoration target; Target two: forest connectivity change target
(90% of the total potential forest connectivity change for that biogeographical
subregion at that time step).
Test Conservation penalty factor (SPF)
Target 1 Target two
1 1 1
2 1 1.5
3 1 2
4 1 2.5
5 1.5 1
6 1.5 1.5
7 1.5 2
8 1.5 2.5
9 2 1
10 2 1.5
11 2 2
12 2 2.5
13 2.5 1
14 2.5 1.5
15 2.5 2
16 2.5 2.5
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Table A4.2. Final Marxan parameters for restoration target one. Target 1: restoration
target one (15% of forest); Target two: forest connectivity change target (90% of the
total potential forest connectivity change for that biogeographical subregion at that
time step).
Prioritisation
stage
Biogeogeographical
Subregion
Target 1- restoration Target two- forest connectivityincrease
Amount (ha) SPF Amount (ha) SPF
Static
Florestas de Araucaria 489,110.7 1 73,220.2 1
Bahia 245,199.8 1.5 37,792.0 1.5
Brejos Nordestinos 48,813.9 1 13,017.7 1
Diamantina 182,031.6 1.5 38,475.0 1
Florestas de Interior 772,381.5 1.5 187,893.7 1
Pernambuco 63,390.0 1 18,913.7 2
Serra do Mar 548,187.9 1.5 151,198.1 1.5
Sao Francisco 327,245.1 1.5 80,752.1 1.5
Dynamic,
TS1
Florestas de Araucaria 163,037.0 1 29,660.1 1
Bahia 81,733.3 1.5 8,352.5 1.5
Brejos Nordestinos 16,271.3 1.5 4,497.4 1
Diamantina 60,677.3 1 10,776.8 1.5
Florestas de Interior 257,460.7 1.5 70,312.0 2
Pernambuco 21,130.0 1 4,850.4 1.5
Serra do Mar 182,729.3 2 70,178.6 1
Sao Francisco 109,081.7 1.5 30,078.5 1.5
Dynamic,
TS2
Florestas de Araucaria 163,036.9 1 30,735.9 1
Bahia 81,733.3 1 15,335.8 2
Brejos Nordestinos 16,271.3 1 4,866.9 1
Diamantina 60,677.2 1 8,851.7 1
Florestas de Interior 257,460.5 1 58,183.0 1.5
Pernambuco 21,130.0 1 3,802.7 2.5
Serra do Mar 182,729.3 1 52,937.2 2
Sao Francisco 109,081.7 1 28,433.8 2
Dynamic,
TS3
Florestas de Araucaria 163,036.9 1 38,848.8 2
Bahia 81,733.3 1 14,096.7 1
Brejos Nordestinos 16,271.3 1.5 4,670.3 2
Diamantina 60,677.2 1.5 13,309.0 1
Florestas de Interior 257,460.5 2.5 75,037.8 1
Pernambuco 21,130.0 1 8,160.4 1.5
Serra do Mar 182,729.3 1 52,340.4 2
Sao Francisco 109,081.7 1 32,116.2 1.5
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Table A4.3. Final Marxan parameters for restoration target two. Target 1: restoration
target two (bring to 30% forest landscape cover); Target two: forest connectivity
change target (90% of the total potential forest connectivity change for that
biogeographical subregion at that time step).
Prioritisation
stage
Biogeogeographical
Subregion
Target 1- restoration Target two- forest connectivityincrease
Amount (ha) SPF Amount (ha) SPF
Static
Florestas de Araucaria 2,203,241.8 1.5 396,294.7 1.5
Bahia 956,184.0 1.5 185,059.6 1.5
Brejos Nordestinos 88,478.2 1.5 19,260.4 1.5
Diamantina 479,630.2 1.5 90,510.3 1.5
Florestas de Interior 5,998,672.6 1.5 1,065,393.2 1.5
Pernambuco 308,308.7 1 80,152.2 1
Serra do Mar 327,979.0 1 87,015.4 1
Sao Francisco 232,020.3 1.5 53,924.0 1.5
Dynamic,
TS1
Florestas de Araucaria 734,414.0 1 88,552.9 1
Bahia 318,728.0 1.5 55,047.4 1.5
Brejos Nordestinos 29,492.7 1.5 6,604.2 1
Diamantina 159,876.7 1 26,132.2 1.5
Florestas de Interior 1,999,557.7 1.5 212,101.1 2
Pernambuco 102,769.7 1 19,242.7 1.5
Serra do Mar 109,326.3 2 43,292.2 1
Sao Francisco 77,340.0 1.5 23,006.6 1.5
Dynamic,
TS2
Florestas de Araucaria 734,413.9 1 168,480.7 1.5
Bahia 318,728.0 1.5 65,100.4 1.5
Brejos Nordestinos 29,492.7 1.5 7,218.1 1.5
Diamantina 159,876.7 1 36,799.4 1
Florestas de Interior 1,999,557.5 1.5 387,340.5 1.5
Pernambuco 102,769.6 2 29,029.8 1
Serra do Mar 109,326.3 1 33,078.5 1.5
Sao Francisco 77,340.1 1 21,590.0 1
Dynamic,
TS3
Florestas de Araucaria 734,413.9 1 185,849.7 2.5
Bahia 318,728.0 1.5 63,172.4 2.5
Brejos Nordestinos 29,492.7 1 9,229.4 1
Diamantina 159,876.7 1.5 37,771.4 2
Florestas de Interior 1,999,557.5 1.5 404,633.4 2.5
Pernambuco 102,769.6 1.5 33,724.3 1.5
Serra do Mar 109,326.3 1 31,560.6 2
Sao Francisco 77,340.1 2 22,135.2 1
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Table A4.4. Final Marxan parameters for restoration target three. Target 1: restoration
target three (total 15M ha); Target two: forest connectivity change target (90% of the
total potential forest connectivity change for that biogeographical subregion at that
time step).
Prioritisation
stage
Biogeogeographical
Subregion
Target 1- restoration Target two- forestconnectivity increase
Amount (ha) SPF Amount (ha) SPF
Static
Florestas de Araucaria 3,099,099.9 1.5 569,999.0 1.5
Bahia 1,475,547.3 1.5 287,494.1 1.5
Brejos Nordestinos 227,962.8 2 53,984.1 2
Diamantina 976,622.6 1.5 202,066.5 1.5
Florestas de Interior 6,415,806.6 1.5 1,141,375.2 1.5
Pernambuco 429,682.2 1 111,240.1 1.5
Serra do Mar 1,458,540.1 1 392,924.4 1
Sao Francisco 916,738.5 2 210,542.0 1.5
Dynamic, TS1
Florestas de Araucaria 1,033,033.3 1 117,537.1 1
Bahia 491,849.0 1.5 86,518.0 1.5
Brejos Nordestinos 75,987.7 1.5 16,504.7 1
Diamantina 325,541.0 1 56,075.3 1.5
Florestas de Interior 2,138,602.3 1.5 222,879.6 2
Pernambuco 143,227.3 1 24,093.5 1.5
Serra do Mar 486,180.0 2 123,864.7 1
Sao Francisco 305,579.7 1.5 62,149.6 1.5
Dynamic, TS2
Florestas de Araucaria 1,033,033.3 1.5 229,566.1 1.5
Bahia 491,849.1 1 110,832.0 2.5
Brejos Nordestinos 75,987.6 2 19,079.5 1.5
Diamantina 325,540.9 1.5 75,660.5 2
Florestas de Interior 2,138,602.2 1.5 405,816.8 1.5
Pernambuco 143,227.4 1 40,769.0 1.5
Serra do Mar 486,180.0 1 142,015.1 1
Sao Francisco 305,579.5 1 78,375.5 2
Dynamic, TS3
Florestas de Araucaria 1,033,033.3 1.5 234,480.3 2
Bahia 491,849.1 1.5 93,743.9 2
Brejos Nordestinos 75,987.6 1.5 19,991.4 1.5
Diamantina 325,540.9 1.5 67,530.8 1
Florestas de Interior 2,138,602.2 1.5 435,316.3 1
Pernambuco 143,227.4 1.5 39,159.2 1.5
Serra do Mar 486,180.0 1 142,047.7 2.5
Sao Francisco 305,579.5 1.5 74,490.8 1
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Annex 5: Detailed description of results for chapter 4
2.1 General aggregated solutions (BAF level)
The summed forest connectivity benefits are 0.74 ± 0.0004 million hectares (M ha) for
the static solution, and 0.71 ± 0.0007M ha for the dynamic solution (table 4.3). These
forest connectivity increments are the equivalent of adding one large forest patch of
0.74M ha or 0.71M ha under the static or dynamic approach respectively. The
percentage of each set-aside hectare that directly increases forest connectivity is 27.6
±0.0001% for the static solution and 26.4 ±0.0003% for the dynamic solution.
Informational rent capture is 963 mill. $ in the static solution and 1,286 mill. $ in the
dynamic solution (table 4.3). For each dollar spent, 25% is captured as informational
rents for the static approach, and 36% for the dynamic approach (table 4.3).
Effect of the economic feedback
The effect of the economic feedback on prioritisation outputs varies with
biogeographical region. For most regions, the cost per hectare for the dynamic solution
is lower than the static solution, percentage differences varying between 1% and 29%
(table 4.4, figure 4.4). However, for two regions the cost per hectare for the static
solution is slightly smaller than for the dynamic solution (Florestas de Araucaria 3.4%,
Serra do Mar 0.98%) (table 4.4, figure 4.4).
Informational rent capture is higher for the dynamic solution across biogeographical
regions (figure 4.4), with the percentage difference varying from 7% to 81% (table 4.4,
figure 4.4). The difference in the percentage of each dollar spent that is captured in
informational rents varies from 11% to 89% (table 4.4, figure 4.4).
Set-aside cost-effectiveness for most regions increases when accounting for the
feedback on land rent extraction, the dynamic solution being 1-5% more cost effective
than the static solution. In Florestas de Interior set-aside cost-effectiveness for the
dynamic solution is 40.8% higher than the static solution (table 4.4, figure 4.4). In
Florestas de Araucaria and Serra do Mar, however, set-aside cost-effectiveness is
3.3% and 0.97% higher for the static solution, respectively (table 4.4).
Effect of the environmental feedback
The effect of the environmental feedback on prioritisation outputs varies widely with
the biogeographical region. For most regions, forest connectivity increment is higher
for the static solution (figure 4.4), the difference varying between 1.7% and 28.5%
between solutions (table 4.4). Exceptions are Florestas de Interior and Serra do Mar,
for which forest connectivity increment for the dynamic solution is higher than the static
(table 4.4).
Differences in the cost-effectiveness of forest connectivity increment between
solutions can go both ways, considering results at the biogeographical region level
(figure 4.4). In five regions, cost-effectiveness is higher for the static solution, with
percentage differences between 0.3% and 25.2% (table 4.4). In three regions,
however, the opposite is observed, with percentage differences under 1%, except in
Florestas de Interior where forest connectivity increment cost-effectiveness is 50%
higher for the dynamic solution (table 4.4).
2.2 Solutions across space
Economic Feedback
The economic feedback effectively increases the opportunity cost of land, and
accounting for it when prioritising translates into a small decrease in overall cost of the
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dynamic versus the static solution at the biogeographical region of the BAF as a whole.
At the municipality level, the difference in cost per hectare between approaches varies
with the region; with Florestas de Araucaria and Serra do Mar presenting the largest
variability in differences (figure 4.4). Spatially, there are more municipalities where the
increase in the opportunity cost of land is larger for the dynamic approach than for the
static approach, and reaches higher values (figure 4.8a). Informational rent capture
per hectare follows a similar spatial pattern to cost per hectare for municipalities where
there is no difference or which are included only in the static solution.
Environmental Feedback
The environmental feedback makes increases in forest connectivity larger for
municipalities included in a solution repeatedly over time. Accounting for it in the
prioritisation results in a small difference in overall forest connectivity increment at the
biogeographical region, for which the static solution had larger increment than the
dynamic solution. At the municipality level, the difference in forest connectivity
increment per hectare between approaches varies with the region; with Florestas de
Interior and Serra do Mar presenting the largest variability in differences (figure 2).
2.3 Solutions across time
Aggregate solutions
The annual cost of the static solution is higher than the annual cost of the dynamic
solution at all time steps, both solutions increasing in annual cost with time. The largest
increment in annual cost is between time steps one and two for the static approach,
and between time steps two and three for the dynamic approach. Annual set-aside
cost-effectiveness also increases with time for both solutions, but the dynamic solution
is more cost effective at all time steps. The largest increase in set-aside cost-
effectiveness is between time steps two and three for both solutions (figure 4.6).
Both annual forest connectivity increment and its cost-effectiveness have similar
behaviour across time. Initially, the dynamic solution has a higher value for both
variables, but by time step two the static solution has the highest values. For both
solutions, both annual forest connectivity increment and its cost-effectiveness
increases with time, and the largest increment takes place between time steps two
and three (figure 4.6).
Annual informational rent capture is highest for the dynamic solution at all time steps,
and decreases with time for both solutions. The largest reduction in informational rent
capture per year takes place between time steps one and two for both solutions.
However, for the static solution, it continues to decrease sharply between time steps
two and three, whereas for the dynamic solution it remains similar. The proportion of
each dollar spent that is captured in informational rent per year presents almost
opposite behaviour across time for static and dynamic solutions. The dynamic solution
remains similar between time steps one and two, and increases sharply between time
steps two and three. The static solution decreases linearly at each time step (figure
4.6).
Effect of the economic feedback
At the BAF level, the difference in outputs between the static and dynamic solution
presents different behaviours over time. The percentage difference between
approaches in annual informational rent, and in the proportion captured from each
dollar spent increases sharply at each time step, from under 5% to over 1000% (data
not included).
- 282 -
Percentage difference in annual cost increases between time steps one and two, and
slightly decreases between two and three. The opposite is observed for percentage
difference in set-aside cost-effectiveness. For both variables, the largest change in the
difference between static and dynamic solution outputs takes place between time
steps one and two (data not included).
At the biogeographical region, however, differences in outputs between static and
dynamic solutions across time are not homogeneous. Percentage difference in annual
cost remains between -10% and 10% across time for most regions. For these regions,
the percentage difference in annual cost increases between time steps one and two,
and remains similar between time steps two and three for most regions (figure 4.5).
One exception is Florestas de Interior, where percentage difference in annual cost is
above 30% at time steps one and two, declining by more than half at time step 3. The
second exception is Pernambuco, where percentage difference in annual cost
increases from approximately -16% to 21% between time-steps one and two, and
sharply decreases to -6% at time step three. A mirrored behaviour is observed for
percentage difference in set-aside cost-effectiveness (figure 4.5).
Effect of environmental feedback
The percentage difference both in forest connectivity increment and its cost-
effectiveness between the static and dynamic solution increases with time at the BAF
level, with the largest change in the difference happening between time steps one and
two (data not included). The same behaviour is observed at the biogeographical region
level, with Florestas de Interior clearly presenting the largest changes in percentage
difference of forest connectivity (total and per dollar) across time (figure 4.5).
2.4 Municipality characteristics and the effect of feedbacks
The largest significant effect on cost per hectare difference between municipalities is
the biogeographical region. Smaller significant effects of municipality characteristics
are the amount of potential set-aside land, initial forest connectivity and the amount of
variation within the municipality in the opportunity cost of farmland (SM table 6, model
1). The larger the potential set-aside in the municipality, the smaller the value of the
difference in cost per hectare. The same relationship is observed for variation in the
opportunity cost of farmland. However, the larger the municipality’s forest connectivity,
the larger the value of the difference in cost per hectare. So, for biogeographical
regions with a negative coefficient, such as Florestas de Araucaria and Serra do Mar,
the static approach results in lower cost per hectare values, but as variation in the
opportunity cost of farmland increases, the dynamic approach becomes a better
solution. For the remaining regions, larger municipality forest connectivity and
potential set-aside values reduce the cost per hectare benefits of a dynamic approach,
whereas larger variation in opportunity cost of farmland increases the benefit (SM table
6, model 1).
The largest effect on the difference in informational rent capture per hectare is also
the biogeographical region, however, the only significant factor is Florestas de Interior.
Municipality characteristics that have a significant effect are the amount of potential
set-aside, forest connectivity and variation in the opportunity cost of farmland (SM
table 6, model 2). Larger municipality forest connectivity and potential set-aside values
reduce the difference in informational rent capture per hectare, whereas larger
variation in opportunity cost of farmland increases it (SM table 6, model 2).
The largest significant effect on forest connectivity increment per hectare difference is
the biogeographical region, however, Florestas the Interior and Serra do Mar are non-
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significant levels. Smaller significant effects of municipality characteristics are of
potential set-aside, and variation in opportunity cost of farmland (SM table 6, model
3). For all regions, the larger the municipality’s variation in opportunity cost of farmland
and potential set-aside, the smaller the value of the difference in forest connectivity
increment per hectare, and the smaller the benefit of a dynamic approach (SM table
6, model 3).
The largest effects on set-aside cost-effectiveness difference come from the
biogeographical region, but only half of the levels have a significant effect: Brejos
Nordestinos, Diamantina, Pernambuco and Sao Francisco (SM table 6, model 4).
Potential set-aside, forest connectivity and variation in the opportunity cost of farmland
all have significant, though small, effects on set-aside cost-effectiveness difference. In
Florestas de Araucaria and Interior, and Serra do mar, the larger the municipality’s
forest connectivity, the larger the value of the difference in set-aside cost-
effectiveness, and the larger the benefit of a dynamic approach. However, for the
remaining regions, the difference first gets to zero and only after that there are benefits
of a dynamic approach. In all biogeographical subregions the larger the municipality’s
variation in the opportunity cost of farmland and potential set-aside, the smaller the
value of the difference in forest connectivity increment per hectare, and the larger the
benefit of a static approach (SM table 6, model 4).
The largest significant effect on the difference in the proportional capture of
informational rent is the biogeographical region, however, Florestas the Interior and
Serra do Mar have non-significant effects. Smaller significant effects of municipality
characteristics are of potential set-aside, and variation in opportunity cost of farmland
(SM table 6, model 5). The larger the municipality’s potential set-aside and variation
in the opportunity cost of farmland, the smaller the value of the difference in the
proportional capture of informational rent. The larger the municipality’s forest
connectivity, the larger the value of the difference in the proportional capture of
informational rent (SM table 6, model 5).
Significant effects on forest connectivity cost-effectiveness include municipality’s
variation in the opportunity cost of farmland, and some levels of the biogeographical
regions factor (Florestas de Interior, Brejos Nordestinos, Diamantina and Sao
Francisco). Municipality’s potential set-aside is non-significant but its removal did not
result in a better model as measured by AIC (p= 0.1009). For all regions, the larger
the municipality’s variation in opportunity cost of farmland and potential set-aside, the
smaller the value of the difference in forest connectivity increment per hectare, and
the smaller the benefit of a dynamic approach (SM table 6, model 6).
